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Across Canada, transplant waitlists far outweigh the organs and tissue made available by the 
current post-mortem donation system. Every transplant donor is critical to alleviate the ever-
growing demand for organs and tissue and there is significant potential for increased donations. 
Every donation statute in Canada invokes an exception to the deceased’s prior consent being 
binding. The next of kin’s power to veto decisions concerning post-mortem donations violates 
donor autonomy and neither the common law nor statutes explain how this veto should be 
interpreted and applied. The result is a system of organ donation that depends significantly on the 
altruism of surviving family members and ignores the need for increased donations. Issues with the 
current donation frameworks are illuminated by a wills and intestacy analogy. 
 
Basic principles of property law can and should guide lawmakers to meaningful reform of the 
donation systems. Post-mortem donative instructions should be viewed as sacrosanct, much like 
the testator’s instructions are viewed in the law of wills. Our choices concerning where our post-
mortem body parts go are not safeguarded by the same protections afforded to our choices 
concerning property. This thesis explores the evolution of the common law of ownership regarding 
the human body and body parts, as well as the historical development of Canada’s donation 
legislation and the meaning of property in theories of jurisprudence. The enforceability of 
ownership rights in organs and tissue is consistent with popular definitions of property and 
substantiated further by ostensibly contrasting theoretical views of jurisprudence. This thesis 
contrasts presumed consent and mandated choice systems of organ donation and proposes an 
improved system of presumed consent that carefully qualifies the role of family, safeguards 
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Few things, if any, are as valuable, rare and sought after as donated organs and tissue. Their demand 
far outweighs their availability, and while hundreds of Canadians die every year waiting for a 
transplant,1 thousands more remain on waitlists2 and continue their race against time. 
Saskatchewan’s organ donation campaign claims that one deceased donor has the potential to 
provide 8 organ transplants3 and can improve the lives of more than 75 people through tissue 
transplantation.4 But according to the Saskatchewan Health Authority, transplants are only 
medically feasible in approximately 5 percent of all deaths.5 Another expert suggests this rate is 
actually lower and closer to 2 percent.6  
 
While these estimates may sound low, they actually mean that of the estimated 9,694 people that 
died in Saskatchewan in 2018/20197, an estimated 194 (2%) to 485 (5%) of people were clinically 
qualified to donate. However, of those hundreds of potential transplant sources, there were only 16 
actual post-mortem donors in the province in 2018.8 Such a low donation rate is a grim reality and 
one that is underscored by the fact that approximately 125 individuals were remaining on 
Saskatchewan’s transplant waitlist by the end of 2018.9  
 
The Saskatchewan example, above, is not unique. Across Canada, this concerning ratio is common. 
Waitlists far outweigh the organs and tissue that are made available by the current post-mortem 
donation system. Nationally, an estimated 287,275 people died in Canada in 2018/2019,10 and of 
that large pool of deceased people, only 762 individuals actually had their organs or tissue donated 
after death.11 Let that sink in.  
 
It is clear that every single source for transplant is critical to alleviate the ever-growing demand for 
organs and tissue. It is also clear that there is significant potential for increased donations if organ 
donation systems effectively tapped into the deceased donor pool. After all, if it is true that 2 to 5 
percent of deaths allow for organ donation, then of the 287,275 people that died in Canada in 2018, 
 
1 In 2018, 223 Canadians died while waiting for a single or combination transplant. See Canadian Institute for Health 
Information, e-Statistics Report on Transplant, Waiting List and Donor Statistics: 2018 Cumulative Report, January 
1 to December 31, Canada, 2018, online: <https://www.cihi.ca/en/e-statistics-on-organ-transplants-waiting-lists-and-
donors> at Table 2C [CIHI, 2018 Cumulative Report]. 
2 There were 4,492 Canadians awaiting single (4,351) or combination (141) transplants in 2018. For waiting list 
statistics re single transplants. See ibid at Table 2B. 
3 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Deceased Organ Donor Potential in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Institute 
for Health Information, 2014), online: <https://secure.cihi.ca/free_products/OrganDonorReport_ENweb.pdf> at 4 
[CIHI, Deceased Organ Donor Potential in Canada]. 
4 Saskatchewan Health Authority, “About Donation”, online: <https://www.saskhealthauthority.ca/Services-
Locations/organ-tissue-donation/Pages/AboutDonation.aspx> [SHA, “About Donation”]. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Sarah Appleby, Canadian Blood Services Director of organ and tissue donation and transplantation, quoted in 
Meghan Collie, “More than 200 Canadians died while waiting for organ transplants in 2018: report” (5 December 
2019), online: Global News <https://globalnews.ca/news/6253000/canada-organ-donation-supply/>. 
7 Statistics Canada, “Estimates of the components of demographic growth, annual: Table 17-10-0008-01”, online: 
<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1710000801> [Statistics Canada, “Table 17-10-0008-01”]. 
8 CIHI, 2018 Summary Statistics, supra note 1 at Table 4. 
9 Ibid at Table 2A. 
10 Statistics Canada, “Table 17-10-0008-01”, supra note 7.  





there were between an estimated 4,984 (2%-762) and 13,601 (5%-762) untapped deceased donors. 
Even a fraction of that pool could have significantly shrunk the transplant waitlists or even 
eliminated them altogether.  
 
In 2014, the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) released their findings from a study 
on deceased organ donor potential in Canada.12 It concluded that there was indeed room to increase 
post-mortem donation throughout the country. According to CIHI, an effective post-mortem 
donation system requires improving specific components, “from identifying and referring potential 
donors, to securing patient consent, to managing donors during the dying process, to ensuring 
hospital resources are in place for organ recovery and that a suitable match is found for 
transplantation.”13 This thesis focuses on the first two components identified by CIHI, namely 
“identifying and referring potential donors” and “securing patient consent”.  
 
How do we get to a better donation model that improves these two complex and equally important 
aspects, and why have attempts at reform been insufficient to date? In this thesis, I suggest one 
way forward is by looking at the organ donation conundrum through a property law lens. After all, 
it is not uncommon to look at challenges from different angles, and sometimes a new look at an 
old problem is the push forward to truly impactful and principled solutions. Accordingly, I suggest 
that basic principles of property law can and should guide lawmakers to meaningful reform of the 
donation system. 
 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I begin by arguing that Canada’s current donation frameworks seem 
married to principles of altruism and substitute decision-making. It is a fact that every single 
donation statute in Canada, new and old, invokes an exception to the deceased’s prior consent being 
binding. For example, Saskatchewan’s legislation provides that “[n]o person shall act on a consent 
given pursuant to this section if he or she has reason to believe that the consent was subsequently 
withdrawn.”14 This provision effectively prohibits organ and tissue procurement if there is any 
reason to believe the deceased’s legally binding consent to donate was subsequently withdrawn. 
Inclusion of these “consent is binding authority exceptions” has helped enable the common practice 
by provincial donation agencies of advertising statements like: “…it's crucial you have this 
conversation with family because their consent will be required”;15 or “[a]fter talking about 
[donating] with your family, they will be asked to sign a consent form saying they have been 
informed about, and agree with, the donation process… Tell them what you want to happen when 
you die… Family members will feel better about their decision if they have talked to you and know 
 
12 CIHI, Deceased Organ Donor Potential in Canada, supra note 3. 
13 Ibid at 7. 
14 The Human Tissue Gift Act, 2015, SS 2015 c H-15.1, s 7(4). For provisions in other provinces to the same effect 
see Human Tissue Gift Act, RSBC 1996, c 21, s 4(4); Human Tissue and Organ Donation Act, SA 2006, c H-14.5, s 
8(3)(a); The Human Tissue Gift Act, SM 1987-88, c 39, CCSM c H180, s 2(3)(a); Trillium Gift of Life Network Act, 
RSO 1990 c H.20, s 4(3); Human Tissue Gift Act, RSNB 2014, c 113, s 4(3)(a); Human Tissue Gift Act, RSNS 1989, 
c 215 (repealed; repeal in force January 18, 2021), s 5(3) [Nova Scotia Act (1989)]; Human Tissue Gift Act, SNS 
2010, c 36 (repealed, repeal in force January 18, 2021)]; Human Organ and Tissue Donation Act, SNS 2019, c 6 (in 
force January 18, 2021), s 15(1) [Nova Scotia Act (2019)]; Human Tissue Donation Act, RSPEI 1988, c H-12.1, s 
10(2)(a); Human Tissue Act, RSNL 1990, c H-15, s 6(3); Human Tissue Gift Act, RSY 2002, c 117, s 4(3); Human 
Tissue Donation Act, SNWT 2014, c 30, s 12(2)(a); and Human Tissue Act, RSNWT (Nu) 1988, c H-6, s 1(2)(a). 





what you want.”16 It seems that, regardless of whether we record our consent legally in accordance 
with the provincial statutes, next of kin are the ultimate decision-makers when it comes to post-
mortem organ and tissue donation. In Chapter 1, I argue that this dependence and an over-reliance 
on altruism can be traced to the development of the common law concerning ownership of human 
bodies and body parts, and so too can the historical evolution of Canada’s provincial donation 
statutes.  
 
Chapter 2 will then explore two significant components of the organ donation framework: 
individual autonomy and the public need for increased donations. Responding to the public need 
for increased donations will require effective identification of potential donors. At the same time, 
protecting individual autonomy must also be central to any donation framework and therefore 
safeguarding patient consent is also vital. To further illuminate how autonomy and public policy 
are offended by the current donation frameworks, Chapter 2 will pose a wills and intestacy analogy 
to illustrate how our society imposes strict legal rules over the disposal of testamentary property 
by will or by intestacy procedures, but then refrains from extending similar approaches and 
principles to the disposition of post-mortem organs and tissue. 
 
Chapter 3 will investigate the age-old question: “what is property?” Through a review of property 
principles and theory, we will consider why organs and tissue have generally not been subject to 
personal property rights and whether there should be personal property ownership in our organs 
and tissue. If we suppose that organs and tissue are property for the purposes of post-mortem 
donation, then it should follow that donor and non-donor instruction should be protected and legal 
mechanisms should be in place to mitigate against the waste of viable organs and tissue, thereby 
appealing to both individual autonomy and the public interest of increasing donation rates.  
 
Chapter 4 will compare mandated choice and presumed consent systems of organ donation. In 
doing so, we will look beyond Canada, to the United States and Europe, to see if other countries 
have been successful at striking a balance between protecting individual autonomy while at the 
same time increasing donations. In reviewing these foreign systems and results from domestic and 
international surveys on presumed consent, I argue that the default mechanism of the presumed 
consent system, while largely misunderstood by society, is a key component that can set presumed 
consent above all other frameworks and offers the best avenue to a balanced system.  
 
In Chapter 5, the final chapter of this thesis, I will argue that a reformed presumed consent system 
can work to balance donor and non-donor autonomy against the public’s need for increased 
donations. In establishing this argument, I will outline specific components that would be necessary 
for a reformed presumed consent system to strike the correct balance.  
 
Ultimately, this thesis aims to show how a property law lens inspires meaningful and large-scale 
reform to the ongoing donation problem. Not everyone will agree with taking a property lens to 
this issue; however, I believe this thesis can add value to the already considerable literature and 
debate on the topic. People have a common understanding of – and appreciation for – property. In 
some form or another, property is vital to everything we do, and this important relationship we 
 







have with property is recognized and given effect by property law. In my view, there are critically 
important relationships between people and post-mortem organs and tissue that have fallen into a 
gap in the law which has helped enable the donation problem. Property law not only helps to 
explain these relationships but can also expand to recognize this area in a way that effects 




































Overview of Canada’s Donation Model 
 
Provincial and territorial statutes outline the procedural framework for post-mortem organ and 
tissue donation. Today, all provinces and territories in Canada have implemented legislation 
concerning human organ and tissue donation.1 What is evident upon review of the procedural 
frameworks governing post-mortem donation across Canada are the common features of “altruism” 
and “substitute consent”.2 These are two key components of post-mortem donation and are not the 
only similar features among the jurisdictional models. Across Canada, post-mortem organ donation 
models are largely uniform and provide near identical powers for donors and substitute decision-
makers. The reason for this is twofold and can be traced to the development of the common law 
concerning ownership of human bodies and body parts as well as to the evolution of donation 
statutes in Canada. What follows is a summary of both of those areas.  
 
1.1 The Common Law of Ownership Regarding the Human Body and Body Parts  
 
a) Ownership in a Living Human Body: 
At common law, the concept of property tends to centre around the elements of possession, use and 
ownership.3 In the most basic sense, we indeed possess and use our bodies in our day-to-day life. 
Yet, in the legal sense, the common law has long-held that a living human body is incapable of 
being owned.4 Correlating to this rule was the common law’s age-old perception that people do not 
even possess their own body or body parts.5 The effects of these principles have been many. For 
example, if we cannot own our bodies, then we cannot own another person’s body and thus people 
cannot be sold or bought.6  
 
Although the common law abstains from explicitly recognizing property in the living human body, 
laws have been established to protect bodily integrity and autonomy.7 For example, the law at one 
 
1 See Human Tissue Gift Act, RSBC 1996, c 211 [BC Act]; Human Tissue and Organ Donation Act, SA 2006, c H-
14.5 [Alberta Act]; The Human Tissue Gift Act, 2015, SS 2015 c H-15.1 [2015 Saskatchewan Act]; Human Tissue 
Gift Act, SM 1987-88, c 39, CCSM c H180 [Manitoba Act]; Trillium Gift of Life Network Act, RSO 1990 c H.20 
[Ontario Act]; Human Tissue Gift Act, RSNB 2014, c 113; Human Tissue Gift Act, RSNS 1989, c 215 [repealed; 
repeal in force January 18, 2021]; Human Tissue Gift Act, SNS 2010, c 36 [repealed, repeal in force January 18, 
2021]; Human Organ and Tissue Donation Act, SNS 2019, c 6 [in force January 18, 2021] [Nova Scotia Act (2019)]; 
Human Tissue Donation Act, RSPEI 1988, c H-12.1; Human Tissue Act, RSNL 1990, c H-15; Human Tissue Gift 
Act, RSY 2002, c 117; Human Tissue Donation Act, SNWT 2014, c 30; Human Tissue Act, RSNWT (Nu) 1988, c H-
6 [Nunavut Act]. 
2 See Joan M. Gilmour, ““Our” Bodies: Property Rights in Human Tissue” (1993) 8:2 Can J L & Soc 113 at 116. See 
also Barbara von Tigerstrom, “Human Tissue Legislation and a New Medical Paradigm: Governing Tissue 
Engineering in Canada” (2015) 8:2 McGill JL & Health S1 at S11. 
3 Lam v University of British Columbia, 2013 BCSC 2094 at para 31, 20 BLR (5th) 139 [Lam (2013 BCSC)]; aff’d 
2015 BCCA 2, [2015] 4 WWR 213 [Lam (2015 BCCA)]. 
4 Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust, [2009] EWCA Civ 37 at para 30, [2010] QB 1 [Yearworth]. 
5 Ibid at para 30, citing R v Bentham, [2005] UKHL 18, [2005] 1 WLR 1057.  
6 Notwithstanding these principles, the slave trade certainly recognized a proprietary interest in the human body 
between the 17th and 19th centuries in Canada. It wasn’t until the 19th century that the law prohibited ownership of 
other people and thus the sale of others and ourselves was also barred. The Court in Yearworth noted that it took 
until the nineteenth century for the law to recognize that our bodies cannot be the property of other persons if they 
cannot be our own property. See Yearworth, ibid. 





point prohibited the destruction of our own bodies, since we ought not destroy what we do not 
own.8 Hence, attempting suicide was considered a criminal act and was punishable under Canada’s 
first Criminal Code, enacted in 1892.9 In 1972, 80-years after enacting that prohibition, Parliament 
decriminalized attempted suicide.10 Interestingly too, is that in 2015 physician assisted suicide was 
also decriminalized.11  
 
The law’s evolution concerning suicide does not necessarily depart from the age-old notion that 
‘suicide is a sin’, but its evolution could be attributed to a modern interpretation that ‘any person 
in their right mind would not kill themselves’ and since ‘we ought not destroy what we do not 
own’, the court’s intervention is necessary to establish who meets the legal threshold for assisted 
suicide. This modern interpretation could be consistent with the notion that we ‘do not own our 
bodies’, or in contrast it could be a signal that the law is evolving to establish more protections for 
bodily integrity and autonomy.  
 
b) Ownership in Parts of a Human Body:  
i. Conversion of Excised Organs and Tissue 
As previously noted, the common law has long held that a living human body is incapable of being 
owned.12 This foundational principle has affected the common law approach to ownership in 
human body parts. For over two decades, the 1990 case of Moore v Regents of the University of 
California was widely recognized as a leading authority on the law of ownership of parts excised 
from a living human body.13 Although an American precedent, it has served as a persuasive 
decision in Canada.14 The case concerned a patient who had consented to the removal of his spleen 
and other parts of his body (i.e. blood, blood serum, skin, bone marrow aspirate, and sperm) on the 
representation that such tests were essential for his health and well-being.15 However, unbeknownst 
to the patient, the doctors and others were using his cells to generate a cell-line with high economic 
 
8 The concept that “we ought not destroy what we do not own” has age-old religious roots. Per 1 Corinthians 6:19-
20, “Know ye not, that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost, which is in you, whom ye have of God? and ye 
are not your own, For ye are bought for a price: therefore glorify God in your body, and in your spirit: for they are 
God’s”: The holy Bible: that is, the sacred Scriptures contained in the Old and New Testament (London: M. Lewis, 
Paternoster-Row, 1775) at 1019. The concept has also been analyzed in early theory. Per John Locke, “…no body 
can transfer to another more power than he has in himself; and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, 
or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another.” See Chapter XI “of the extent 
of the legislative power” in Second Treatise of Government (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1980) online <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm>. 
9 Criminal Code, 1892, SC 1892, c 29, ss 237, 238 (repealed). See also Florence Kellner, “Suicide in Canada” (2006 
July 2; last edited 2016 October 3) The Canadian Encyclopedia, online: 
<http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/suicide/> [Kellner]. 
10 Kellner, supra note 9. 
11 Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331. What the decriminalization of assisted 
suicide arguably signifies, at least in the ‘patient autonomy’ aspect of the organ donation context, will be discussed 
in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
12 Yearworth, supra note 4 at para 30. 
13 Moore v Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal (3d) 120 (1990), 793 P2d 479 [Moore]. 
14 The Court in Piljak Estate v Abraham, 2014 ONSC 2893, [2014] OJ No 2665 (QL) [Piljak] relies on the 
conclusions of Dr. Carol C. Cheung et al. in “Defining diagnostic tissue in the era of personalized medicine” (2013) 
185:2 CMAJ, 135-139, concerning who “owns” excised human tissue. In that article, the authors cite to Moore, 
supra note 13, for the principle that a patient does not have a proprietary interest in excised cells. At para 26 of 
Piljak, Master Dash states “[t]he authors note that their conclusion has been supported by American jurisprudence. 
While this is not binding on me I find the reasoning [compelling] and I adopt its conclusions.” 





potential.16 The patient’s action for breach of fiduciary duty succeeded while his action in 
conversion did not.  
 
The patient in Moore submitted that the defendants improperly interfered with his right of 
possession, use or control of his property, and that he continued to own his cells after their removal 
from his body and never consented to their use in medical research.17 The majority held that 
conversion did not apply because the subject matter of the patented cell-line and all products 
derived from it were not the patient’s property. There was no expectation that the patient would 
retain possession of his cells once they had been removed from his body, and to establish 
conversion the patient would have had to retain a sufficient ownership interest in them.18 The Court 
held that theories of fiduciary duty and informed consent are sufficient to cover the interests of the 
patient in a case such as this. A breach of fiduciary duty or lack of informed consent can form the 
basis for an action, and therefore doctors must “disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient’s 
health, whether research or economic, that may affect [the patient’s] medical judgment.”19 
However, the Court determined that it would be unreasonable to hold researchers liable for 
conversion when they may unknowingly be in possession of body parts that were not authorized 
for use in research by the patient.20 It would be an issue of public policy if that sort of liability 
existed as it could seriously hinder important research and advancements in healthcare. The Court 
noted further that the law of conversion has well-established that a converter “is entitled to the 
benefit of any work or labor that he has expended on the [property]….”21 Thus, “if the great bulk 
of the value of a cell line patent and derivative products is attributable to the efforts of medical 
researchers and drug companies,…rather than to the “raw materials” taken from a patient…the 
patient’s damages will be correspondingly limited.”22 In this way, the common law of conversion 
requires body parts to have acquired additional attributes by work or skill in order to be considered 
property. But as we will see, conversion is not the only instance when ‘property’ can be declared 
in an excised body part.  
 
ii. Bailment of Sperm 
In the 2009 decision of Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust [Yearworth]23, the English and Wales 
Court of Appeal broke new ground in ruling that sperm was property. The claimants were patients 
and, having been diagnosed with cancer, they rendered samples of their sperm to be held at the 
defendant hospital before undergoing chemotherapy treatment. The samples were stored frozen in 
liquid nitrogen but subsequently thawed when the nitrogen levels fell too low. The hospital relied 
on the common law rule that an excised body part is incapable of being owned but the Court 
rejected this argument, finding that the claimants did have ownership in their sperm and that the 
claimants gratuitously bailed their sperm to the hospital. Therefore, the hospital was liable to the 
claimants under the law of bailment. Thus, while the common law required excised body parts to 
have acquired additional attributes by work or skill in order to be considered property, the common 




18 Ibid at 129. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid at 143-148. 
21 Ibid at 159, citing Harper et al., The Law of Torts (2d ed. 1986) § 2.34 at 234. 
22 Moore, supra note 13 at 159. 





of being property without such added attributes. The Court elaborated on this principle, stating at 
para 45: 
 
In this jurisdiction developments in medical science now require a reanalysis of the 
common law’s treatment of and approach to the issue of ownership of parts or 
products of a living human body, whether for present purposes (viz. an action in 
negligence) or otherwise.24  
 
iii. Stored Embryos 
In 2005, some 15 years after the Moore decision, claims of property in human biological material 
arose in Canada. At that time, the issue before Alberta’s Court of Queen’s Bench in C.C. v A.W. 
[C.C. v A.W.]25 was whether stored embryos are property. That case involved a gift of sperm by 
the respondent to the claimant for the purposes of assisting the claimant in conceiving children. 
Through the use of that sperm, embryos were created and the claimant conceived and delivered 
twins. The respondent refused to consent to the release of the remaining four embryos to the 
claimant from the fertility clinic in which they were stored. In assessing the context in which the 
gift of sperm was given, the Court noted that the respondent’s gift was unqualified; given in 
anticipation that the claimant would conceive children; and that the respondent was well-aware that 
the claimant could use the fertilized embryos “when and how she chose”.26 The Court concluded 
that stored embryos were indeed property, and as the chattel and property of the claimant, the 
respondent had no legal interest to “control or direct their use in any fashion”.27  
 
iv. Stored Sperm 
Since C.C. v A.W., other Canadian jurisdictions have concluded that stored sperm in particular 
contexts is property.28 One particular Canadian case considered a situation comparable to the 
Yearworth action. In Lam v University of British Columbia,29 the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia heard a case concerning the malfunction of a freezer storing hundreds of sperm samples. 
The freezer malfunction subsequently damaged the sperm. A class-action suit was brought against 
the defendant University by hundreds of donors and the Court held that the University was liable 
for the damage, ruling that sperm is property and falls within the definition of “goods” stored in a 
warehouse.30 The Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissed the University’s appeal and 






24 Ibid at para 45. 
25 C.C. v A.W., 2005 ABQB 290, 50 Alta LR (4th) 61. 
26 Ibid at para 21. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See also K.L.W. v Genesis Fertility Centre, 2016 BCSC 1621; J.C.M. v A.N.A., 2012 BCSC 584; Lam (2015 
BCCA), supra note 3; Kate Jane Bazley v Wesley Monash IVF Pty. Ltd., [2010] QSC 118 (Queensland SCTD); 
Jocelyn Edwards: Re the Estate of the late Mark Edwards, [2011] NSWSC 478. 
29 Lam (2013 BCSC), supra note 3. 
30 Ibid at para 49. 
31 Lam (2015 BCCA), supra note 3. The University sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and that 





v. Excised Diagnostic Tissues 
More recently, in the 2014 case of Piljak Estate v Abraham,32 the Ontario Superior Court concluded 
that excised human tissue was personal property. The deceased’s estate sought to have an 
inspection performed on tissue samples taken from prior medical tests, and the relevant statute 
allowed for the inspection of “personal property where it appears to be necessary for the proper 
determination of an issue in a proceeding.”33 Hence, the issue arose as to whether the excised 
human tissue was personal property. In concluding that the excised tissue was property, the Court 
affirmed that excised diagnostic tissue became part of the “medical record” once removed from a 
patient’s body and thus possession and ownership transferred from the patient to the institution or 
hospital.34 By this line of reasoning, the Court also adopted the view that the organs and tissue were 
the patient’s property up until the point that they became excised.35  
 
As we saw in the above discussion, the common law has long held that a living human body cannot 
be owned or possessed, but as we have seen, time and technology have carved out instances where 
the common law recognizes ownership of human biological material. Likewise, in the post-mortem 
context, the common law continues to abide by the general rule that there can be no ownership in 
a human corpse; however, courts have since carved out a number of exceptions to make findings 
of property in the dead. The following discussion provides an overview of the common law of 
property in the post-mortem context.  
 
c) The Human Corpse: “No Ownership” 
For centuries, the English common law held that a human corpse was incapable of being owned. 
There were several reasons for this longstanding rule. First, the common law held that ownership 
of a living human body is not possible.36 Likewise, the common law also held that a person cannot 
own his body or any part within it. Thus, it followed as nonsensical to expect ownership in a human 
corpse when it was impossible to hold ownership in a living human body.37 Second, the human 
body was perceived as the Holy Ghost’s temple. Anything done to the body beyond burial was 
considered sacrilegious.38 Third, conflicting claims of ownership over a corpse could slow down 
the burial process and increase the chance of disease spreading from the dead to the living. Before 
the days of modern refrigeration, a prompt burial was in the best interests of public health.39  
 
These reasons underscored the Court’s decision in the 1882 case of Williams v Williams.40 In that 
case, the testator died and the executors buried his body. In a codicil to his will, the testator 
instructed his executors to give his corpse to Ms. Williams, and by way of a letter, he instructed 
Ms. Williams to arrange for a specific cremation of his body and to place his ashes in a specified 
 
32 Piljak, supra note 14. In this case, the patient died of colorectal cancer. The patient’s estate brought an action in 
negligence against the doctor, alleging a breach in the standard of care by failing to detect the cancer in medical tests 
that he had previously performed on the patient. 
33 Ibid at para 17. 
34 Ibid at para 26. For “medical record”, see “records of personal health information” as defined in Hospital 
Management, RRO 1990, Reg 965 at s 1. 
35 Piljak, supra note 14 at para 26. 
36 Yearworth, supra note 4 at para 30. 
37 Ibid at para 31. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid . 






vase, and upon doing so, he instructed her to claim her expenses from the executors. Ms. Williams 
caused the corpse to be dug up, and following the testator’s written instruction, Ms. Williams 
attempted to claim her expenses against the executors. The Court dismissed her claim, holding that 
there was no property in the human corpse and that a body could not be disposed of by will. Since 
there was no property in the corpse, Ms. Williams had no right to have the corpse dug up and 
cremated, and it would be inequitable to order that Ms. Williams be reimbursed for expenses that 
she had no right to incur in the first place.  
 
i. The Human Corpse: “No Ownership” Exception #1: Preservation 
Property When Preserved for Exhibition 
Large developments to the common law of ownership in a human corpse came out of Australian 
courts, much as they had come out of English courts. In the 1908 Australian case of Doodeward v 
Spence41 a physician preserved the body of a two-headed stillborn baby in spirits. When the doctor 
eventually died, the subject matter was sold and came to be possessed by C, who showcased the 
“dead-born [fetal] monster” for profit.42 A police officer then seized it with the intent to have it 
buried and C brought an action for detinue. Finding in favour of C’s action, the majority held that 
a human corpse is capable of becoming property and that a person has a right to retain lawful 
possession of a body or body part where that person has exercised skill or work over the body or 
body part so as to give it attributes that differentiate the subject matter from that of a corpse or body 
part merely awaiting burial.43 The dissent held firm to the principle that there could be no ownership 
of a human corpse, while the majority essentially carved out the first exception to that rule.   
 
Not Property When Preserved for Autopsy  
In 1996, almost a century after Doodward v Spence was decided, the England and Wales Court of 
Appeal heard Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority and Another.44 In this case, a pathologist 
removed the brain from a woman who died of a brain tumour, and submerged it in paraffin wax to 
preserve it for his further examination, which never happened. The corpse was buried and the brain 
was brought to a second hospital for storage. The woman’s next of kin eventually began an action 
in negligence against her doctor and sought to have the brain examined for evidentiary purposes, 
however the preserved brain could not be located. The next of kin therefore brought a suit against 
a second doctor located at the second hospital on allegations that the second doctor either destroyed 
or misplaced the brain. Their action against the second doctor was struck on the basis that there 
was no reasonable cause of action, and their subsequent appeal was dismissed. In coming to its 
decision, the Court noted that it agreed with the Court’s determination in Doodeward, but when 
applying it to the facts of this case, it distinguished the brain preserved in paraffin wax from the 
Doodeward fetus preserved in spirits, noting that the fetus was preserved for future use as an exhibit 
whereas the brain was preserved only for further autopsy, and for no additional use beyond that. 
As such, the Court found that preservation does not always cause an object to become property and 
the process surrounding an autopsy will not render a body or body part into something capable of 
ownership. In this way, the Court determined that the brain never became something that the next 
of kin were entitled to possess.45 
 
41 (1908) 6 CNL 406, [1908] HCA 45 [Doodeward].  
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid.  
44 [1997] 1 WLR 596, [1996] 4 All ER 474 [Dobson]. 





Property When Preserved for Research and Teaching 
In 1997, the scope of the Court’s ruling in Dobson was put to the test in R v Kelly and Lindsay.46 
In that case, two defendants were charged, convicted and sentenced for theft of human body parts 
used for training purposes at the Royal College of Surgeons. In appealing their conviction and 
sentence, the defendants argued that they did not commit theft because the body parts were not 
property and were therefore not capable of being the subject of theft.47 The Court dismissed that 
argument, reiterating that a corpse alone cannot be the subject of property except if the corpse or 
parts thereof acquired different attributes from a person’s work or skill. On that point, the Court 
went one step further, expanding the range of attributes that a human corpse is capable of acquiring, 
finding that the body parts were the property of the Royal College of Surgeons because they were 
training materials and therefore had “a use or significance beyond their mere existence.”48 The 
Court made important observations about the common law’s view of property in human bodies: 
 
…the common law does not stand still. It may be that if, on some future occasion, 
the question arises, the courts will hold that human body parts are capable of being 
property for the purposes [of a particular piece of legislation], even without the 
acquisition of different attributes, if they have a use or significance beyond their 
mere existence. This may be so if, for example, they are intended for use in an organ 
transplant operation, for the extraction of DNA or, for that matter, as an exhibit in 
a trial.49  
 
Interestingly, the Court signals that organ transplantation may substantiate a finding of property in 
organs and tissue. In my view, if one intends to transfer their organs and tissue into the donation 
system for transplant into another person, those body parts quite obviously have “a use or 
significance beyond their mere existence.” From the Court’s reasoning in R v Kelly and Lindsay, it 
should therefore follow that those organs and tissue are property, at least for the purposes of 
determining those transfers pursuant to the donation legislation. However, as we have seen, courts 
make very narrow findings of property in body parts, and the question of whether there is property 
in organs and tissue for the purposes of facilitating a transplant pursuant to the donation legislation 
has yet to be tried in a court of law. This is somewhat confounding considering the donation 
legislation has been in effect for decades and the problems of low donation rates and autonomous 
interference are by no means new issues.  
 
De facto Property When Determining Proper Disposal 
With respect to bodies awaiting burial, in Re JS50 the England and Wales High Court reviewed the 
law concerning the disposal of a deceased body as established in Williams and observed that “[t]he 
administrator or executor of the estate has the right to possession of (but not property in) the body 
and the duty to arrange for its proper disposal.”51 However, as we will see in the Chapter 3 analysis 
of “what is property”, a right to possession is how property is generally distinguished from mere 
possession. Thus, even though the Court in Re JS insists otherwise, it effectively granted a limited 
form of property in the deceased’s body.  
 
46 [1999] QB 621, [1998] 3 All ER 741 [R v Kelly and Lindsay].  
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Re JS, [2016] EWHC 2859 (Fam) [Re JS]. 





The facts of the case concerned a 14-year-old terminally ill applicant seeking a means to decide 
what happens to her body at the end of her lifetime and after her death. More specifically, she 
sought to have her remains cryogenically frozen and stored indefinitely in a clinic in the United 
States. In approving her application, the Court noted that entrusting the child’s mother to arrange 
for the cryogenic freezing of the child’s body does not contravene the principle in Williams that a 
body is not property and therefore cannot be disposed of by will.52  
 
Thus, the Re JS principle is narrow and tells us that a person still cannot control how their own 
body is disposed of after death.53 Although a deceased person’s wishes are relevant, they are not 
binding on third parties. With the Williams principle in mind, the Court in Re JS makes clear that 
it “is not deciding or approving what should happen, but is selecting the person best placed to make 
those decisions after JS’s death.”54 In other words, the Court places no legal obligation whatsoever 
on the mother to carry out the deceased’s wishes.  
 
The narrow scope of Re JS is interesting because the common law has, in my view, added an 
exception to the general rule established in Williams, i.e. that there is no property in a corpse. The 
Court in Re JS gives a de facto property right to an executor or administrator, which includes what 
is to happen to the body after death. In doing so, it highlights the fact that there does not seem to 
be a principled reason for denying that same power to a person prior to their decease. Although 
“proper disposal” has yet to be defined, the Court signaled that customs change over time,55 which 
I take as meaning that the law can continue to recognize new ways to properly dispose of bodies 
and therefore new limited forms of property will develop as a result.56 
 
From this point of view, denying the right to dispose of one’s own body by will or similar 
testamentary instruments (like on a donor registration system, for example) seems contrary to the 
principle established in Re JS; which ultimately sought to identify the person in the best position 
to make post-mortem determinations on behalf of the deceased.57 Chapter 2 of this thesis will 
examine this notion further in the context of potential problems with Canada’s current donation 
frameworks. One of those problems, as we will see, is that the frameworks violate individual 
autonomy. In that chapter, I pose the intestacy and wills parallel to highlight the unprincipled nature 
of the current donation systems and to illuminate the connection that post-mortem donation has to 
 
52 Williams, supra note 40. 
53 Re JS, supra note 50 at 48. 
54 Ibid at 37. 
55 Ibid at 47. 
56 The scope of this thesis does not include hypothesizing as to whether a cryogenically frozen body takes on the 
same proprietary nature as that of frozen sperm as determined in Yearworth, supra note 4, or Lam (2013 BCSC), 
supra note 3; aff’d Lam (2015 BCCA), supra note 3, or perhaps as that of a the preserved fetus as determined in 
Doodeward, supra note 41. It is clear that courts determine property interests in human bodies and body parts 
narrowly and on a case-by-case basis. The nature of a cryogenically preserved body is apt to carve out a new 
exception to the rule that there is “no ownership in a human corpse” since this preserved version of a human body is 
unlike those that the courts have considered to date. For example, since a property interest vests in the frozen sperm’s 
donor, to whom would the property interest in a cryogenically frozen body vest? Would it vest in the deceased’s 
closest representative or would it vest in the company that conducted the preservation? What about in 200 years 
when all relatives of the cryogenically frozen body are gone? These questions fall beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
they are undoubtedly forthcoming issues for the courts to determine. 
57 The Court in Re JS, supra note 50 at para 37, acknowledges that this decision may encourage other pre-death 





property law, which Chapter 3 discusses in greater detail. Before we get there, though, it will be 
helpful to have a better understanding of how Canada’s current donation frameworks came to be. 
Accordingly, what follows the above overview of the common law is the historical development 
and legislative history of donation statutes in Canada.  
 
1.2 Historical Development of Canada’s Donation Legislation 
 
Three waves of legislation led us to our current donation framework, and the first wave can be 
traced back to the mid-nineteenth century.58 In 1849, legislation regarding human tissue arose in 
response to the increased demand for anatomical subjects and cadaveric research at Canadian 
medical schools.59 Around that time, legislation was adopted on the principle that unclaimed 
bodies, either publicly exposed or left in public institutions like hospitals or prisons, should be used 
for teaching purposes at medical schools.60 Since then, tissue transfer legislation has included a 
“bequeathal principle”, which authorizes people to “donate their bodies to medical science”.61 
Stemming from that earliest wave of human tissue legislation, approximately 600 bodies are 
supplied annually to medical schools under today’s provincial anatomy acts or statutes alike.62  
 
The second wave of human tissue legislation began a century later, in the 1950s, with the 
introduction of corneal transplant statutes that allowed for the treatment of various forms of 
blindness. In 1959, the Canadian Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Legislation (now the 
Uniform Law Conference of Canada or ULCC),63 proposed a Uniform Cornea Transplant Act,64 
 
58 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Procurement and Transfer of Human Tissues and Organs (Ottawa: Minister 
of Supply and Services Canada, 1992) at 127, online: 
<https://ia800809.us.archive.org/10/items/procurementtrans00lawr/procurementtrans00lawr.pdf> [LRCC]. 
59 Ibid at 129. See also von Tigerstrom, supra note 2 at S9. 
60 LRCC, supra note 58 at 128. The early practice of transferring unclaimed bodies to medical schools has raised the 
question as to whether some of the dead were a public property. See LRCC, supra note 58 at 128. 
61 Ibid at 129. See also Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, Proceedings of the 
Fifty-Third Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (1971) at 
Appendix I, s 4, online: Uniform Law Conference of Canada: 
<http://www.ulcc.ca/images/stories/Past_Proceedings_PDF/1971ULCC0053.pdf> [1971 Uniform Act]. 
62 LRCC, supra note 58 at 129. Some (but not all) Canadian provinces have anatomy acts that specifically facilitate 
the study of anatomical research. The provinces with anatomy acts are Nova Scotia (Anatomy Act, RSNS 1989, c 
13), British Columbia (Anatomy Act, RSBC 1996, c 13), Manitoba (The Anatomy Act, CCSM c A80), Ontario 
(Anatomy Act, RSO 1990, c A.21), and New Brunswick (Anatomy Act, RSNB 2011, c 110). Saskatchewan did have 
an anatomy act (The Anatomy Act, RSS 1978, c A-19 [repealed]), but it was repealed and replaced by the Public 
Health Act, 1994, SS 1994, c P-37.1. 
63 The purpose of the ULCC was addressed by President W.F. Bowker (as he then was) in his 1965 address to the 
Conference: “Today the development of national communications, nation-wide businesses and a mobile population 
make [the need for Uniform Acts] much more acute than it was during World War I. Besides, there are divisive 
tendencies that should be balanced by forces that will bring us together. As we approach the Centenary of 
Confederation, is it too fanciful to suggest that this Conference can help to secure a more united Canada? See 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh Annual 
Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, 1965) at 22-23, online: Uniform Law Conference of Canada: 
<http://www.ulcc.ca/images/stories/Past_Proceedings_PDF/1965ULCC0047.pdf> [1965 Uniform Act]. 
64 Uniform Cornea Transplant Act (Model Act) in 1959 Proceedings of the Forty-first Annual Meeting of the 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (Victoria, B.C.: The Conference, 1959) at 77 





which was eventually adopted by eight provinces and two territories.65 This legislation introduced 
a “donation principle” that enabled people to donate eyes after death.66 Under the proposed 1959 
Uniform Cornea Transplant Act we also see the donation principle extend to next-of-kin or 
someone in lawful possession of the body (the “possessor”), so that even if a person’s intent to 
donate was unknown, their family or possessor could consent on the deceased’s behalf.67 Thus, the 
first trace of the substitute decision-making is introduced quite early on in the development of 
Canadian human tissue legislation, making its debut alongside that of the “donation principle”.  
 
The third wave of legislative reform was initiated by the “organ transplant age”, a period between 
the early 1950s and 60s when people realized that kidney transplantation was a beneficial treatment 
for end-stage renal failure.68 During this time, the ULCC developed a uniform statute within the 
1965 Uniform Act to deal with post-mortem donation of organs and tissue. The ULCC adopted 
uniform statutes on organ donation in 1965,69 1971,70 and 1989 (revised in 1990).71 The 1965 model 
established Canada’s first donation framework to allow for the transplant of organs and tissue 
beyond just corneas. This early donation model was brief and contained provisions that dealt only 
with post-mortem organ and tissue donation.72 It comprised donative provisions that seemed to 
empower the deceased with “binding and full authority” to decide whether their body and/or body 
parts would be donated for therapeutic purposes, for science, or not at all.73 The 1965 model gave 
further effect to substitute decision-making by establishing an exception to the deceased’s binding 
authority, mandating that people (i.e. doctors or donor organizations) shall not act on a donative 
consent where there is “reason to believe” that the deceased had later withdrawn that consent.74 In 
such instances, the legislation empowered the deceased’s relative or lawful possessor to determine 
whether the body/body parts would be donated. This so-called “substitute consent” or “substitute 
 
65 LRCC, supra note 58 at 130.  
66 Ibid at 130. See also von Tigerstrom, supra note 2 at S9. 
67 1959 Uniform Cornea Transplant Act, supra note 64 at 77, s 4. See also LRCC, supra note 58 at 130. 
68 LRCC, supra note 58 at 130. One of the first Canadian provinces to introduce organ donation legislation was 
Ontario, replacing its Cornea Transplant Act with the Human Tissues Act in 1963. See LRCC, supra note 58 at 131. 
69 Human Tissue Gift Act (Model Act) in 1965 Uniform Act, supra note 63 at 104-106 (Appendix M). See also von 
Tigerstrom, supra note 2 at S10. 
70 Human Tissue Gift Act in Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (Conference of Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in 
Canada, 1971) at 152-156 (Appendix I), online: Uniform Law Conference of Canada: 
<http://www.ulcc.ca/images/stories/Past_Proceedings_PDF/1971ULCC0053.pdf> [1971 Uniform Act]. See also von 
Tigerstrom, supra note 2 at S10. 
71 Uniform Human Tissue Donation Act (1990) in Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Human Tissue Donation Act, 
(1990), online ULCC <www.ulcc.ca/en/unofmr-acts-new-order/older-uniform-acts/440-josetta-1-en-gb/uniform-
actsa/human-tissue-donation-act/284-human-tissue-donation-act-1990-draft> [1990 Uniform Act]. See also von 
Tigerstrom, supra note 2 at S10. 
72 Human Tissue Gift Act (Model Act) in 1965 Uniform Act, supra note 63 at 104-106 (Appendix M). It is unclear 
why only post-mortem donation was entertained in this early uniform statute. The Alberta Commissioners that 
drafted the 1965 model noted that they hoped their draft would be accepted by all Canadian jurisdictions as the 
model Cornea Transplant Act. This suggests that they did not consider inter vivos donations since corneas could not 
be taken from living donors in the 1960s. See 1965 Uniform Act, ibid at 63. 
73 Human Tissue Gift Act (Model Act) in 1965 Uniform Act, supra note 63 at 104-106, (Appendix M), s 1(1)). 
Nunavut’s statute is modeled on the original 1965 Uniform Act. See Nunavut Act, supra note 1. See also von 
Tigerstrom, supra note 2 at S10. Hence, Nunavut’s donation statute is nearly identical to the 1965 template, with 
some minor exceptions (for example, the Nunavut Act replaces the ULCC’s 1965 proposed consenting age from 18 
to 19, which is Nunavut’s age of majority. See Nunavut Act, s 1.  





decision” became binding and full authority, but it too was subject to a near identical exception, 
capable of veto where there was “reason to believe” that the deceased would have objected to that 
substitute decision, or where there as an objection from another member of the same class of 
persons as the person who gave the substitute decision.75 
 
Substitute decision-making has remained the same within uniform donation statutes since 1965, 
securing a spot in the ULCC’s subsequent 1971 and 1990 models.76 For nearly two decades, the 
1971 Uniform Act would serve as the model template for organ donation in Canada. During that 
time, 9 Canadian jurisdictions, including Saskatchewan, base their donation framework on the 1971 
uniform model.77 Today, all territorial and provincial organ donation statutes include the principles 
of donation and substitute decision-making,78 both as elements that are seemingly unable to exist 
without the other.79 
 
1.3 Canada’s Donation Legislation Today 
 
a) Case Study: Saskatchewan 
Much like the common law, the legislative frameworks governing organ and tissue donation have 
evolved over time. For 40 years, Saskatchewan’s organ and tissue donation was governed by The 
Human Tissue Gift Act.80 However, on July 16, 2018 that statute was repealed and replaced by The 
Human Tissue Gift Act, 2015 (the “2015 Saskatchewan Act”).81 Its enactment followed the 
provincial government’s inquiry into improving the rate of organ and tissue donation in 
Saskatchewan, an inquiry that took place between May, 2016 through November, 2016.82 
 
Like all provincial models, the 2015 Saskatchewan Act requires consent to donate a person’s organs 
and tissue. Consent, when given in accordance with the legislation, can authorize a body, bodily 
 
75 Ibid at 104-06, (Appendix M), s 2(2).  
76 The 1971 Uniform Act, supra note 70, also widened the scope of organ donation, adding in provisions that allowed 
for inter vivos donation. See von Tigerstrom, supra note 2 at S10. 
77 The jurisdictions of Saskatchewan, British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Yukon and Québec base their donation models on the 1971 uniform framework, with 
modifications and updates in some cases. See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, “Table III – 2006: Uniform Acts 
adopted before 2000, Showing the Jurisdictions that Have Enacted Them in Whole or in Part, With or Without 
Modifications, or in Which Provisions Similar in Effect are in Force”, online: ULCC 
<http://www.ulcc.ca/en/general-info-status/other-implementation-tables/2129-table-iii-pre-2000-unifonn-acts-
enacted-by-statute> [ULCC, "Table III- 2006"]. See also von Tigerstrom, supra note 2 at S11 and footnote 42. 
78 These principles are commonly cited as “consent by person for use of body after death” and “consent by spouse or 
others for use of body after death”, or some phrasing akin to that. See for example, BC Act, supra note 1 at ss 4(1), 
5(1); Manitoba Act, supra note 1 at ss 2(1), 2(3), 3(1), 3(3); and Ontario Act, supra note 1 at ss 4(1), 5(2). The 
precise language within the sections dealing with post-mortem and substitute decisions tend to vary somewhat 
between jurisdictions. For example, some jurisdictions have placed restrictions on donations made by minors and on 
individuals that lack requisite capacity. See von Tigerstrom, supra note 2 at S12. These variations and others alike 
are largely attributed to the particular Uniform Act (1965, 1971 or 1990) that underpins a particular provincial or 
territorial donation act. 
79 See Chapter 2 of this thesis for further discussion of this point. 
80 The Human Tissue Gift Act, RSS 1978, c H-15 [repealed]. 
81 2015 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 1. 
82 Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Human Services, “Inquiry into Organ and Tissue 
Donation: Second Report of the Twenty-Eighth Legislature” (28 November 2016) at 1. No significant changes were 
made to the provisions concerning consent to post-mortem donation and substitute decision-making. See 2015 





tissue or body parts to be used after death “for the purposes of transplant, medical education or 
scientific research.”83 However, consent cannot authorize selling, buying or otherwise dealing in 
bodies, bodily tissue or body parts (other than blood or blood constituents).84 Under s 18, 
contravention of any provision therein is an offence punishable by a fine up to $100,000 and/or by 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months.85 
 
Section 7(1) of the 2015 Saskatchewan Act states that a person may consent to post-mortem 
donations by signing a written instruction, or orally in the presence of two or more witnesses during 
last illness.86 Upon death, both written and oral forms of consent become binding and are to be full 
authority to use the body, bodily tissue and body parts for the purposes specified in the deceased’s 
consent, except where there is “reason to believe” that the consent was subsequently withdrawn.87 
In that case, or where consent has not been or cannot be given, a substitute decision-maker (i.e. the 
deceased’s nearest relative) may consent to donation on the deceased’s behalf.88 This substitute 
decision is deemed binding and is to be full authority, except where there is “actual knowledge” 
that the deceased would have objected to the substitute decision, or where there is an objection by 
a person of the “same or closer relationship” to the deceased.89 
 
The abovementioned overview summarizes the current post-mortem organ donation process in 
Saskatchewan and, by no coincidence, also summarizes the post-mortem donation structure in most 
other Canadian jurisdictions. Substitute decision-making provisions have remained virtually 
unchanged across Canadian jurisdictions, without any significant variations from the 1965 Uniform 
Act, except for the provinces of Alberta and more recently Nova Scotia, which have taken the most 
notable derogation from that uniform standard. 
 
a) Case Study: Alberta 
Alberta’s Human Tissue and Organ Donation Act (the “Alberta Act”) came into force on August 
1, 2009.90 Although modeled on the 1990 Uniform Act,91 the Alberta Act adds a “mandatory 
consideration principle” and provisions concerning their online registry that enable consent to be 
recorded online when a person applies for either a driver’s licence or a provincial identification 
card.92  
 
83 2015 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 1 at s 7(1). 
84 Ibid at s 17. 
85 Ibid at s 18(1). 
86 Ibid at s 7(1). 
87 Ibid at ss 7(3), 7(4). 
88 Ibid at s 10(1). 
89 Ibid at s 10(3). 
90 Alberta Act, supra note 1 at s 17. 
91 1990 Uniform Act, supra note 71. The Northwest Territories Act, supra note 1, is modeled on this 1990 
framework. 
92 Alberta Act, supra note 1 at s 4.2(1) – 4.2(2). The Alberta Act also authorizes the Alberta Government to collect 
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The mandatory consideration process requires Albertan medical practitioners to “consider and 
document” whether a deceased’s organs and tissue are medically suitable for transplant.93 If they 
are suitable, the medical practitioner must notify a donation organization.94 At that point, if consent 
to donation is unknown, a “required request principle” mandates the donation organization to seek 
consent from the deceased’s next of kin,95 and the next of kin’s substitute decision becomes binding 
and is to be full authority, unless there is “personal knowledge” that the donor would have objected 
to it or where a person in the same class would refuse to give a consent.96 
 
On the other hand, if a deceased’s consent was previously recorded in the online registry, the 
Alberta Act mandates that a donation organization must not seek a substitute decision from the 
deceased’s next of kin.97 In this way, one of the aims of the online registry is to ensure that the 
deceased’s donative wishes will be honored, especially where those wishes conflict with the views 
of a deceased’s next of kin.98 However, much like the uniform models before it, Alberta’s donation 
structure preserves the role of substitute decision-making; providing an override power to any 
previously recorded consent, including consent documented in the online registry, by prohibiting 
anyone from acting on a prior given consent if they have “personal knowledge” that the donor 
would have objected to the donation proceeding.99  
 
Alberta’s online registry and mandatory consideration requirement are the first of their kind among 
the Canadian jurisdictions.100 However, its donation framework has been slow to realize the Alberta 
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Government’s claim that the 2006 revisions would increase the rate of potential donors to actual 
donors.101 Moreover, the statistics neither support nor refute the notion that the 2006 legislative 
changes would ensure the deceased donor’s wishes take precedence over those of the family, 
because the details concerning who ultimately made the donative decision is either not documented 
or not made available to the public.  
 
Over the past decade, donation rates in Alberta have slowly but steadily increased. There were 52 
deceased donors in 2015; 70 deceased donors in 2016; 81 deceased donors in 2017; and 71 
deceased donors in 2018.102 Although there was a decrease in donation between 2017 and 2018, 
the statistical trend over the last decade suggests that the 2006 amendments have contributed to an 
overall increase in the number of deceased patients being referred to organ procurement 
organizations as possible potential donors. But what the statistics do not tell us is the percentage of 
Albertans that register as donors while alive, or even how many Albertans are currently registered 
on the 2006 system.  
 
In some combination, Alberta’s online registry and mandated referral program appear to have 
increased donation rates, though only slightly. In reviewing Alberta’s transplant waitlist statistics 
in recent years, it is obvious that there is still a great need for increased donations. In 2017, there 
were 627 patients waiting for a single transplant in Alberta and another 13 patients waiting for 
combination transplants.103 That same year, 35 Albertans died waiting for transplants and 61 others 
withdrew from the waitlist; the latter meaning that they either improved, opted to be removed, or 
were too ill to be kept on the list.104 With 627 people awaiting a transplant in 2017, and 25,532 
deaths in Alberta that same year, the 81 deceased donors that same year left much to be desired.105 
 
While the Alberta framework seems to do a better job at recognizing individual autonomy via 
online registration opportunities and attempts to respond to the public’s need for increased donation 
rates via the mandated referral program, it continues to fall short of making truly impactful change. 
Registering consent online is no doubt helpful for organizing and tracking consent, but the 
framework still falls short of mandating consent as full and binding authority and could quite 
obviously do more to make potential donors actual donors. A recent push for further reform to 
Alberta’s donation system106 – one that is considering a presumed consent model like the newly 
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enacted system in Nova Scotia – is quite telling of the continued disappointment brought by the 
2006 registration system. With this in mind, I turn now to Nova Scotia’s new presumed consent 
legislation, which aims to bridge the gap between potential and actual donors.  
 
b) Case Study: Nova Scotia 
On January 18, 2021, Nova Scotia became the first jurisdiction in North America to enact presumed 
consent legislation.107 Under the new legislation, individuals record consents and refusals in a 
registry.108 Those who do not register their consent or refusal are “deemed to consent to [their] 
organs and tissues being used for transplantation activities.”109 The presumption of consent is to be 
“full authority for transplantation activities,”110 unless the deceased lacked capacity to make a 
decision about donating “for a significant period before dying,”111 or if the deceased was not a 
resident of Nova Scotia for 12 months immediately prior to death,112 or if the deceased was under 
the age of majority.113 
 
In keeping with all other Canadian jurisdictions, Nova Scotia’s presumed consent legislation will 
continue to empower the substitute decision-maker to consent or refuse consent if they have 
“information that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the deceased would have made 
a different decision respecting donation after death than the decision recorded in the registry” or 
presumed under the legislation.114 Alberta’s proposed presumed consent legislation has a near-
identical provision at s 4.01(2)(c).115 Moreover, s 32 of the Nova Scotia Act (2019) mandates that 
“[n]o person shall give a consent or refusal under this Act if the person has personal knowledge 
that the individual for whom the consent or refusal is given would have made a different 
decision.”116  
 
The new legislation also maintains the classic exception to the mandate that consent is to be binding 
and full authority. Section 31 of the new Act will provide that “[n]o person shall act on a consent 
given or deemed to be given under this Act if the person has knowledge (a) that the donor 
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subsequently withdrew the consent; or (b) of an objection by the donor.”117 Similarly, Alberta’s 
proposed presumed consent legislation states that consent will be presumed and organs and tissue 
will be donated for transplantation where a person dies and no donation decision has been made 
before their death.118 However, the legislation goes on to state that a person is not considered to 
have agreed to a post-mortem donation if information is provided “that would lead a reasonable 
person to conclude that, if the deceased person had made a decision, they would have decided to 
refuse to donate in accordance with [the presumed consent provision].119 
 
These might seem like wise provisions to include, but I would argue they are apt to carry more 
weight in procurement practices than what appears to be intended by the new legislated provisions. 
For example, if the exception under s 31 (Nova Scotia) or s 4.01(2)(c) (Alberta) are interpreted and 
applied like the exceptions under the current opt-in frameworks, medical professionals and 
donation organizations are going to continue seeking validation of the donor’s previously recorded 
consent or the presumption of consent with next of kin. The Alberta Government and Alberta 
Health Services’ website, “MyHealth Alberta”, confirms that even where an individual has given 
consent to donating, “[a] family will be asked to sign a consent form saying they have been 
informed about, and agree with, the donation process, even if the person that died has signed the 
back of his or her healthcare card or registered online.”120 While the Alberta Government and 
Health Services agree that “[t]he decision to donate is a personal one” they also note that “…family 
helps make decisions about donating.”121 The MyHealth Alberta website also notes that 
“[r]egistering in the Alberta Organ and Tissue Donation Registry is an important way to 
communicate your wishes to the medical team,”122 which in my view suggests the main role of the 
registration system is to communicate a person’s intention to donate, but not necessarily to record 
one’s binding, legal consent. 
 
Nova Scotia’s presumed consent legislation is undoubtedly the first radical reform to any donation 
framework in Canada and it is perhaps also the most promising for effecting a meaningful increase 
in organ and tissue donation. One of the aims of Nova Scotia’s presumed consent law is to translate 
registrations (including presumed registrations) into actual donations.123 In this way, it appears that 
one of the leading motivations for the presumed consent law is increasing donations. However, 
Nova Scotia’s Premier, Hon. Stephen McNeil, believes the presumed consent clause will change 
the conversation between medical professionals and the deceased’s family, to the effect that it will 
help increase donation rates.124 According to Premier McNeil, through the presumed consent 
system, doctors will no longer be asking the family if the deceased is an organ donor. Rather, the 
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Premier believes that, instead, doctors can now say, “all of us are organ donors and we want to 
know whether you want to fulfill the wishes of your loved one,” and this conversation is key to 
solving the organ donation problem, according to Premier McNeil.125 
 
Thus, while the principal motivation of the presumed consent law appears to be increasing donation 
rates, it also seems another motivation is to get the family on board with the post-mortem organ 
donation, as if that should and will continue to play a key role in the post-mortem donation process. 
There seems to be a belief that increased donation rates will result from aiming the law at families 
and their conversation with doctors. This belief suggests that governments are not considering that 
increased donation rates can happen in a respectful, fair, and legal way without the role of the 
family at the centre of the process. It is as if there is an attitude across governments and organ 
donation agencies of ‘we can’t have one (being increased donation rates) without the other (being 
the families on board with donation), and in my view this is a flawed foundation to expect a 
successful donation system to grow from.  
 
The presumed consent law came into force on January 18, 2021. Practically speaking, it is too soon 
to tell how this conversation will affect day-to-day procurement practices. In situations where the 
presumption of consent is engaged (i.e. the deceased did not opt out), and the family exhibits 
uncertainty about donation, will medical professionals move forward with the procurement? To 
rebut the presumption of consent, will it be enough for the family to say that the deceased donor 
could have changed his or her mind about donation? Section 15(1) of the Nova Scotia Act (2019) 
provides: 
 
15(1) Where a substitute decision-maker provides information that would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that an individual would have made a different 
decision respecting donation after death than the decision recorded in the Registry 
or deemed under Section 11 [the presumed consent provision], the substitute 
decision-maker may consent or refuse on behalf of the individual in accordance with 
that information.126  
 
We know third-party information is enough to invalidate the prior “binding” consent of a deceased 
under the current opt-in framework. As we examined earlier, MyHealth Alberta and the 
Saskatchewan Health Region are just two examples of government agencies that explicitly state 
the family will be asked about the deceased’s wishes, even where legal consent was given prior to 
death. There seems to be a very low threshold for the ‘type’ of information capable of invalidating 
a deceased’s prior given consent, and it can be as informal as family dissenting to organ donation. 
I have not uncovered any sources or case studies that suggest a higher threshold of evidence has 
been required before a deceased’s prior given consent is rendered invalid. It is not difficult to 
imagine that the same type of ‘low threshold information’ currently accepted under the opt-in 
frameworks will also be accepted under s 15(1) of Nova Scotia’s presumed consent law, but only 
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As we have seen, there seems to be only so much that provinces are willing to reform under an opt-
in donation model, and registries and mandatory consideration principles seem to be the extent of 
those reforms. Unfortunately, the success of any opt-in framework is limited by its heavy 
dependence on the altruism of donors and substitute decision-makers. As we saw, Saskatchewan 
has yet to institute any sort of reform and although Alberta has made changes aimed at ensuring a 
deceased’s donative intent takes precedence over the next of kin’s wishes,127 tracking prior 
recorded consent through the online registry is simply not enough to protect donor autonomy. And 
as we saw, identifying medically viable donors through a mandatory consideration requirement has 
not led to a meaningful increase in organ and tissue donation.128 Hence Alberta is now seeking to 
replace that with a presumed consent framework of some sort.   
 
In Nova Scotia, the presumed consent clause appears to be aimed largely at the concerns and 
feelings of the deceased’s next of kin. Much like the opt-in frameworks across the rest of Canada, 
Nova Scotia’s new legislation is ripe to contravene the individual’s autonomy to make a binding 
decision about organ donation, and not have that decision easily invalidated by family who disagree 
or by facilitating the procurement practice of having family ‘consent’ to the deceased’s prior given 
consent. With a continued focus on family, the presumed consent system may very well fall short 
of the expectations it carries for increasing transplants, as once again the system responsible for 
establishing donations may rely far too much on substitute decision-making. In the chapter that 
follows, I will explore how the principles of public policy and individual autonomy are offended 
under the existing opt-in frameworks. These transgressions can and will endure under 
contemporary presumed consent systems if substitute decision-makers are empowered to hold the 
same authority as they carry under the opt-in models. 
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Potential Problems with the Current Donation Model 
 
Canada’s opt-in organ donation model is broken. Revisiting the statistics of our case study’s 
jurisdiction, we must remind ourselves that there were 97 Saskatchewan patients waiting for a 
transplant in 2017 and one reported death of a patient awaiting a transplant.1 In that same year, 
there were 9,450 deaths recorded in the province.2 Of those residents who died, only 17 became 
organ donors. Some may wonder how this issue concerns property law, but in my view the more 
accurate query is ‘why isn’t this a property law issue?’  
 
Is the current donation model to blame for low donation rates? Some may argue that low donation 
rates are simply the unfortunate consequence of a generalized provincial attitude towards organ 
donation, and that the majority of the people in Saskatchewan lean further against organ donation 
than they are in favour of it, hence the low donation rates. Without citing to a source, the 
Saskatchewan Health Authority (SHA) states on its website that “[o]nly a small portion of 
individuals die in such a way that makes organ donation possible – approximately 5 percent of all 
deaths.”3 Therefore, if we look at recent donation records, we can see that in the 2015 example, 
statistics show that of the estimated 470 people who died in Saskatchewan under circumstances 
that made organ donation clinically viable,4 only 10 people became post-mortem donors.5 Thus, of 
the 470 “could-be” donors, 460 people died without having any of their organs or tissue donated. 
This pool of deceased people either chose not to donate, failed to indicate donative wishes during 
their life or had their donative wishes reversed. 
 
What kind of death makes organ donation clinically viable? Section 13(1) of The Human Tissue 
Gift Act, 2015 states that, for the purposes of a post-mortem transplant, “the fact of death must be 
determined in accordance with accepted health care provider practice.”6 The legislation falls short 
of defining death for the purposes of post-mortem donation and in doing so it allows for flexibility 
with respect to determining death for the purposes of facilitating post-mortem organ procurements.  
 
The SHA’s statistic that only 5 percent of all deaths allow for post-mortem organ donation is likely 
based on “heart-beating brain death” or “HBD”.7 Also known as “brain death donation”, HBD is a 
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procurement practice where organs become available when patients are declared brain dead but 
still have a beating heart and ventilating lungs.8 In medical practice, a principle known as the “dead 
donor rule” or “DDR” represents the ethical standard that “organ donors must be dead before vital 
organs are removed.”9 In other words, the patient must be dead before organs are procured, rather 
than being killed by or for the organ donation. However, as most post-mortem donation statistics 
show, there is a shortfall in heart-beating brain death donors in Canada. Therefore, in response to 
the shortfall in clinically viable post-mortem donations, many hospitals have begun using the “non-
heart-beating-organ donation” (NHBD) protocol, also referred to as “donation after cardiac death” 
(or “DCD”).10 Coupled with brain death donations, the DCD protocol is widely used across Canada 
and the United States, and is said to have helped increase the number of post-mortem donors by 
over 25 percent in Ontario.11  
 
In DCD procurement, the patient need not necessarily be brain dead, but their heart has to have 
stopped beating for at least five minutes before organs can be removed.12 The window of 
opportunity to procure organs following cardiac death is much narrower than brain death 
procurements because organs are deprived of oxygenated blood when circulation stops, and this 
can damage the organs and tissue. While time is of the essence in DCD cases, procurement must 
also “not occur so soon [after the heart stops] that the donor is not yet dead,”13 otherwise the dead 
donor rule is at risk of violation.  
 
If we consider that 9,450 people died in Saskatchewan in 201714, we must acknowledge that death 
in all of those cases was either declared after the heart stopped beating or at the point where brain 
death was pronounced. Organ procurement is available and accepted in either type of death 
scenario; however, only one DCD procurement took place in Saskatchewan in 2015 and 2016, and 
there were no DCD procurements in 2017.15 The SHA’s statistic that ‘transplants are only 
medically feasible in approximately 5 percent of all deaths’ would mean that post-mortem organ 
transplantation was viable for approximately 472 deceased individuals in 2017 (5 percent of 
Saskatchewan deaths that year), but in reality only 25 became post-mortem donors that year.16  
 
This trend is less likely to be a symptom of unsuitable donors or lack of consent and more so a 
question of capacity in the healthcare system. Afterall, Saskatchewan’s 2016 Legislative 
Committee Report stated that “…adequately resourced support systems need to be in place and 
staff need to be trained to move donations through the system quickly. Operating rooms need to be 
made available for transplants as well as for emergencies.”17 Lack of evaluations and measurements 
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under the current donation framework makes it difficult to identify the root causes of these poor 
donation trends. What is clear is that the statistics raise questions about whether there is a serious 
flaw in the organ donation program and in the law enabling the framework. As this thesis will 
show, law reform is going to be necessary in order to deal with the issues that hinder the donation 
program’s success.18 
 
In Part 1 of this chapter, I focus on two key issues within Saskatchewan’s current “opt-in” model. 
First, I suggest that the provincial framework is an attack on individual autonomy because it enables 
post-mortem procurement practices that rely almost exclusively on substitute decision-making, 
thus putting the family’s interest first. Second, and relatedly, I argue that the current framework 
violates public policy by neglecting to implement a process that combats low provincial donation 
rates and lengthy transplant waitlists. In Part 2 of this chapter, I identify intestacy law and wills as 
well-developed areas of the law that work to oversee the disposal of property after death. As we 
will see, honouring the deceased’s intention, maintaining social order and limiting waste are some 
of the public policy motivations that drive intestacy law and wills. By viewing organs and tissue 
through a property lens, we start to see an important parallel between these areas of law and organ 
donation, and this parallel promotes our understanding of how the current framework is failing and 
why it needs to be reformed.  
 
2.1 Key Issues 
 
a) Violation of Individual Autonomy 
Autonomy has long been viewed as having an important role in the medical context, and its role is 
very much interwoven with the notion of consent. At common law, medical professionals must 
obtain a patient’s consent before administering medical treatment to a patient.19 Justice Cory of the 
Supreme Court of Canada explained the classic nexus between autonomy and consent in 
Ciarlariello v Schacter:20 
 
Every patient’s right to bodily integrity encompasses the right to determine what 
medical procedures will be accepted and the extent to which they will be accepted. 
The right to decide what is to be done to one’s own body includes the right to be 
free from medical treatment to which the individual does not consent. The 




18 Some critics of DCD procurement argue that removal of organs so soon after cardiac arrest is unethical because 
the donor is not known to be dead, at least insofar as the age-old dead donor rule standard applies. The crux of this 
argument relies on the fact that brain death is permanent since there is no known medical intervention that can bring 
a person back from brain death, whereas cardiac death is not permanent (and technically reversible) since the heart 
can continue to beat with medical intervention. On the other hand, supporters of the DCD procurement protocol 
argue that death is equal in instances of brain death and cardiac death because only when there is no intention to 
revive a patient’s heart is cardiac death actually declared. In this way, cardiac death is often perceived to be as 
permanent, if not more permanent, than instances of brain death where there is no intention (or ability) to revive the 
patient’s brain. For interesting discussion from both sides of this debate, see Marquis, supra note 11 and Sade, supra 
note 8. 
19 Reibl v Hughes, [1980] 2 SCC 880, [1980] 2 SCR 880; Hopp v Lepp, [1980] 2 SCR 192, [1980] SCJ No 57 (WL).  
20 Ciarlariello v Schacter, [1993] 2 SCR 119, 100 DLR (4th) 609. [Ciarlariello]. 
21 Ibid.  
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The Supreme Court of Canada recently confirmed the common law requirement for informed 
consent, recognizing - as lower courts have - that informed consent is “rooted in the concepts of an 
individual’s right to bodily integrity and respect for patient autonomy.”22 Canada’s highest Court 
also notes that the “patient’s autonomy interest” is “the right to decide what happens to one’s body 
and one’s life”, noting also that this has “historically been viewed as trumping all other interests, 
including what physicians may think is in the patient’s best interest.”23 
 
The common law has long recognized principles of informed consent, well before Cory J’s remarks 
in Ciarlariello. Since at least 1914, it has recognized that doctors could be found to have committed 
assault or battery where they perform an operation without the patient’s consent.24 Still, despite 
informed consent’s early recognition, it has been given inconsistent application throughout the 
years and, as a result, so too has the autonomous right to determine what will be done with one’s 
own body.  
 
For example, it was not until 1988 that women were finally recognized in law as having the right 
to choose to have an abortion.25 With respect to autonomy, Justice Wilson made the following 
observation at page 171 of R v Morgentaler:26 
 
“[t]he right to “liberty” contained in s. 7 guarantees to every individual a degree of 
personal autonomy over important decisions intimately affecting his or her private 
life. Liberty in a free and democratic society does not require the state to approve 
such decisions but it does require the state to respect them. A woman’s decision to 
terminate her pregnancy falls within this class of protected decisions. …It is not just 
a medical decision; it is a profound social and ethical one as well.” 
 
Moreover, it was not until 2015 that individuals who suffered from debilitating medical ailments 
were recognized as having the right to seek the assistance of physicians in order to end their life 
with dignity.27 In Carter v Canada (Attorney General)28, the Supreme Court of Canada revisited 
the matter of patient autonomy in medical decision-making. The Court reviewed its 2009 majority 
decision in A.C. v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services)29 and reiterated: 
 
 
22 Cuthbertson v Rasouli, 2013 SCC 53 at para 18, [2013] 3 SCR 341 [Cuthbertson]. See also Fleming v Reid (1991), 
4 OR (3d) 74 (CA), 82 DLR (4th) 298. 
23 Cuthbertson, supra note 22 at para 19. 
24 Schloendorff v New York Hospital, (1914) 105 NE 92, cited in Jonathan Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, 6th ed 
(Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 207. See also Malette v Shulman (1990), 72 OR (2d) 
417 at 423, [1990] OJ No 450 (WL) [Malette]: “The right of a person to control his or her own body is a concept that 
has long been recognized at common law. The tort of battery has traditionally protected the interest in bodily scrutiny 
from unwanted physical interference. Basically, any intentional nonconsensual touching which is harmful or 
offensive to a person’s reasonable sense of dignity is actionable. …Thus, as a matter of common law, a medical 
intervention in which a doctor touches the body of a patient would constitute a battery if the patient did not consent 
to the intervention.” 
25 R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30, [1988] SCJ No 1 (WL). 
26 Ibid. 
27 Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331 [Carter]. 
28 Ibid. 
29 2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 SCR 181 [A.C. v Manitoba]. 
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“[The] right to “decide one’s own fate” entitles adults to direct the course of their 
own medical care ([A.C. v Manitoba] para. 40): it is this principle that underlies the 
concept of “informed consent” and is protected by s. 7’s guarantee of liberty and 
security of the person ([A.C. v Manitoba] para. 100)… the right of medical self-
determination is not vitiated by the fact that serious risks or consequences, 
including death, may flow from the patient’s decision. It is this same principle that 
is at work in the cases dealing with the right to refuse consent to medical treatment, 
or to demand that treatment be withdrawn or discontinued…”30  
 
As these few examples illustrate, autonomy over one’s own body has become increasingly 
recognized over time. Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Carter acknowledged that the possibility 
of death does not vitiate a person’s right of medical self-determination. In my view, it should also 
follow that a person’s decision to donate (or not to donate) his or her organs after death should be 
given the same level of respect and autonomy because the decision is ultimately an exercise of his 
or her right to medical self-determination, albeit only determinable once deceased.   
 
Some might argue that there is a distinction to be made between autonomy to choose when and 
how to die (as outlined in Carter), versus choosing what happens to our bodies after death. To that 
I would say the distinction is not enough, in my view, to qualify post-mortem donation choices as 
some lower form of autonomy that in essence cannot bind. If the law is willing to recognize and 
respect choices concerning when and how we die and is also aiming to increase donation rates, 
why does it still treat legal consent to post-mortem donation as a lesser form of consent? Is it 
because of the risk that the procurement could offend family? Or is it possibly because the health 
care system is afraid of potentially obligating itself to facilitate high volumes of post-mortem 
transplants? In my opinion, whatever the reason, the distinction between these types of medical 
decisions is not enough to merit giving post-mortem donation choices less respect than decisions 
concerning when or how we die.  
 
As the current law stands, substitute decision-making can always be employed (and is typically 
required) to determine or possibly veto a deceased’s prior given consent to post-mortem donation. 
This deference to substitute decision-makers is offensive to donor autonomy. To those that say it 
is meaningless to talk about exercising autonomy after death or with respect to what will happen 
after one’s death, I would remind them that examples of respect for autonomy are common in 
society and have been well-recognized and respected by law. We see examples of this every day 
in wills and I will illuminate these parallels later on in this chapter by exploring wills and intestacy 
laws further.  
 
In the meantime, if we further consider the notion of medical self-determination, it is generally 
understood that even in situations where treatment is vital to a patient’s survival, a doctor cannot 
veto the patient’s demand to end treatment.31 Forcing the procedure on a patient is both legally and 
morally wrong because of the principle of autonomy.32 Moreover, under the common law, for 
 
30 Carter, supra note 27 at 67 [emphasis added].  
31 Cuthbertson, supra note 22 at para 18. 
32 Herring, supra note 24 at 207. For more on the right to refuse consent or to discontinue treatment, see Ciarlariello, 
supra note 20; Malette, supra note 24, and Nancy B. v Hôtel-Dieu de Québec, (1992) 86 DLR (4th) 385 (Que SC), 
[1992] JQ No 1 (QL). 
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consent to be valid the patient must provide it voluntarily and the patient must be informed.33 A 
patient is informed when the doctor has ensured that “the patient understands the nature of the 
procedure, its risks and benefits, and the availability of alternative treatments before making a 
decision about a course of treatment.”34 
 
In determining whether a risk necessitates explanation to a patient, the Supreme Court of Canada 
has advised that an objective approach should be taken.35 In other words, a doctor should 
contemplate “whether a reasonable person in the patient’s position would want to know the risk.”36 
In the context of post-mortem organ donation, explanation of material risk is unnecessary since 
procurement takes place after death or brain death. Thus, death is a key factor that allows the 
consent process for post-mortem donations to be simpler than that which is employed for medical 
procedures.  
 
As one may expect, the common law of consent is generally directed at patients that have the 
requisite capacity to make decisions concerning medical treatment.37 A patient is said to have 
capacity when they have the ability to understand the “nature, purpose and consequences” of a 
particular form of treatment.38 However, the traditional approach of initiating medical treatment by 
first obtaining informed consent meets challenges in situations where patients cannot understand 
the nature, purpose, and consequences of a doctor’s proposed treatment.39 As a general rule, when 
a patient lacks this sort of understanding, he or she does not exercise autonomy by consenting or 
refusing a particular medical treatment.40 In other words, they are said to “lack capacity”.  
 
The common law of consent seems at odds with the version of consent employed in 
Saskatchewan’s statutory provisions concerning post-mortem donation. Consent given prior to 
death and in accordance with the Act is to be binding and full authority,41 unless the doctor has 
“reason to believe that it was subsequently withdrawn.”42 In the medical context, case law has dealt 
with the issue of withdrawn consent in circumstances involving living, and sometimes 
unconscious, patients.43 In those circumstances, the common law holds that it is a question of fact 
as to whether a patient has withdrawn consent.44 Whether a deceased patient has withdrawn consent 
to organ donation has yet to go to trial (i.e. there is no case law on this issue); however, donation 
agencies seem to have a moral or normative view that the final word on organ donation should rest 
with the deceased’s family, regardless of the individual’s capacity at the time of leaving legal 
consent. In my view, the end result is the same as treating a person as though they lacked capacity, 
which should signal a problem with the consent provisions of the statute. Although Saskatchewan’s 
statute recognizes that a donor’s consent is to be full and binding authority, consent given in 
accordance with the Act can always be replaced by the wishes of a substitute decision-maker.  
 
33 Cuthbertson, supra note 22 at para 18. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ciarlariello, supra note 20. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Cuthbertson, supra note 22 at para 19. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid at para 20. 
40 Malette, supra note 24 at 423-424. 
41 The Human Tissue and Gift Act, RSS 1978 c H-15 [repealed], s 5(1) [1978 Saskatchewan Act]. 
42 Ibid at s 5(3). 




The futility of the statutory consent provisions is made especially obvious by the Saskatchewan 
Health Authority’s (SHA) interpretation of the provincial organ donation statute. The SHA is a 
provincial agency responsible for overseeing the delivery of health services and programs across 
the province. It is accountable to the public, generally, and is governed by the Saskatchewan Health 
Authority Board of Directors, which is comprised of 10 members appointed for three-year terms 
by Saskatchewan’s Minister of Health.45 On its website, the SHA states that “[i]n Saskatchewan, 
organs and tissue will not be donated without your family or next-of-kin's consent” and it therefore 
encourages people to discuss their organ donation wishes with loved ones, because doing so will 
assist them in making “this important decision” on the deceased person’s behalf.46 As discussed in 
Chapter 1, this is similar to MyHealth Alberta’s interpretation of their provincial statute, where 
family are asked to ‘consent to the deceased’s prior given consent’47, regardless of whether it was 
made in accordance with the statute. 
 
The SHA’s interpretation of the provincial statute undermines any notion of personal consent, and 
this seems contrary to the underlying objectives of the consent provisions. The SHA’s approach 
disregards the binding nature of prior consent, and relies solely on the override exception, which 
stipulates that personal consent to donation is binding and only subject to the override exception if 
there’s reason to believe the deceased changed his or her mind. In this way, the SHA’s approach 
appears to fly in the face of the personal consent provisions. 
 
Defenders of the SHA’s approach might argue that the “consent is binding authority exception” 
ultimately gives family the final decision-making power, and therefore persuading family of one’s 
final wishes prior to death seems sensible. But is the deceased’s prior given consent intended to be 
subordinate to the family’s final decision-making power? Presumably not. If the objective is to 
give family the ultimate decision-making power, then why include any provisions at all for 
personally consenting to donation? If the only aim of the personal consent provisions is to establish 
a basis for family to work from in order to make the final decision, then the donation statute’s 
legislative objective is far more offensive than the SHA’s donation program. But I do not believe 
this is the intended application of the personal consent provisions. At some point between the 
legislation coming into force and its present application by the SHA, the principle of autonomy got 
lost.  
 
Discussing wishes with loved ones and establishing next of kin as the vessel for a deceased’s wishes 
is not a stable platform for recording consent. Simply put, family should not be the conduit of prior 
given consent and, although considered acceptable, family should also not be the main basis for 
determining the fate of a deceased’s organs and tissue when consent was not given prior to death. 
Of course, authorizing next of kin as the ultimate decision-maker could have positive effects on 
people awaiting an organ transplant. For example, positive impacts are likely where a deceased did 
not consent to donation prior to death but where the next of kin authorizes the donation. On the 
 
45 Saskatchewan Health Authority, “Our Organization: Governance”, online: 
<https://www.saskhealthauthority.ca/about/Pages/Governance.aspx>. 
46 Saskatchewan Health Authority, “Organ and Tissue Donation: Talk to Your Family”, online: 
<https://www.saskhealthauthority.ca/Services-Locations/organ-tissue-donation/Pages/Talk-to-Your-Family.aspx> 
[SHA, “Talk to Your Family”]. 
47 My Health Alberta, “Organ and Tissue Donation in Alberta”, online: 
<https://myhealth.alberta.ca/alberta/Pages/organ-and-tissue-donation-faqs.aspx>. See also Maeghan Toews, 
“Evaluating the “family veto” of consent for organ donation” (2016) 188:17/18 CMAJ at E436. 
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other hand, negative impacts are just as likely where next of kin vetoes the deceased’s prior given 
consent to donate.  
 
Notwithstanding the opposite outcomes in the above scenarios, autonomy is at issue in both 
situations. Where a person dies without donative wishes, substitute decision-making that leads to 
donation is apt to benefit a handful of people; however, individual autonomy is still prone to 
violation (despite the public benefit) because the current model does not provide a secure platform 
for individuals to solidify their non-consenting instruction. Likewise, the current model fails to 
“codify” the consent of those that wish to donate, and in this way the provincial model violates 
what little autonomy it alleges to provide under the consent provisions of the Act.  
 
Consent in the context of organ and tissue donation should be viewed as a protector of autonomy. 
In overlooking consent given in accordance with the Act, the province is violating the individual’s 
autonomous right to decide what happens to his or her own body. Autonomous choice embodies 
the notion of individual freedom; freedom to control one’s own destiny by “being able to decide 
how to live out [one’s own perceived] version of the ‘good life’.48 In the context of post-mortem 
organ donation, a framework that respects individual autonomy would guarantee a deceased’s prior 
consent. At the same time, that framework ought to impose a process that can identify and respect 
the autonomy of individuals that do not consent to post-mortem organ donation. Saskatchewan’s 
current donation framework does neither of these two things.  
 
Notwithstanding instances where the deceased provided sufficient consent prior to dying, the 
framework upholds and actually enforces a process of “re-determining” consent. The reason for 
this is largely because the law has distinguished between people who are competent to make 
decisions and those who are not.49 The statutory provisions dealing with post-mortem donation 
treat the deceased as having lacked capacity to legally consent while alive, while the provisions 
dealing with inter vivos donation view the individual as fully competent and fit to consent to 
donation. As Professor Jonathan Herring so eloquently puts it, “fall on the side of competence and 
your right to autonomy requires your decision to be respected; fall on the side of incapacity and the 
decision is made on your behalf.”50 Indeed, a deceased donor may have lacked requisite capacity 
prior to death, and certainly a donor lacks capacity upon death or at the point of brain death. 
However, it should not follow that, upon death, that individual’s prior legal consent is rendered 
voidable.  
 
The statutory provisions that dictate how the public must consent to post-mortem organ donation 
are misleading because in practice those provisions do not actually produce a binding form of 
consent. The system of consent that has been established by the current framework is always 
voidable by death, and since death is a certainty in every case, the consent endorsed by statute is 
always voidable. As advanced in the foregoing analysis, this is problematic because it seriously 
infringes on individual autonomy.  
 
In the medical context, and specifically in the context of post-mortem organ donation, autonomy 
and the public interest should be balanced against one another. Some might argue that there is no 
 
48 Herring, supra note 24 at 207-208. 




need to strike a balance between these two interests (the individual interest and the public interest), 
because greater autonomy would not necessarily come at the expense of the public interest but 
might actually further it if greater autonomy led to more donations. But who is to say that greater 
autonomy would lead to increased donations? In my view, the demand for donation is simply too 
high not to give similar weight to the public interest factor. But a framework that focuses too 
heavily on the public interest of increasing donations (and in turn not enough on respecting the 
autonomous choice to donate or to refuse donation), could obviously then violate autonomy. 
Therefore, striking a balance between these interests is necessary. 
 
The current provincial framework fails to strike a balance between the public’s interest for 
increased donations and the individual’s interest to determine whether to donate. And so, the 
framework not only fails to give effect to individual autonomy, but also fails to address the societal 
need for increased organ and tissue donation. In the following discussion, I will address how the 
framework is violating the public policy that is meant to further post-mortem organ donation.  
 
b) Violation of Public Policy 
Public policy can be thought of as a moral value stemming from the “perceived needs of the 
community.”51 Judicial impression typically determines what is or is not in the public interest52 
and, generally speaking, evidence is not necessary in making findings of public policy.53 In civil 
claims, for example, courts will bar certain activities on the basis of public policy if it can be said 
that the activity at issue is contrary to public or moral interest, or if it is contrary to public 
conception of justice and morality.54  
 
Public policy shares a connection with both legislation and common law. As a general rule, public 
policy is intended to “reflect a well-informed identification of what will satisfy the public interest 
articulated by legislation”55 and in turn “the broad goals identified in legislation and adjudicated in 
individual cases can be translated into, or applied through, coherent and sensible public policy.”56 
In this way, public policy should dictate the objective behind a particular statutory or common law. 
In other words, the general purpose of legislation and common law should be to satisfy the 
perceived needs of the public. In the context of organ donation law, the public need should be 
obvious: more and more people require organ and tissue transplants to live and enhance their lives.  
 
The legislative objective of the 2015 Saskatchewan Act is to facilitate inter vivos and post-mortem 
donations of human tissues, bodies or body parts.57 While the legislation acknowledges to some 
extent (implicitly) the public need for organ donation, it fails to promote the urgent public policy 
interest of increased donations. This is obviously so considering Saskatchewan’s organ donation 
 




54 Simpson v Chiropractors’ Assn. (Saskatchewan), 2001 SKCA 22, 31 Admin LR (3d) 87, Cameron JA.  
55 Alice Woolley, “Legitimating Public Policy” (2008) 58 UTLJ 153 at 179. Describing the connection between 
public policy and legislation, Woolley notes at 179: “[i]n general, having democratic legitimacy and instrumental 
soundness rest on the goodwill, creativity, and budget of particular administrative decision makers is an insufficient 
protection of democratic values, and of the legitimate instrumental concern that public policy reflect a well-informed 
identification of what will satisfy the public interest articulated by legislation.” 
56 Ibid at 154. 
57 2015 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 6.  
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statistics, which indicate the objective of the donation legislation is not being achieved. The 
statistics further indicate a serious and ongoing societal need for increased donations, and as a 
result, reflect a serious and ongoing violation of public policy.  
 
From a ‘societal needs’ perspective, overriding a deceased’s donative wishes can determine 
whether a prospective organ recipient lives or dies. As the SHA notes, “one organ donor can save 
up to eight lives and one tissue donor can enhance the lives of [up to] 75 people.”58 The SHA also 
notes that approximately 90 people are on the kidney transplant waitlist and they will wait, on 
average, 2.8 years for a kidney, which is approximately 437 dialysis treatments per person.59 
Clearly, the demand for organ transplants continues to outweigh the supply of available organs, 
and a framework that relies on substitute decisions to increase post-mortem donation is flawed.  
 
The SHA notes that an individual is more likely to need an organ transplant than they are to become 
a donor,60 and the provincial framework has yet to mitigate this problem. According to some 
American scholars, people fail to communicate their donative intent and families fail to provide 
the substitute decision to donate, and together these failures are seen as causing organ shortages 
across the United States.61 However, more accurately stated, the state fails to implement an 
adequate model that effectively codifies individual donative intent, and in this way, the state 
remains insensitive to the public need for organ donations.  
 
As we have seen, the current donation framework does not require people to leave donative wishes. 
Saskatchewan and the rest of Canada (with the recent exception of Nova Scotia) maintain true “opt-
in” models for donating post mortem. A key issue with this type of model is that it confuses those 
people that truly opt out of organ donation with those that “died before they could opt in”, and there 
is a stark difference between those two groups. A donation model that cannot differentiate between 
people that do not consent versus those that may consent but died without leaving a record of 
donative intent will leave many potential opportunities for increased donations untapped. In this 
way, then, the current opt-in donation model does actually contribute to low donation rates. Indeed, 
nations that have the opposite, or “opt-out” model for deceased organ donation, report higher rates 
of post-mortem donations than countries like Canada that have maintained an opt-in framework. 
However, there are several underlying variables potentially enabling those higher donation rates, 
and we will examine those in Chapter 4.62  
 
The opt-out model is widely referred to as the “presumed consent” system for deceased organ 
donation. Whether that model discounts our privileges of ownership more or less than the current 
opt-in framework will also be discussed in Chapter 4.   
 
 
58 “Saskatchewan Health Authority, “Organ and Tissue Donation”, online: 
<https://www.saskhealthauthority.ca/Services-Locations/organ-tissue-donation/Pages/Home.aspx>. 
59 Saskatchewan Health Authority, “Organ and Tissue Donation: Living Kidney Donation”, online: 
<https://www.saskhealthauthority.ca/Services-Locations/organ-tissue-donation/Pages/Living-Kidney-
Donation.aspx>.  
60 SHA, “Talk to Your Family”, supra note 46. 
61 Haley Cotter, “Increasing Consent for Organ Donation: Mandated Choice, Individual Autonomy, and Informed 
Consent” (2012) 21:2 Health Matrix 599 at 600. 
62 A.M. Rosenblum et al., “The authority of next-of-kin in explicit and presumed consent systems for deceased organ 
donation: an analysis of 54 nations” (2012) 27:6 Nephrol Dial Transplant, 2533 at 2534. 
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2.2 The Intestacy & Wills Parallel  
 
As we know, across Canada, the law does not intervene to ensure a transfer when people die without 
leaving instructions concerning their organs and tissue. However, the law does intervene and 
oversee the transfer of property when people die without a will. Ultimately, intestacy and wills 
legislation are used to pass on property when people die. In some ways, the organ donation 
framework is analogous to wills; existing like a special branch of wills in order to facilitate the 
transfer of organs and tissue.63 If the donation framework is parallel to a will, then presumed 
consent is in some ways parallel to intestacy law.  
 
Today, when a person dies intestate (without a will), the law ensures that the deceased’s property 
meets the hands of someone else. Pursuant to legislation, the property goes to either the deceased’s 
spouse, next of kin or the Crown. Either way, the property is sure to go to someone, somewhere. 
Every province and territory in Canada enforces intestacy provisions to this effect.64 As notable 
scholar Henry Maine observed, one of the earliest forms of intestacy dates back to ancient times, 
when jurists viewed the father and son as one unified person, and that unity formed the basis for 
the “universal succession” concept.65 One of the underlying reasons for this early form of intestacy 
was to transfer household power and thus safeguard social stability when death occurred.66 
According to Maine, the law of universal succession meant one man inherited the belongings of 
another, thus essentially becoming subject to the deceased’s rights and liabilities.67 The successor 
subsequently held those rights and duties in the same legal capacity as the deceased had held them 
before dying.68  
 
Other forms of succession evolved from this, including inheritance.69 Inheritance was 
characteristically similar to universal succession, insofar as the heir still “stepped at once into all 
the rights and all the duties of the dead man”, thereby becoming “instantly clothed with his entire 
legal person.”70 However, this early form of inheritance differed in that it allowed for co-heirs to 
benefit under a deceased’s estate as opposed to just one beneficiary.71 Since then, this notion has 
 
63 It perhaps goes without saying that it is impractical to “will away” one’s organs and tissue given the time-sensitive 
nature of the transplant process. While it takes time to locate and probate a will, post-mortem organs and tissue have 
a very short “shelf life” and therefore quick action is required to effectively transfer such property to a new owner. 
The purpose of the intestacy and wills analogy is to show that governments have established effective ways of 
transferring a deceased person’s property and therefore it is within the realm of possibility to create a process for the 
effective transfer of organs and tissue.  
64 Wills and Succession Act, SA 2010, c W-12.2; Wills, Estates and Succession Act, SBC 2009, c 13; The Intestate 
Succession Act, CCSM c I85; Devolution of Estates Act, RSNB 1973, c D-9; Intestate Succession Act, RSNL 1990, c 
I-21; Intestate Succession Act, RSNWT 1988, c I-10; Intestate Succession Act, RSNS 1989, c 236; Intestate 
Succession Act, RSNWT (Nu) 1988, c I-10; Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c S.26; Probate Act, RSPEI 
1988, c P-21; The Intestate Succession Act, 1996, SS 1996, c I-13.1 [Saskatchewan Succession Act]; Estate 
Administration Act, RSY 2002, c 77. 
65 Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law, 10th ed (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1906), online: Online Library of 
Liberty <https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/maine-ancient-law> at 172. 
66 Paul Milton, “Inheritance as the Key to all Mythologies: George Eliot and Legal Practice” (1995) 28:1 Mosaic, 49 
at 52. 
67 Maine, supra note 65 at 174.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid at 175.  
70 Ibid at 174. 
71 Ibid at 176. 
 
 34 
evolved much further and today wills are rarely allowed to dispose of a deceased’s assets “with 
absolute freedom”.72 Public policy limits personal autonomy in the wills context with laws that 
now ensure a widow or minor child have rights to a definite share of a deceased’s estate.73 
 
In early Roman law, the transfer of property was actually ancillary to the law’s primary objective 
of transferring household power to the son.74 While much has changed since the early Roman era, 
the underlying objectives of today’s intestacy and inheritance laws remain similar to what they 
were back then. The law is still concerned with maintaining social order when a person dies and 
leaves behind an estate. Thus, the law mandates certain processes for executing a valid will, 
probating a will, disbursing property under a will, disbursing property when there is no will, and 
so on, as a means of maintaining social order.  
 
2.2.1 Public Policy and Testamentary Dispositions 
 
Public policy is a consideration when judges make decisions concerning property disbursements 
under a will. Public policy is invoked in clear cases where public harm is “substantially 
uncontestable”.75 Courts are required to intervene in the interests of society.76 Therefore, when a 
testamentary gift offends public policy, for example, the law will render that gift void, or where 
appropriate, the law will even go as far as to re-write the testator’s gift in a way that balances the 
testator’s intention with public policy in order for the gift to succeed.77 In other cases, where a 
condition requires “a beneficiary to act in a manner contrary to law or public policy” in order to 
receive the gift, “courts will intervene to void the offending testamentary condition on public policy 
grounds.”78 
 
Where testamentary gifts are subject to a condition for inheritance and the condition is vague or 
uncertain, courts prefer to construe a vesting construction if possible so that the testamentary gift 
vests sooner rather than later.79 For example, in most jurisdictions testamentary gifts cannot hang 
in perpetuity80 and where courts can interpret the language of a gift as a ‘condition subsequent’, 
 
72 Ibid at 217. 
73 Ibid at 217. See also The Wills Act, 1996, SS 1996, c W-14.1; The Family Property Act, SS 1997, c F-6.3; 
Saskatchewan Succession Act, supra note 64. 
74 Milton, supra note 66 at 52. “Household power” refers to an element of the family structure in classical society, 
when men were formally responsible for the household and the women and children within it. On classical household 
power, Maine, supra note 65 at 119 observed, “[t]he points which lie on the surface of history are these: -The eldest 
male parent –the eldest ascendant– is absolutely supreme in his household. His dominion extends to life and death, 
and is as unqualified over his children and their houses as over his slaves….”  
75 Re Estate of Charles Millar, Deceased, [1938] SCR 1, 1937 CanLII 10 (SCC) at 2. 
76 Ibid at 4. 
77 See for example Canada Trust Co. v Ontario Human Rights Commission (1990), 74 OR (2d) 481, 1990 
CarswellOnt 486 (WL) [Canada Trust]. 
78 Spence v BMO Trust Company, 2016 ONCA 196 at 56, 2016 CarswellOnt 3345 (WL) [Spence]. 
79 See Re Down, [1968] 68 DLR (2d) 30, [1968] 2 OR 16 [Re Down]. Per Laskin JJA (as he then was) at page 36: 
“There is also the consideration that difficulties of construction such as are posed by the will in this case should be 
resolved in favour of all the objects of the testator’s bounty….” For more on testamentary constructions and the 
presumption against intestacy, see H.J. Hayes Co. v Meade (1987), 82 NBR (2d) 419, 1987 CarswellNB 66 (WL) 
[Hayes].   
80 The rule against perpetuities has been repealed in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Nova Scotia. For further 
discussion on reasons for repeal, see for example Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, Final Report - The Rule 
Against Perpetuities (Halifax: Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, 2010), online: <http://canlii.ca/t/7fd>. For 
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they will apply that construction over a ‘condition precedent’ interpretation.81 A condition 
precedent is a contingent interest and the testamentary gift will not vest until the beneficiary meets 
some requirement. On the other hand, a condition subsequent is a vested interest, and the gift passes 
to the beneficiary and is subject divestment if the beneficiary does not meet a specific 
requirement.82 In these ways, it is understood that courts like to see gifts vest and where 
interpretation is necessary, the court’s construction will favour vesting if possible. 
 
How is this relevant to the overall discussion concerning post-mortem organ donation? In common 
law, there is a general bias toward certainty rather than contingency. In my view, the current organ 
donation system, although rooted in statute and not common law, provides only for “uncertain 
dispositions” because the deceased’s prior given consent is not actually binding. In this way, a 
deceased’s prior given consent to post-mortem donation is consistent with “uncertain testamentary 
gifts” that become subject to construction. In the organ donation context, a “vesting” construction 
would be one that favours post-mortem procurement for the purposes of transferring organs and 
tissue to another person, and a vesting construction could apply where the deceased gave consent 
to a post-mortem donation. In presumed consent systems, the vesting construction could apply in 
cases where the deceased did not opt out of the presumption to donate after death.  
 
Furthermore, when dealing with property in a will, the law is cautious not to offend the testator’s 
intention since, in many ways, the will is perceived as a contract between the deceased and the law. 
As explained by Godin J in H.J. Hayes Co. v Meade, “[t]he cardinal rule of interpretations of wills 
is that effect must be given to the intentions of the testator.”83 When a person writes a will, they 
trust in the law to execute his or her final testamentary intentions. Upon death, the will allows that 
testator to instruct from the grave. Thus, “the court has a responsibility to ensure that only wills 
that meet the hallmarks of validity are probated.”84 A probated will “represents the testator’s true 
testamentary intentions.”85 The court’s responsibility of ensuring validity is a duty owed “to the 
testators, whose deaths preclude them from protecting their own interests, to those with a legitimate 
interest in the estate, and to the public at large.”86 
 
It would be highly offensive to the testator if the law enforced a framework that gave next of kin 
the ultimate decision-making power over what happens to the deceased’s property gifted in a will. 
In intestacy matters, it would be most bizarre to give the deceased’s next of kin the power to 
determine where that deceased’s property ends up. Testamentary law does not put the family’s 
emotions first because the family’s emotions and perceptions of ‘need’ can obscure and oppose the 
testamentary direction. Disputes over property would be frequent and probably chaotic without the 
laws that regulate and oversee disposal of property after death. In my view, with this property lens 
applied, the approach to post-mortem disposal of organs and tissue under the current donation 
 
conditions void for offending the rule against perpetuities generally, see Re Tilbury West Public School Board and 
Hastie, [1966] 2 OR 20, 55 DLR (2d) 407 (HC) [Re Tilbury]. 
81 On constructions in favour of vesting, see McKeen Estate v McKeen Estate (1993), 132 NBR (2d) 181, [1993] 
NBJ No 69 (QB); Hayes, supra note 79.  
82 For further discussion on vested and contingent interests, see Thomas G. Feeney, The Canadian Law of Wills (3rd 
Ed.) (Toronto: Buttersworths, 1987) at 225, 257, 259 and 260; Re Down, supra note 79; Hayes, supra note 79.  
83 Hayes, supra note 79 at para 17 (WL). 





framework appears inconsistent with the sensical principles that have long underpinned property 
dispositions in these other areas of law.   
 
This brings me to my final point in the intestacy and wills parallel, being the state’s inherent 
concern with property going to waste. The law views ‘property being used’ as notably better for 
the economy than property that stagnates for long periods of time.87 For example, the concern for 
wasting property (or “the development of otherwise idle property”) forms one of the common 
justifications for the law of adverse possession, which is sometimes referred to as “squatters’ 
rights.”88 The justification behind this kind of law is derived from the principles of economic 
efficiency and fairness.89 On economic efficiency, Professor, David Duff, submits: 
 
Economic efficiency is…a central objective of public policy…. As a normative 
principle, efficiency favours the allocation of scarce resources to their most highly 
valued uses in order to maximize aggregate welfare. While the measure of value 
employed for this purpose might be based on happiness or utility, economic analysis 
invariably dismisses these standards as indeterminate or unmeasurable, relying 
instead on more objective measures such as willingness to pay.”90 
 
In my view, the principles of economic efficiency and fairness underpin the reasoning of Lord 
Justice Sales of the English and Wales Court of Appeal in R (on the application of Best) v Chief 
Land Registrar.91 In that case, he observes that “…a primary objective of the law of adverse 
possession [is that] land should be put to use and not sterilised.”92 Although founded on the tort of 
trespass93, adverse possession law serves “valuable social and economic purposes, including that 
of ensuring that land is kept marketable and is not ‘sterilised’ by the inaction of the true owner.”94 
Inaction can stem from “abandonment or non-use by an owner who has no interest in it or who 
may have disappeared.”95 Lord Justice Sales further held that “[t]he public interest in having land 
put to good use and in having clear rules to govern acquisition of title to land which has been 
abandoned has been taken to override the general concern that a person should not benefit from 
their unlawful actions.”96 Accordingly, the law of adverse possession places a positive obligation 
on the true owner of land “to use the land in order to limit the risk that the property might be lost 
to an adverse claimant.”97 An owner’s failure to use their land may result in being statute-barred 
from suing an adverse possessor of that land.98 While there is no right to adverse possession in 
Saskatchewan, other provinces maintain such rights through legislation, and the period of time that 
 
87 For more on the economic position that principles of property will lean toward wealth maximization if 
transferability is pursued, see Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 6th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2014) at 27-28. 
88 N. Elfant, "Compensation for the Involuntary Transfer of Property Between Private Parties: Application of a 
Liability Rule to the Law of Adverse Possession" (1984) 79 Northwestern University L Rev 758 at 758. 
89 Ibid at 760. 
90 David Duff, “Benefit Taxes and User Fees in Theory and Practice” (2004) 54 UTLJ 391 at 396. 
91 R (on the application of Best) v Chief Land Registrar, [2015] 4 All ER 495, [2015] EWCA Civ 17.  
92 Ibid at 77. 
93 Ibid at 44. 
94 Ibid at 107. 
95 Ibid at 20. 
96 Ibid at 44. 
97 Ziff, supra note 87 at 142.  
98 Ibid at 140. 
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an adverse possessor has to possess the land before a true owner is statute-barred from suing can 
range from ten to twenty years.99  
 
The laws of adverse possession, wills, succession, intestacy, abandonment and so on, support the 
notion that ‘use’ is one of the key interests in property, so much so that the law has established a 
number of areas, rules and procedures to ensure use continues by passing property to a subsequent 
owner deemed in law as having use for it.   
 
Conclusion 
The above appraisal shows that laws exist to ensure property will pass to the next rightful owner. 
The enforcement of intestate succession rules as well as rules of construction that favour gifts 
vesting and oppose them being contingent for a long time or in perpetuity are clear signals that the 
law is keen to save property from going to waste by instituting processes that ensure property 
continues to be productive for as long as it has use. However, notwithstanding these well-
established rules, when a person dies without leaving behind instructions concerning organ 
donation, the law does not intervene the same way it does in intestacy and testamentary 
circumstances. Worse still, the law upholds an organ donation framework that allows the 
deceased’s next of kin to veto donative intent. In the law of wills, such a format would be abhorrent. 
A will that is validly executed and probated mandates the disposal of the deceased’s property as 
directed therein.100 Where there is a lack of clarity in a will, courts will be guided by the testator’s 
expressed intent, or a construction “ascertainable from the language of the will.”101  
 
With the law of wills in mind, why then does the law uphold such a different framework for the 
post-mortem donation of organs and tissue? More specifically, why is it that family continues to 
hold such a powerful place in the organ donation framework? What is it about our organs and tissue 
that lead the state to refrain from codifying our post-mortem donative wishes? Why are donation 
frameworks so concerned with the emotional and psychological state of a deceased’s family,102 and 
why do procurement practices tiptoe around these considerations?103 If extrinsic evidence is 
admissible in the law of wills for clarifying testamentary intention,104 why are signed donation 
cards and consent registries not enough to confirm intention and initiate post-mortem donations? 
 
 
99 The Land Titles Act, 2000, SS 2000, c L-5.1 s 21. In Alberta, the period is ten years. See Limitations Act, RSA 
2000, c L-12, s 3(1), 3(4). In Prince Edward Island, the period is twenty years. See Statute of Limitations, RSPEI 
1988, c S-7, s 16.  
100 Neuberger, supra note 84 at 118; Spence, supra note 78 at 68.  
101 Per Godin J in Hayes, supra note 79 at para 17 (WL). On the importance of ascertaining the testator’s intention 
and the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to do so, see the reasons for judgment by Vancise JA in Ratzlaff Estate v 
Ratzlaff, 2002 SKCA 53 at 45-48, 2002 CarswellSask 246 (WL) [Ratzlaff] and Re Tilbury, supra note 80; Re 
McKellar, [1972] 3 OR 16, 27 DLR (3d) 289; Re Essex County Roman Catholic Separate School Board and Antaua, 
80 DLR (3d) 405, [1977] CarswellOnt 429 (WL). See also Lord Atkin’s observation in Perrin v Morgan, [1943] AC 
399 at page 415, [1943] 1 All ER 187: “I anticipate with satisfaction that henceforth the group of ghosts of 
dissatisfied testators who…wait on the other bank of the Styk to receive the judicial personages who have 
misconstrued their wills, may be considerably diminished.” 
102 See E.L. Eckenrod, “Psychological/Emotional Trauma of Donor Families” (2008) 40 Transplantation Proceedings 
1061-1063. 
103 See Margareta A. Sanner, “Two perspectives on organ donation: experiences of potential donor families and 
intensive care physicians of the same event” (2007) 22 Journal of Critical Care 296 at 303. 
104 Ratzlaff, supra note 101; Canada Trust, supra note 77. 
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If we think of organs and tissue as our property, we ought to be able to decide where these things 
go when we die. Where we have failed to make any instruction during our lifetime, the government 
ought to have a process in place that mitigates against the waste of such property. But where we 
are unable to make these decisions (as minors or adult dependants) or where we wish to defer the 
decision to someone else, the government should also have a process that qualifies the next of kin’s 
role in such situations.  
 
In the inter vivos context, competent adults can make informed decisions to gift their organs, tissue 
and blood. Generally speaking, where it is clinically viable, especially in life saving circumstances, 
these “gifts of life” will transfer pursuant to the intent of the living donor.105 The law recognizes 
and respects autonomous choice in inter vivos organ donations, as it does in testamentary contexts. 
So, what changes in the post-mortem donation context that causes the law to downplay donor and 
non-donor instructions? Why does the law differentiate its concern for wasting realty from the 
concern for wasting organs and tissue? Chapter 3, which follows, will investigate why organs and 
tissue are treated differently after we die and will question whether, according to property theory, 

















105 Inter vivos transfer of organs and tissue is legislated in all provincial and territorial donation statute. For the 
Saskatchewan provisions concerning “Gifts for Transplants During Life”, see the 2015 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 






When we think of property, we tend to think of land and other tangible objects; or, generally, things 
we can see and touch. My house is property; the park is property; that cellphone is property. In this 
way, when we think of property in the everyday sense, we also – but perhaps unknowingly – tend 
to think of those things in relation to ownership or function. By exploring theoretical bases of 
property and law, this chapter aims to show that there are principled reasons for treating body parts 
as personal property in the organ donation context.  
 
First, through a review of A.M. Honoré’s incidents of ownership, this chapter will demonstrate 
how property is more than a thing; that it is a legal construct that develops when a right of 
ownership to a particular thing is legally enforced by law. Through this rights-based appreciation 
of “property”, Part 1 of this chapter surveys areas of our current legal system that show signs that 
Honoré’s characteristics of personal property ownership have already been recognized and 
enforced in body parts in certain contexts. In doing so, this section will demonstrate a clear and 
necessary connection between property and law.  
 
Part 2 of this chapter focuses on the intersection between property and law. Since property is a 
legal construct, an understanding of property’s formation would be incomplete without further 
consideration for what qualifies rules as “law”, or in this context, what qualifies ownership as an 
enforceable right to property. Accordingly, Part 2 of this chapter will turn to theoretical 
explanations for how the law comes to be. In reviewing law according to both natural law and legal 
positivist theory, this section will demonstrate how two seemingly contrasting theoretical 
explanations of law can substantiate arguments in favour of enforceable personal property rights 
in body parts within the organ donation context.  
 
3.1 What is Property? 
 
What is property? What constitutes property? How do we know when something is property? These 
questions have been the subject of much academic debate for many years and they continue to 
divide opinion. To the average person, property is understood as a word that denotes ownership. In 
this sense, the use of the word “property” is typically applied as a label to show ownership over 
objects or things.1 Most people will have heard or used phrases such as “Get off my property!” or 
“Hey! That’s mine!” but not all people realize the legal nuances of those phrases. Still, in the 
general sense, the concept of property and the word, “property”, do convey a right to some object 
or thing. This general concept of property traces to the law’s deeper consideration and regulation 
of ownership. As Jeremy Waldron puts it, “[t]he concept of property is the concept of a system of 
rules governing access to and control of material resources.”2  
 
 
1 C.B. Macpherson, “The Meaning of Property” in C.B. Macpherson, ed, Property: Mainstream and Critical 
Positions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) 1 at 2. 
2 Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) at 31. For incorporeal 
property (“intellectual property, property in ideas and inventions, reputations, stocks and shares, choses in action, 
even positions of employment”) see Waldron’s discussion, ibid at 33-37. 
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In law, the term “property” describes the relationship and legal rights that people have to things. 
Much like its use in the general sense, “property” serves as a symbol of legal ownership. But 
ownership is more deeply understood in law as invariably forming the basis for all property. Thus, 
when we speak of property in law, we really speak of ownership and “…those legal rights, duties 
and other incidents…” dispensed by our legal system to connect a person (or persons) to a particular 
thing.3 In this way, property has been considered not just as material objects but also as a bundle 
of rights4 or “a collection of rights (over things) enforceable against others.”5   
 
Jeremy Waldron describes tangible property as a material resource and explains that “[s]omething 
is to be regarded as a material resource if it is a material object capable of satisfying some human 
need or want.”6 According to the legal philosopher, A. M. Honoré, unfettered ownership of a 
property (i.e. of a material resource) is the greatest interest that can be held in law, and it involves 
the right to use, exclude, lend, sell or will a material resource away.7 Still, ownership has its limits 
and to use Honoré’s example, an owner is not free to use her personal property in a way that would 
cause physical harm against her neighbor. The law will always regulate the scope of ownership of 
(i.e. the rights to) a particular property.  
 
With regard to the law’s regulation of ownership, Honoré submits that common features of 
ownership will transcend particular legal systems.8 These he termed “the standard incidents of 
ownership”, and they include (1) the right to possess; (2) the right to use; (3) the right to manage; 
(4) the right to the income; (5) the right to the capital; (6) the right to security (i.e. the right to 
remain owner indefinitely); (7) the incident of transmissibility (i.e. the ability to transfer to a 
successor); (8) the incident of absence of term9 (i.e. the ability to enjoy the thing in absence of 
term); (9) the prohibition of harmful use; (10) liability to execution (i.e. executability; that the 
owner’s interest can be taken away to pay for a debt; and (11) the incident of residuary character 
(i.e. when interests lesser than ownership terminate, such as leases or easements, the law provides 
for corresponding rights to vest back into the owner).10 
 
3 A. M. Honoré, “Ownership” in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (First Series), A.G. Guest, ed., (Clarendon Press: 
Oxford, 1961) 107 at 107.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 6th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2014) at 2, referring to C.B. MacPherson’s take 
on property as depicted in Macpherson, supra note 1.   
6 Waldron, supra note 2 at 31. 
7 Honoré, supra note 3 at 108.  
8 Ibid.  
9 As explained by Imogen Goold, Professor of Law at University of Oxford, “…absence of term is related to 
transmissibility as both affect the duration of ownership. Absence of term refers to the indeterminate length of one’s 
ownership rights…Ownership, thus, would continue indefinitely unless terminated by the owner, but for the fact that 
at some point the owner will die. It is for this reason that an indeterminate interest must be linked to a power of 
transmissibility to deal with the fate of the object upon the owner’s death. An interest for life differs slightly, as it is 
determinate, ceasing at death.” Goold notes that in relation to human tissue “there may be problems with determining 
who is the owner with an indefinite interest” because common law cases and human tissue legislation are silent on 
absence of term in relation to human tissue. Statute provides a consent format and defines uses for tissue, but the 
legislation does not “contain any suggestions that once it has been used the right to use it ceases, or that possessory 
rights cease either. In the absence of such provision, it seems that most [but not all] researchers, hospitals and tissue 
banks have simply continued to hold tissue indefinitely.” See Imogen Goold, “Sounds Suspiciously like Property 
Treatment: Does Human Tissue Fit within the Common Law Concept of Property?” (2005) University of 
Technology Sydney Law Review 62 at 64-65. 
10 Honoré, supra note 3 at 107. 
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In describing his eleven “standard incidents of ownership”, Honoré notes that full ownership can 
be recognized where there is most, but not necessarily all, of his incidents accounted for.11 In this 
way, Honoré’s approach to identifying property is broad and flexible and recognizes that not all 
things that people generally consider to be “property” will share all of the same characteristics of 
ownership.12 Thus, even though not all eleven incidents will apply to things we know as property, 
there will inevitably be a nexus between all things that are considered to be property because those 
things will comprise certain characteristics of ownership.13 In this way, Honoré’s theory 
compliments our consideration of personal property ownership in organs and tissue because it is 
such an open and flexible theory.14  
 
Even though Honoré himself observed that “a person is not, in most systems, regarded as owning 
his body...”, he qualified this statement to the era in which it was said, observing further that 
personal ownership in one’s body is influenced by the fact that body parts were, at that time, not 
considered external material objects.15 And this was true. Honoré penned his theory of ownership 
in 1960 when transplant surgery was still in its infancy “and a multitude of medical technologies 
and applications utilizing the body and its parts and products were decades away”.16 Accordingly, 
we need not visit each of Honoré’s incidents in great detail, but the following discussion provides 
a brief focus on a select few to enhance arguments in favour of personal property ownership in 
organs and tissue. 
 
3.1.1 Incidents of Ownership in the Human Body 
 
a) The Right to Possess & The Ability to Transfer 
Honoré’s first incident of ownership is “the right to possess”, being the right to “have exclusive 
physical control of a thing, or to have such control as the nature of the thing admits”.17 Interestingly, 
Honoré reduced this incident further, and clarified that it can be “divided into two aspects, [1] the 
right to be put in exclusive control of a thing and [2] the right to remain in control,” the latter of 
which is underscored by the notion that others should not interfere in that control without 
permission.18 Honoré also argued that a legal system protects ownership where it has established 
“rules and procedures for attaining these ends”.19 Jeremy Waldron would add that property rules 
help determine “peacefully and reasonably predictably who is to have access to which resources 
for what purposes and when.”20 
 
This incident of possession already fits with our notions of possession of the body and body parts 
of the living, the dead, and the dying. Theories of informed consent, physician fiduciary duty, and 
civil law measures like the current consent framework for inter vivos organ donation all point to a 
legal system with established rules and procedures for putting individuals in exclusive control over 
 
11 Ibid at 112-113.  
12 Muireann Quigley, “Property and the body: Applying Honoré” (2007) 33 J Med Ethics 631 at 632. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Honoré, supra note 3 at 130. 
16 Quigley, supra note 12 at 632. 
17 Honoré, supra note 3 at 113. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Waldron, supra note 2 at 32. 
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their body parts. Even the post-mortem donation provisions aim (albeit not well) to give people 
exclusive and binding authority to decide whether their own organs and tissue will be donated after 
death. Donation legislation outlines the procedures for these autonomous choices to be recorded, 
but these procedures are then skewed by infringing procurement practices (namely, the practice of 
validating the deceased’s prior given consent with the family’s subsequent consent) and health 
region donor cards that should serve as a mechanism for recording legal consent as outlined in the 
statute, but do not.  
 
The donation frameworks also demonstrate Honoré’s incident of transmissibility. By way of human 
tissue legislation, the law has put in place rules and procedures for the inter vivos and post-mortem 
transfer of our organs and tissue to a successor. This is akin to the law’s recognition of cars as 
property, and to the rules enacted for transferring ownership in a car to a buyer, to a relative or to 
the owner’s estate.  
 
b) The Right to Security 
Like the “right to possess”, the “right to security” as a standard incident of personal property 
ownership (i.e. the right to remain the owner of an object indefinitely) is inherent in the very nature 
of organs and tissue. People want to remain the owner of their body parts for as long as they so 
choose and organ donation law recognizes this, particularly in the inter vivos donation context. 
Even though most people are born with two functioning kidneys and only need one to live, the law 
does not force people to give up a kidney to save the life of someone who could die because they 
do not receive a transplant. Indeed, the ‘right not to have a kidney taken from one’s body against 
his or her will’ is not only about property ownership but is also protected by Charter guarantees of 
life, liberty and security of the person.21 The effect of those rights is consistent with recognizing 
ownership of our organs and tissue because they provide for the right to remain the indefinite owner 
of our body parts. In this way, the law can and inadvertently does recognize this incident of 
ownership in our body.  
 
c) The Right to Use & The Right to Manage 
In line with the property incidents of possession and security, our legal system has also established 
rules around how an individual uses, manages and secures their personal body and this, too, is 
consistent with recognizing ownership of our organs and tissue. The rights to life, liberty and 
security of the person as guaranteed under the Charter come to mind again when thinking about 
how the law has established rules and procedures for using, managing, and securing our body parts. 
And while the Charter does not guarantee or constitutionalize any property right, it does 
constitutionalize the protection of the person – by guaranteeing that state laws will not infringe on 
our life, on our liberty and on the security of our person.22 This guarantee is exemplified by the 
decriminalization of abortion23 and physician assisted suicide,24 as well as the striking down of 
certain Criminal Code provisions found to violate sex workers’ rights to security of the person.25 
In my view, prohibitions on certain actions with a body are consistent with “general constraints on 
action” that are often applied to property. As Jeremy Waldron puts it, prohibitions on harmful 
 
21 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 7. 
22 Ibid. 
23 R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, [1988] SCJ No 1 (WL). 
24 Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331. 
25 Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 SCR 1101. 
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behaviour are really just “a general constraint on action.”26 When society sets limits on what may 
be done with a particular resource, “we can locate rules about property within those limits” and 
determine “which (generally permissible) actions may be performed with which resources.”27 
 
In this way, striking down prohibitions against particular actions with a body (abortion and 
physician assisted suicide) not only lifts certain constraints, but also signals that the Charter 
protects our abilities to control the integrity of our body, and by extension the Charter defends the 
individual’s dominion over his or her own body and parts thereof by guaranteeing that the state 
will not employ laws that interfere with the individual’s control over them. In my view, the lifting 
of these constraints is an indicium of personal property ownership in our body and body parts. This 
idea harks back to the “control” element of possession, which we discussed is based on the notion 
of non-interference by others without the owner’s permission.  
 
d) The Right to Income 
Moreover, “a right to the income” as a standard incident of personal property ownership is also 
exemplified where people are lawfully enabled to earn income from their own body. For example, 
Canadians can be compensated for participating in clinical research trials and the scope of 
compensation is regulated by Health Canada.28 Health Canada employs the Good Clinical Practice 
standard (GCP) when overseeing and regulating trials requiring human participation.29 
Approximately 900 clinical trials are authorized each year by Health Canada,30 and trial financing 
is provided by sponsors like pharmaceutical or biotech companies, as well as disease foundations 
and charities.31 Health Canada’s GCP guidelines recommend that the participant’s informed 
consent form contain information outlining, among other things, the “anticipated prorated payment, 
if any,…for participating in the trial.”32  
 
In 2018, a Tri-Council Policy Statement33 was established by Canada’s three federal research 
agencies – the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), the Natural Sciences and 
Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC), and the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council (SSHRC) – which aims “…to promote the ethical conduct of research involving 
humans.”34 Regarding payment for human participation in clinical trials, the policy states that 
incentives can be “monetary or otherwise” and “differ from reimbursements and compensation for 
injury….”35 The policy further notes that “[w]here incentives are offered to participants, they 
 
26 Waldron, supra note 2 at 32. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Government of Canada, “Health Canada’s Clinical Trials Database” (07 June 2016), online 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/drug-products/health-canada-clinical-trials-
database.html> [Clinical Trials Database]. 
29 Health Canada, Good Clinical Practice: Integrated Addendum to E6(R1) (Health Canada Guidance Document) (25 
May 2017), online <https://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/pdf/prodpharma/applic-demande/guide-
ld/ich/efficac/e6r2-step4-eng.pdf> at 1 [Health Canada Clinical Trial Guidance Document]. 
30 Clinical Trials Database, supra note 28. 
31 It Starts With Me, “Glossary: Sponsor”, online <https://itstartswithme.ca/faq/#clinical-research>. 
32 Health Canada Clinical Trial Guidance Document, supra note 29 at 20. 
33 Canadian Institute of Health Research et al., Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research 
Involving Humans (December 2019), online <https://ethics.gc.ca/eng/documents/tcps2-2018-en-interactive-
final.pdf>. 
34 Ibid at 3.  
35 Ibid at 29. 
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should not be so large or attractive as to encourage reckless disregard or risks” which “…may 
amount to undue inducement and thus negate the voluntariness of participants’ consent.”36 Despite 
the caution surrounding participation incentives, the transactional relationship between a healthy 
participant and the sponsoring organization is consistent with the notion of ‘sale’ and exemplifies 
legal recognition of personal property ownership in one’s own body.  
 
Interestingly, legal prohibitions on compensation for certain parts of the body are actually not as 
exhaustive as we might think they are. For example, in Saskatchewan and New Brunswick, paid 
plasma donation is possible at private plasma clinics. In Saskatchewan, the enabling law is found 
at s 17 of The Human Tissue Gift Act37 and for New Brunswick it is s 10(1) of the Human Tissue 
Gift Act.38 Other Canadian provinces have yet to establish clinics but have similar statutory 
provisions that enable compensation for plasma donation as well as other regenerative material in 
some jurisdictions.39  
 
In Saskatoon and Moncton,40 Canadian Plasma Resources (CPR) will pay qualified donors for their 
blood plasma “wherever provincial law allows.”41 CPR’s website states that it will compensate 
qualified plasma donors up to $60 per donation, and that donors can give plasma twice in a seven 
day period.42 CPR claims the compensation is a show of appreciation for “the time, commitment 
and, in some cases, the expense that…donors dedicate to helping others.”43 CPR also acknowledges 
that its paid plasma donation program “…ensures a secure and safe supply of plasma for patients 
that need it.”44 On its website, CPR also incentivizes donations with a donor loyalty program, 
through which donors are entered to win “valuable gifts and prizes each year.”45  
 
36 Ibid at 29. 
37 The Human Tissue Gift Act, SS 2015 c H-15.1 [2015 Saskatchewan Act]. 
38 Human Tissue Gift Act, RSNB 2014, c 113 [New Brunswick Act]. 
39 For other provinces that enable paid plasma donation, see the Human Tissue Gift Act, RSBC 1996, c 211, s 10; The 
Human Tissue Gift Act, SM 1987-88, c 39, CCSM c H180, s 15(1); Trillium Gift of Life Network Act, RSO 1990 c 
H.20, s 10(2); Human Tissue Act, RSNL 1990, c H-15, s 18; Human Tissue Gift Act, RSY 2002, c 117, s 10; and 
Human Tissue Gift Act, RSNS 1989, c 215, s 11 (repealed; repeal in force January 18, 2021). Compensation remains 
possible under Nova Scotia’s new legislation, the  Human Organ and Tissue Donation Act, SNS 2019, c 6 (in force 
January 18, 2021), which prohibits dealing in organs, tissues or bodies for valuable consideration (s 27(1)) but the 
Act does not apply to blood, blood constituents and certain regenerative material (s 3). Section 27(2)(c) also carves 
out power for the health authority or Minister to authorize the buying and selling of tissues by the tissue bank. Prince 
Edward Island, the Northwest Territories and Alberta also make compensation possible. The Human Tissue 
Donation Act, RSPEI 1988, c H-12.1 prohibits the commercial transaction of tissue (s 15) but blood, blood 
constituents and certain regenerative material are among parts excluded from the definition of tissue (s 1(g)). The 
Human Tissue Donation Act, SNWT 2014, c 30 similarly prohibits the commercial transaction of tissue (s 18) but 
excludes blood, blood constituents and certain regenerative material from the definition of tissue (s 1). Similarly, the 
Human Tissue and Organ Donation Act, SA 2006, c H-14.5 prohibits “reward or benefit” for the transplantation of 
any body part (s 3(2)) but the Act does not apply to blood, blood constituents, certain regenerative material and by-
products used for a purpose other than transplantation (s 2). 
40 CPR clinics are located in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan and Moncton, New Brunswick. See Canadian Plasma 
Resources, “Contact”, online <https://giveplasma.ca/contact/>. 
41 Canadian Plasma Resources, “Compensation”, online <https://giveplasma.ca/become-a-donor/compensation/> 
[Canadian Plasma Resource, “Compensation”]. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Canadian Plasma Resources “Blood Donation VS Plasma Donation: An In-Depth Look” (23 January 2020), online 
<https://giveplasma.ca/blood-donation-vs-plasma-donation-an-in-depth-look/>. 
45 Canadian Plasma Resource, “Compensation”, supra note 41. 
 
 45 
Some may argue that CPR’s compensation is for the service of donating rather than for the sale of 
plasma, but in my view the argument is one of semantics. Although the language surrounding 
CPR’s payment and incentive program excludes terms like “buy” and “sell”, the transaction 
between CPR and the plasma “donor” is ultimately an exchange of a good (being plasma) and a 
service (donating) in exchange for money.46  
 
The argument that compensation is for the service of donating also seems inconsistent with the 
enabling law that allows blood plasma to be collected for compensation. For example, 
Saskatchewan and New Brunswick employ the language of “sale” in their statutory provisions. The 
substance of both provisions is that “…no person shall buy, sell or otherwise deal in, directly or 
indirectly, for a valuable consideration, any tissue for a transplant, or any body or part of a body 
other than blood or a blood constituent, for the purposes of transplant, medical education or 
scientific research”.47 In my view, the language suggests that the payment is more so for the blood 
constituent (being the plasma) than it is for the service of donating. However, putting this debate 
aside altogether, the fact that the law allows for this transaction in the first place (regardless of what 
we wish to attribute the compensation to) is still consistent with the notion of ‘sale’ and serves as 
another example of the legal recognition of personal property ownership in one’s own body. 
 
In Canada, the law’s prohibition on the sale of other parts of the body, such as kidneys, liver, heart, 
lungs, and so on, does not necessarily preclude arguments for personal property ownership in these 
and other organs and tissue. To relate the “income” indicia of ownership to an ownership context 
that we are familiar with, take for example the patient who buys prescription drugs which they then 
own but are prohibited from selling to other people. It was legal for the drug 
manufacturer/pharmacy to profit from the sale of that medicine to the patient, but the patient is 
prohibited from selling that prescription medication to someone else. In such a scenario, the 
‘income indicia’ is present up until ownership of the medication transfers to the patient, but the 
medication is still considered to be a property and is made no less a property by the subsequent 
restraint on alienation.  
 
46 Blood donors are not yet compensated even though the physical act of donating blood is quite similar to donating 
plasma, albeit donating blood is less time-consuming than donating plasma. According to the World Health 
Organization (WHO), voluntary non-remunerated blood donations contribute to a safe blood supply for patients 
requiring transfusions. See World Health Organization, Report on Global Consultation: 100% Voluntary Non-
Remunerated Donation of Blood and Blood Components (World Health Organization, Geneva, 2009). While blood 
plasma can be cleaned of diseases, blood itself cannot, and on this line of reasoning, the WHO intimates that a 
money incentive to increase blood donations would negatively impact the quality of the blood supply, as people with 
blood diseases would be more apt to come forward and donate under false declaration of clean blood. However, 
blood donation is rigorously screened for disease and so the science substantiating the WHO’s policy on non-
commercialization of blood donation remains unclear. Arguably, the WHO’s policy is only substantiated by evidence 
from uncontrolled studies that used non-random samples. See, for example, T. Eastlund, “Monetary blood donation 
incentives and the risk of transfusion-transmitted infection” (1998) 38:9 Transfusion 874-882. For the argument that 
randomized field trials (which are typically relied on to form health policy) show that donor pools are not worsened 
by money incentives, see Nicola Lacetera and Mario Macis et al., “Economic Rewards to Motivate Blood 
Donations” (2019) 340: 6135 Science 927-928. In that study, the authors suggest that the evidence rendered under 
those uncontrolled studies of non-random samples has unfortunately driven laws and policies that ban economic 
incentives for blood, organ and reproductive tissue donation in many countries. 
47 2015 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 37 at s 17. For the near-identical law in New Brunswick see New Brunswick 
Act, supra note 38 at s 10(1): “No person shall buy, sell or otherwise deal in, directly or indirectly, for a valuable 
consideration, any human tissue for a transplant or any human body or part of any human body, other than blood or a 
blood constituent, for therapeutic purposes or for the purposes of medical education or scientific research.” 
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As Professor Muireann Quigley has observed, it is acceptable to the bundle of rights theory that 
“the body might be considered property on some occasions or in some situations but not others. 
For that reason, it simply does not matter if it is concluded that, for example, the right to income 
of the thing when applied to the body does not include of the sale of body parts.”48 Even though 
the sale of certain body parts is prohibited, ownership in organs and tissue is nonetheless still 
evidenced by those occasions where a person can exchange a bodily substance, like blood plasma, 
for compensation.  
 
3.1.2 Limitations & Enforceability of Ownership  
 
Limitations on the scope of ownership (e.g. that a thing can be inter vivos donated but cannot be 
sold) does not preclude the thing from being property. On the contrary, constraints on ownership 
are expected and part of the normative framework governing personal property ownership. Some 
medicines can be sold for money and some are illegal to sell, but both medicines are still known to 
be the personal property of someone. Although the law prohibits the sale of a liver but allows 
compensation for blood plasma donation, it does not automatically follow that the liver is any less 
property than blood plasma. Quite the reverse, the law’s control of the sale of body parts suggests 
that both the liver and blood plasma are property requiring limitations as to how they can be 
alienated from one owner to another, much like other property ownership that is regulated by the 
law (like prescription medications, vehicles, guns, etc.). Again, limitations on the scope of 
ownership do not preclude the thing from being property.  
 
Still, notwithstanding that human body parts seem to check several of Honoré’s incidents of 
ownership, the law has long established that a person does not own their body. Rather, the person 
is considered to have “a right to bodily security or liberty,”49 but this right has not extended into 
the realm of property rights in one’s own body. While this might seem inconsequential, the 
difference between a right to bodily security or liberty versus a personal property right in our bodies 
is that, when we die, our organs and tissue are not treated as objects of personal property. This is 
problematic because once we die our prior choices about our body seem to fall into the crack where 
property law fails to extend to our post-mortem body. When this happens, and it inevitably does 
happen every time someone dies under the current donation framework, our choices about where 
we want our body parts to go are not safeguarded by the same protections afforded to choices 
concerning property.  
 
As we have come to know, property is largely understood to be an enforceable right to a particular 
thing.50 Therefore, to have a legally recognized claim (i.e., to have ‘ownership’) in some thing, it 
is imperative that the law enforces that claim. With law’s enforcement, the right to the thing is 
legally recognized and the same is true in reverse: i.e., without law’s enforcement, the right to the 
thing is not legally recognized.51 Without law’s recognition, that claim is unsubstantiated and ‘is 
not good against the world’. Put another way, that claim will not trump claims to the same object 
that may be made by others. Thus, the enforceability factor of the asserted ownership right is 
absolutely imperative. In this way, then, objects that may be property are only truly property if they 
 
48 Quigley, supra note 12 at 632. 
49 Honoré, supra note 3 at 129. 




can be owned. And an object can only truly be owned if the law not only recognizes that ownership 
but enforces or gives effect to that ownership as well.  
 
Depending on whom you ask, the law’s enforceability of an ownership right is contingent on 
different things. What I aim to show in the discussion that follows is that two ostensibly contrasting 
theoretical views of jurisprudence can support the case for personal property ownership in organs 
and tissue. First, I will explore the natural law theory of jurisprudence, which is of the view that 
the law’s enforceability of a right will depend on whether society believes that the right to 
ownership over an object is moral. If it is moral, i.e., if society believes that there ‘ought to be’ 
personal property ownership in the object, then law will enforce that ownership claim.  
 
In contrast, I will also explore the legal positivist theory of law as according to H.L.A. Hart. Per 
Hart’s approach to legal positivism, the enforceability of an ownership right will depend on 
whether human body parts fall within the ‘penumbra’ of property law, and then, if they do, whether 
the established rules of property should, based on social aim and policy, apply to this penumbra 
problem. 
 
3.2 Property in Theories of Jurisprudence 
 
a) Natural Law Theory 
Generally speaking, natural law theory believes that there is a necessary connection between law 
and morality. The traditional view of natural law theory stresses that “it is essential to the concept 
of a legal system that the apparatus of rules, courts and government, is aimed at the common 
good.”52 From the natural law perspective, “when there is a conflict between natural law and human 
law, natural law must take precedence” and therefore “all human-made law must be in accordance 
with the fundamental natural law principles”, such as “notions of doing good, avoiding evil and 
promoting the common good.”53 For a rule to be legitimately called a “law”, it must be morally 
justified, according to natural law theory.54 
 
In this same vein, natural law theory believes that property rights “have legitimacy independently 
of, and antecedent to, government.”55 In the early days of natural rights theory, John Locke 
famously defended individual rights against government authoritarianism in Two Treatises of 
Government (1689). In that work he explained,  
 
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man 
has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The 
Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it 
in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and [joined] to it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state 
Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the 
 
52 N.E. Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence: Justice, Law and Rights, 2nd ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2002) at 158. 
53 William C. Starr, “Law and Morality in H.L.A. Hart’s Legal Philosophy” (1984) 67:4 Marquette Law Review 673 
at 673-4. 
54 Ibid at 674. 
55 B. Bjorkman & S. O. Hansson, “Bodily Rights and Property Rights” (2006) 32:4 J Med Ethics 209 at 209. 
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common right of other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of 
the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once [joined] to, at least 
where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.56 
 
Interestingly, the starting point of Locke’s theory of private ownership is first and foremost the 
assumption that we have property in ourselves, or “in his own Person” as he puts it. According to 
Locke, people have a duty to preserve themselves and God’s other creatures, and rights to land and 
other things are integral in order to carry out such a duty.57 When carrying out this duty of 
preservation, we mix our labour with objects, thereby adding value to those objects and thereby 
making us the legitimate and exclusive owners of that object.58  
 
However, some theorists have pointed out that mixing labour with an object does not necessarily 
add value to it, nor does it necessarily provide a basis for legitimate ownership over the entire 
object since arguably the labourer should only be entitled to the added value, if there is any.59 In 
this way, and in the context of identifying the contents of property rights, the natural rights theory 
of property has been called an “all or nothing theory.”60 
 
Notwithstanding its supposedly limited application, the Lockean view of mixing labour with 
objects has served as the basis for some courts ruling that hospitals hold property in excised organs 
and tissue, or in cell lines created from excised bodily specimens, because of added labour from 
altering or storing removed body parts.61 Yet, in matters concerning human cadavers, the notion 
that relatives have property in a deceased’s body has not found favour by the courts, and some 
argue that this is largely based on the Lockean view that the relatives’ labour has not been mixed 
with the corpse and therefore the body is res nullis (owned by no one).62 In this way, the Lockean 
view seems consistent with relatives not having property in a deceased’s body.  
 
On the contrary, some might argue that Locke would support a decision-making role for next of 
kin grounded in a property right based on their “labour of love”. Supporters of this view could 
argue the next of kin’s labour has “mixed” with the deceased individual over time, thus establishing 
a temporary or, in instances of death, permanent, right to control the fate of the individual’s objects, 
which include organs, tissue, or the body as a whole. The substitute decision-making provisions 
within organ donation legislation may be consistent with this view insofar as they authorize the 
people closest to us to determine what will be done with our organs and tissue. Where the individual 
lacks the requisite capacity to make donative decisions, or in those instances where donative intent 
is “double checked”, the law assumes that the people closest to us are the most appropriate 
 
56 John Locke, “Chapter 5: Of Property (from Second Treatise of Government)” in C.B. Macpherson, ed, Property: 
Mainstream and Critical Positions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) 15 at 18. 
57 Bjorkman & Hansson, supra note 55 at 209. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid at 210. 
61 Ibid. For examples, see Moore v Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal (3d) 120 (1990), 793 P2d 479; 
Piljak Estate v Abraham, 2014 ONSC 2893, [2014] OJ No 2665 (QL). 
62 Bjorkman & Hansson, supra note 55 at 210. There are undoubtedly other concerns that contribute to the notion 
that relatives do not have property in a deceased’s body, such as concerns for public health, disease control or 
mishandling of corpses. 
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substitute decision-makers. In this way, the law empowers family members with ownership rights 
over the body, and thus there may be some consistency with the Lockean view.  
 
However, the Lockean view encounters a flaw if used as a theoretical explanation in support of 
relatives having property in a deceased’s body. When the law empowers family members with 
ownership rights over the body, it denies those same ownership rights to the person whose body it 
was. The Lockean view of property favours the primary labourer, and who puts more labour into 
our own organs than ourselves? The body and its collection of parts are in some sense one and the 
same and it should follow that the person whose body it was should be able make binding decisions 
concerning where his or her body and body parts go upon death.  
 
Adding to this thought experiment, I further submit that post-mortem organ and tissue donation is 
very much in line with the Lockean view of property. Reflecting once again on Honoré’s incidents 
of ownership, we recall that organs and tissue seem to be as much property as any other tangible 
object that comes to mind when we think of things we own. If we consider that death is imminent 
and is one of the most natural states of life, we should appreciate how modern medicine has 
established a window of opportunity within which Locke’s ‘State of Nature’ (being death) ‘hath 
provided’ organs and tissue into a common domain from which those properties “ought to be” 
removed from the body to become the property of another living person (the organ recipient) who 
will inevitably mix their labour into the property. Accordingly, Locke’s age-old theory of private 
property ownership can validate meaningful reform on moral grounds.  
 
b) Legal Positivist Theory 
Sitting opposite to the natural law theory of jurisprudence is legal positivism. Like the natural law 
approach, legal positivist theory also views property as a legal construct. However, the traditional 
view of legal positivism believes that natural law theory unnecessarily confuses law and morality.63 
According to the traditional and more formal view of legal positivism, law and the legal system 
“should be explicated in terms of purely factual, non-moral criteria”.64  
 
On this account, the common thesis of legal positivist theory is that there is no necessary connection 
between law and morality. Subscribers to this notion maintain that “a legal system is a closed 
logical system in which correct decisions can be deduced from predetermined legal rules by logical 
reasons alone.”65 From this perspective, the legal positivist would argue that the enforceability of 
an ownership claim depends on whether the subject making the claim and the object being claimed 
actually fall within the “juridical definition of property.”66 In this way, legal positivists believe that 
the formal principles of justice, being predetermined legal rules, are desirable to our legal system.67 
It is a “basic principle of fairness” that the legal system “should treat like cases alike, and different 
cases differently”, according to legal positivism.68  
 
 
63 Simmonds, supra note 52 at 159.   
64 Ibid.   
65 Starr, supra note 53 at 681. 
66 Ziff, supra note 5 at 2. 




From the perspective of a legal positivist, property has been understood in relation to rights and the 
term property refers to the entitlements that the law has recognized in relation to ownership.69 As 
so eloquently put by Jeremy Bentham, “[p]roperty and law are born and die together. Before laws 
were made there was no property; take away laws and property ceases.”70 In this way, the positivist 
approach views property as a construction of law, and the juridical definition of property will 
determine the objects of property and the subjects that can own it.71  
 
According to legal positivist H.L.A. Hart, a law will govern a certain type of behaviour, but there 
must be a common understanding (or “settled meaning”) in society of what the particular behaviour 
is that the law governs.72 And in addition to this “settled meaning” which is at the core of the law, 
there is also Hart’s so-called “penumbra”, which rests on the periphery of that core and wherein 
fall those “debatable cases” dealing with behaviours/words that are “neither obviously applicable 
nor obviously ruled out” by the governing law.73 Put another way, someone must decide whether 
the legal rule can extend to govern the penumbra issues that do not necessarily fall within the settled 
meaning of the behaviour that the law is established to govern.74 Determining whether a penumbra 
problem falls within the scope of a legal rule cannot be established by logical deductive reasoning, 
according to Hart.75 Rather, the determination of penumbra problems must be “sound or rational 
without being logically conclusive”.76 
 
According the Hart, the criterion that makes penumbra decisions sound is the concept of “what the 
law ought to be” – and this criterion demonstrates the necessary intersection between law and 
morality. Thus, Hart’s legal positivist theory is not as rigid as the common thesis of legal 
positivism, which seems to be emphatic about the judicial process being “primarily a deductive 
reasoning process.”77 As Hart observes, any insistence on the separation of law and morals is 
misleading and false because it fails to admit the penumbra problems that inevitably surface in our 
legal system.78 As Hart explains, such a rigid view of the law is considered to be an inaccuracy of 
the original thesis because it is erroneous to think that the reasoning involved in a judicial decision 
is deduced from premises that are not influenced by the judge’s “practical choices or decisions”.79  
 
When we consider the issue of whether organs and tissue are property for the purposes of post-
mortem donation, I suggest we think of it in terms of a penumbra problem. At the law’s core of 
settled meaning are Honoré’s incidents of ownership. And so, while certain features of Honoré’s 
incidents of ownership are apparent in human body parts, by way of Hart’s approach, judges need 
not apply any of these elements as strict principles that are always necessary for finding an 
enforceable ownership right. To make sound determinations about penumbra problems such as 
this, judges could – and, according to positivists like Hart, should – consider the issue “in light of 
 
69 Ziff, supra note 5 at 2. 
70 J. Bentham, The Theory of Legislation (Bristol: Thoemmes Pr., 2004 ed., 1802) vol. 1 at 113 as cited by Ziff, 
supra note 5 at 2. 
71 Ziff, supra note 5 at 2. 










social aim.”80 While Hart recognizes that law and morality interact with each other, he is careful 
not to find morality as a necessary element of something that is legally enforceable (such as a right 
or a claim).81 As Hart explains, “the intelligent decision of penumbral questions is one made not 
mechanically but in the light of aims, purposes, and policies, though not necessarily in the light of 
anything we would call moral principles.”82  
 
Thus, if we pause to imagine a court being confronted with the issue of whether we have personal 
property ownership in our body parts after we die, we are standing in the penumbra of property law 
and asking the court to tell us if the juridical definition of personal property applies to body parts 
in the post-mortem context. And, since the legal definition of property is understood as being a 
right to a thing, we are really asking the court to determine whether living persons have the right 
to be able to control the fate of their body parts after death, much like their right to make 
testamentary dispositions concerning other kinds of property.  
 
When we examine the penumbra problem again with these thoughts fresh in mind, we see that it is 
indeed tricky to conclusively demonstrate how legal positivism supports personal property 
ownership (i.e. a legally enforceable claim) to our body parts. This is so because Hart’s legal 
positivism is more concerned with offering an accurate description of the legal system’s process 
for establishing law than it is with validating or invalidating laws on moral grounds.83 Still, 
invoking Hart’s legal positivist theory is useful because it helps identify post-mortem body parts 
as a penumbra problem that can fall very well within the ambit of property law.  
 
Our discussion of Honoré’s incidents of property shows to some extent there has already been legal 
recognition, albeit indirectly, of some personal ownership in our body parts, at least whilst we are 
alive and whilst our parts are attached to our person. The law has enforced these property rights by 
establishing various rules for how we govern our bodies and how the state can (and cannot) govern 
our bodies. As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, time and technology have encouraged the common 
law to evolve on questions and claims of property in body parts. Recent case law like Lam84, C.C. 
v A.W.85 and Re JS86 put the self-ownership question into the penumbra. These cases and the legal 
questions they answer weigh in favour of property rights being in line with what the law ought to 
be, precisely because these questions are in the penumbra, consistent with Hart.  
 
The common law continues to expand and show us that individual autonomy, informed consent, 
and life, liberty and security of the person are values that must be recognized and respected when 
determining legal questions about the human body and body parts. However, at the core of our 
donation system sits legislation that does not totally align with these values. The result is a 
legislative framework that stands in the way of where the common law ought to go with respect to 
post-mortem organ donation. Meaningful reform is therefore necessary to move the core of our 
organ donation law so that it aligns with those aforementioned values; values that we have come 
 
80 Ibid at 611. 
81 Starr, supra note 53 at 687. 
82 Hart, supra note 72 at 614. 
83 Starr, supra note 53 at 688. 
84 Lam v University of British Columbia, 2013 BCSC 2094, 20 BLR (5th) 139; aff’d 2015 BCCA 2, [2015] 4 WWR 
213. 
85 C.C. v A.W., 2005 ABQB 290, 50 Alta LR (4th) 61. 
86 Re JS, [2016] EWHC 2859 (Fam). 
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to recognize as paramount in our society. The current donation framework appears to fly in the face 
of these advancements and continued enforcement of the same antiquated donation model is 




In this chapter I have aimed to show that property rights in the post-mortem donation process can 
be substantiated by dominant (and sometimes conflicting) theories of private property. As 
previously discussed, modern medicine has made organ and tissue transplantation a viable and 
lifesaving form of medicine. Imbuing organs and tissue with principles of property law should 
guide legislatures toward constructing a framework that not only respects individual autonomy by 
codifying recorded post-mortem instruction (i.e. protecting a deceased’s instruction to donate or to 
refrain from donating), but also answers the need for increased donations by facilitating the 
donation process in instances where post-mortem instruction was not left. Have other countries 
been more successful in achieving this balance? The next chapter of this thesis examines what 
successes, if any, other countries have experienced by employing a mandated choice or presumed 


































Other Donation Frameworks 
 
As we saw in Chapter 1, provincial donation laws are uniformly entrenched in altruism and have 
taken the form of “opt-in” donation models. As discussed, dependency on this notion of altruism 
is problematic because in most cases families become empowered as the ultimate decision makers 
over whether an individual’s body parts are donated after death, and this form of substitute 
decision-making is regularly engaged irrespective of the deceased’s prior given intent. The result 
is a donation framework that violates donor autonomy whilst undermining the serious need for 
increased donations.  
 
To meaningfully address the need for increased donations, a successful provincial framework must 
turn its attention to the thousands of potential donors who die each year without donating their 
organs and tissue. Part 1 of this chapter contrasts presumed consent and mandated choice schemes 
to consider whether this aim is being achieved under these different frameworks. As we will see, 
common unease surrounding notions of “default” have marred the public’s acceptance of these 
types of donation systems in Canada. However, through an overview of regional case studies, Part 
2 of this chapter will argue that even though family input and other variables can indeed impact a 
presumed consent model’s effect on donation rates, it is ultimately the default mechanism of that 
opt-out framework that is the key distinguishing feature placing presumed consent above other 
donation models.  
 
4.1 Presumed Consent & Mandated Choice 
 
Presumed consent, which is sometimes referred to as the “opt-out” system, hypothetically functions 
as a donation framework under which our consent to donate would be presumed unless we 
explicitly opt out. Under presumed consent legislation, individuals are considered to be post-
mortem donors unless they explicitly rebut the presumption to donate, which is typically done by 
way of a notation on their driver’s licence.1 In light of ongoing organ shortages across the 
developed world, presumed consent has found itself at the centre of heated debates concerning how 
the state should adequately respond to society’s increasing need for donor organs and tissue.  
 
Mandated choice, on the other hand, is a donation framework that requires a person to register a 
decision concerning post-mortem donation. American lawyer, Haley Cotter, has described this 
framework as follows:  
 
…mandated choice, a system in which individuals are prospectively required to 
register their intentions to donate or not to donate their organs when they die. These 
registered choices are legally binding upon the individual’s death. Mandated choice 
differs from the current system of organ donation in which many individuals die 
without expressing a legally enforceable decision regarding organ donation. 
 
1 Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, “Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron” (2003) 70:4 Chi L Rev 1159 
at 1191. See also: A. Abadie & S. Gay, “The impact of presumed consent legislation on cadaveric organ donation: a 
cross-country study” (2006) 25:4 J Health Econ 599 at 599. 
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Mandated choice has the potential to increase the organ supply while maintaining 
individual autonomy and preserving informed consent.”2 
 
Use and study of the mandated choice donation framework is lacking compared to presumed 
consent. Other than the following Texas and Illinois examples, my research has not uncovered any 
other setting where mandated choice has been tested or explicitly enacted. In theory, the 2006 
Alberta framework had the appearance of a mandated choice system, but we will recall from our 
discussion in Chapter 1 that the Alberta framework relies largely on substitute decision-making, so 
much so that family are informed about – and must agree to – the deceased’s prior recorded 
consent.3 Hence, the American examples that follow must suffice for the purposes of this mandated 
choice analysis.  
 
a) Mandated Choice: Case Studies 
 In 1991, Texas briefly attempted to enact mandated choice legislation. The state required people 
to register a donative intention as part of the driver’s license renewal process.4 However, the law 
was not actually enforced, as “license registry employees often did not even ask individuals the 
questions about organ donation.”5 Consequently, people renewing their driver’s license could still 
do so without having to record an answer, and those who refused to answer or were not asked the 
question were registered as if they had responded “no” to organ donation.6 Upon death, the 
deceased’s family could not override this “no” and this system resulted in an eighty percent refusal 
rate and a corresponding drop in organ donation.7 The law was subsequently repealed in 1997.8 
 
Beyond the Texas example, Illinois’ system has been referred to as a mandated choice system,9 
although I would argue that this is a misclassification and it is an opt-in model in every sense. The 
2006 enactment of the First Person Consent Organ/Tissue Donor Registry is an opt-in model for 
people wishing to record their donative intent. Corresponding government legislation is said to 
solidify these registrations so that they are legally binding regardless of any opposition from 
family.10 The Illinois Organ/Tissue Donor Registry provides as follows: “First Person Consent 
makes your decision to be an organ/tissue donor legally binding. Additional witnesses or family 
consent is no longer required; your wishes will be honored.”11 First person consent stems from an 
update to the American Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) in 2006, and as of 2015 it was 
 
2 Haley Cotter, discussing criticism of mandated choice. See Haley Cotter, “Increasing Consent for Organ Donation: 
Mandated Choice, Individual Autonomy, and Informed Consent” (2012) 21:2 Health Matrix 599 at 607. 
3 My Health Alberta, “Organ and Tissue Donation in Alberta”, online: 
<https://myhealth.alberta.ca/alberta/Pages/organ-and-tissue-donation-faqs.aspx>. 
4 Cotter, supra note 2 at 618 citing Joseph L. Verheijde et al., “Recovery of Transplantable Organs After Cardiac or 
Circulatory Death: Transforming the Paradigm for the Ethics of Organ Donation” (2007) 2:8 Phil Ethics & Human 
Med 8.  
5 Cotter, supra note 2 at 618 discussing criticism of mandated choice and citing Susan E. Herz, “Two Steps to Three 
Choices: A New Approach to Mandated Choice” (1999) 8 Cambridge Q Healthcare Ethics 340 at 342. 
6 Cotter, supra note 2 at 618. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid at 619. 
9 Ibid at 622. 
10 Ibid at 621. See also Illinois Secretary of State, First-Person Consent Fact Sheet (31 January 2011), online 
<https://www.lifegoeson.com/publications/pdf_publications/ex73.pdf>.  




adopted by Puerto Rico and all but three American states.12 According to Kristopher T. Starr, 
American lawyer and registered nurse, the 2006 UAGA “…explicitly specified direct written or 
actual consent declarations” and “[d]esignation on one’s driver’s license, by a donor card, or in a 
testamentary or advance directive document all set the standard for consented, predeath donor 
intent to donate under the 2006 UAGA”. According to Starr, in the 47 states that have adopted the 
2006 UAGA, the donor’s clearly published intent will be followed, even if the family’s view 
conflicts with the donor’s intent.13 Under the 2006 UAGA, next of kin still have a role to play: 
where a deceased did not leave donative intent, family can consent or refuse to consent.14 
 
My research has not uncovered any elements of a mandated choice framework within Illinois’ 
revised post-mortem donation system. According to Starr, the 2006 UAGA revision “…explicitly 
specifies direct written or actual consent declarations”15 as being necessary to effect post-mortem 
donation, and the First Person Consent Registry (as previously noted) aims to facilitate and bind 
the explicit intent of donors and non-donors. That said, citizens of Illinois are not required to make 
a choice about organ donation and therefore the model has yet to depart from an opt-in structure.  
 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that since the 2006 UAGA was adopted in Illinois and the First 
Person Consent Organ/Tissue Donation Registry was developed, approximately 60% of adults in 
Illinois have registered as donors.16 Moreover, the number of deceased organ donors has increased 
by 40%, from approximately 300 deceased donors in 2006 to 500 deceased donors in 2019.17 In 
light of this growth, however, the Gift of Hope Organ & Tissue Donor Network (a federally 
designated not-for-profit organ procurement organization in the United States) estimates that more 
than 200 people will die in 2020 while waiting for a transplant in Illinois.18 This deficiency 
reinforces our observations made earlier in Chapter 1 concerning the Alberta model. Specifically, 
it demonstrates that although opt-in (registration) systems can increase registration rates, any 
corresponding increase in donations has remained a drop in the bucket compared to the growing 
need for organs and tissue.19  
 
b) Presumed Consent: Case Studies 
Singapore and much of Europe’s post-mortem donation is based on a presumed consent model, 
including the countries of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Slovenia, Spain and Wales, to name a few.20 However, like the opt-in model of 
Saskatchewan, the presumed consent model also allows for families to have the final decision on 
 
12 Kristopher T. Starr, “Can the family block organ donation”, (2005) 45:5 Nursing 16 at 16. As Starr notes, 




16 Gift of Hope Organ & Tissue Donor Network, “About Us: Trends & Waiting Lists”, online: 
<https://www.giftofhope.org/trends-waiting-lists/> [Illinois Donor Network]. 
17 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network: State Data 
(Illinois)”, online: <https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/view-data-reports/state-data/>. 
18 Illinois Donor Network, supra note 16.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1 at 1191. For a list of other countries with a presumed consent structure see Lee 
Shepherd et al., “An international comparison of deceased and living organ donation/transplant rates in opt-in and 
opt-out systems: a panel study” (2014) 12:131 BMC Medicine 1 at 4 (Table 1) . 
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whether a deceased’s organs will be donated.21 I cannot find any exceptions to the general practice 
of allowing families to have the final decision in presumed consent systems. The literature seems 
to suggest this is the normal trend in presumed consent procurements.22 Data does not specify what 
type of consent ultimately triggered the donation in presumed consent countries (i.e. whether the 
presumption of consent led to the donation or whether the family agreeing to the presumption led 
to the donation). My research did not uncover statistics of this nature. Providing families with 
ultimate decision-making power is often the case in European countries and as we discussed in 
Chapter 1, Nova Scotia’s presumed consent law is shaping up to employ this same process as well. 
Despite this trend among presumed consent jurisdictions, some scholars have argued that 
legislative defaults still have a marked effect on people and their families donate.23 
 
In a 10-year study conducted between 1993 and 2002 (the “2003 study), researchers looked at 22 
countries over that period and considered a variety of factors that could contribute to increased 
donation rates within a presumed consent model.24 Those determinants included but were not 
limited to the dominant religion in the country, GDP, healthcare funding, and the higher number 
of brain deaths recorded in presumed consent countries.25 The study found that much of the 
variation in donation rates are explained by the differences in these “determinants of organ 
donation”, but ultimately “presumed consent legislation has a positive and sizeable effect on organ 
donation rates.”26 The 2003 study observed that most studies before it have consistently observed 
that opt-out systems are rarely enforced and family consent has always been required under 
presumed consent laws.27 Where presumed consent is not enforced and families are approached, 
the 2003 study argues that the default mechanism may affect the final determination of families 
and could generate a sizeable increase in donors as compared to rates under an opt-in system.28 
This assessment is supported by a separate 2003 study in which investigators analyzed the default 
mechanism by comparing opt-in and opt-out trends across presumed consent and informed consent 
(opt-in) countries.29 This subsequent study reported that only 28% of Americans elect to opt in to 
donation, whereas over 90% of people in presumed consent nations leave themselves available to 
post-mortem donation.30  
 
It is important to note that these statistics have not translated into a marked increase in actual post-
mortem donations. As some scholars have asserted, “…there are no clear examples of countries 
with a real sustained increase in organ donation after modifying the law” from an opt-in to an opt-
out framework.31 It is also worth noting that the opt-out frameworks of France and Brazil have had 
 
21 Abadie & Gay, supra note 1 at 600.  
22 See Alexandra Glazier & Thomas Mone, “Success of Opt-In Organ Donation Policy in the United States” (2019) 
322:8 JAMA 719 at 720 for the point that “…opt-out countries will not proceed with organ donation over family 
objection.”  
23 Abadie & Gay, supra note 1 at 600. See also Hendrik P. van Dalen & Kene Henkens, “Comparing the effects of 
defaults in organ donation systems” (2014) 106 Social Science and Medicine 137; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1. 
24 Abadie & Gay, supra note 1. 
25 Ibid at 608. 
26 Ibid at 599. 
27 Ibid at 613. 
28 Ibid at 612 and footnote 31. 
29 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1. 
30 Ibid at 1192. 
31 Rafael Matesanz & Beatrix Domínguez-Gil, “Opt-out legislations: the mysterious viability of the false” (2019) 
95:6 Kidney Int 1301 at 1301. 
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negative effects on donation rates, which some scholars attribute in part to the public’s “increased 
levels of mistrust towards medical professionals.”32 This may stem from a notion that, under a 
presumed consent system, doctors are partial to the interests of other patients who may benefit or 
recover from a transplant made available by the critically ill. Some may argue that a default 
donation system could lead doctors to reduce life sustaining treatment and call ‘time of death’ 
prematurely in order to improve the lives of other patients. Despite this concern and its effect on 
France and Brazil, the majority of the aforementioned studies suggest that the default mechanism 
can contribute significantly to establishing a larger pool of potential donors. 33 Moreover, these 
studies further suggest that it may be possible to significantly increase post-mortem donation rates 
by enforcing presumed consent legislation so that potential donors (i.e. deceased individuals who 
have not opted-out) become actual donors. 
 
c) Attitudes Toward Default Presumptions and Mandated Choices 
It has been said that the opt-in model generates less registered donors because it depends on 
“spontaneous forms of altruism”, which must compete against attitudes of apathy and 
procrastination.34 In the alternative, systems of mandated choice and presumed consent have been 
highlighted as better options for increasing deceased donor statistics. Generally speaking, studies 
have found that, “…the mainly Catholic countries of Central and Southern Europe, with a legal 
system strongly based in Roman law, have opting out/presumed consent systems and an emphasis 
on the citizen’s duties to the state; whereas the largely protestant countries of Northern Europe rely 
more on common law, and place more emphasis on individual rights of determination.”35 
Researchers have also studied the attitudes toward default systems in opt-in countries to get a better 
understanding of how changes to default organ donation frameworks might be received.  
 
In a 2011 national survey of 2069 respondents in the Netherlands (the “2011 Netherlands Survey”), 
respondents were given hypothetical choices regarding defaults in organ donation systems. The 
survey was provided to people aged 16 and older – and the response rate was 77%.36 The survey 
objective was “to test for differences in choices across donation systems.”37 The pool of 
respondents was divided into four groups, so that four different donation regimes could be 
compared, being (1) explicit consent/opt-in; (2) presumed consent; (3) mandated choice; and (4) a 
neutral system “in which respondents were asked whether they would be willing to become an 
organ donor.”38  
 
Group 1, explicit consent, was asked: “Suppose you move to another province where the donor 
system is such that you are not automatically an organ donor. You have to explicitly register as a 
donor. What would you do?”.39 The options for response were “(a) I will leave it as it is and not 
 
32 Shepherd et al., supra note 20 at 11. 
33 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1 at 1192. See also Matesanz & Dominguez-Gil, supra note 31; Shepherd et al., 
supra note 20; Glazier & Mone, supra note 22; and Amber Rithalia et al., “Impact of presumed consent for organ 
donation on donation rates: a systemic review” (2009) 338:7689 BMJ 284. 
34 van Dalen & Henkens, supra note 23 at 137.  
35 S. Cameron & J. Forsythe, “How can we improve organ donation rates? Research into the identification of factors 
which may influence the variation” (2001) 21:5 Nefrologia 68 at 72. See also Abadie & Gay, supra note 1 at 607-
608.  
36 van Dalen & Henkens, supra note 23 at 138. 
37 Ibid at 138. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid.  
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become a donor; (b) I will register as a donor; and (c) Don’t know.40 50% of respondents said they 
would register as a donor.41 
 
Group 2, presumed consent, was asked: “Suppose you move to another province where the system 
is such that you are automatically a donor, unless you explicitly object. What would you do?”42 
The options for response were “a) I will leave it as it is and become automatically a donor; (b) I 
will object and will not become a donor; and (c) Don’t know.”43 The survey found that the number 
of registered donors would increase from a 50% donation rate in an explicit consent system by 
approximately 12% under a presumed consent system, thereby amounting to a 62% donation rate 
under a presumed consent system.44 The conclusion drawn by the authors is that “reform in the 
direction of a presumed consent system would be an improvement.”45 
 
Group 3, mandated choice, was asked: “Suppose that every time you have to renew your passport 
at the local municipality you are also obliged to make a choice with respect to organ donation. In 
case you will renew your passport in the coming week what will be your response with respect to 
the question ‘Do you want to be an organ donor?’”46 The options for response were “(a) Yes, and 
(b) No.”47 The results determined that 66% of respondents would agree to become a donor.48 The 
survey authors therefore conclude that a mandated choice system would result in “a substantial 
increase in the number of donors.”49  
 
Group 4 was asked the neutral question, “Are you willing to become an organ donor”.50 The options 
for response were (a) Yes, I want to become a donor and; (b) No, I don’t want to become a donor; 
and (c) I don’t know and I will delegate this decision to my relatives.”51 The authors of this survey 
note that this question can be interpreted “as a ‘softer’ version of the mandated choice setting where 
the decision maker can opt to have the next-of-kin decide.”52 57% of respondents in group 4 
expressed a “willingness to become a donor”, which signals that the explicit consent [opt-in model] 
produces too few donors.53 
 
Of note, all respondents from each group were asked if they were officially registered as an organ 
donor.54 The goal of this question was to “to study in depth the way actual donor choices are in line 
with donation behavior across donor systems.”55 Investigators determined that 90% of people who 
 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid at 139. 
42 Ibid at 138. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid at 139. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid at 138. 
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid 139. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid at 138. 
51 Ibid. 






told researchers they would donate in their particular regime were in fact registered to donate.56 By 
“registered to donate”, the survey authors are referring to the status of individuals that have either 
opted in by consenting to donate or that have refrained from opting out if they live in a presumed 
consent country. The survey authors conclude that these findings suggest that registered donors 
“do not actually change their mind in a different donor regime” and that non-registered donors do 
change their mind depending on the donation regime in place.57 In this way, the authors hypothesize 
that the donation rate for non-registered donors would be considerably higher under a presumed 
consent system and a mandatory choice regime, as compared to an opt-in system.58 
 
Interestingly, the survey results also showed that a substantial percentage of respondents did not 
have clear preferences.59 The authors observed that undecided respondents in an opt-in model cause 
the number of registered donors to remain the same (50%), but the number of registered donors 
under a presumed consent system increases the donation rate by 12%, for a total donation rate of 
62% under a presumed consent system.60 In addition to that, 20% of respondents said they do not 
know if they would stay registered under a presumed consent system.61 This undecided pool has 
the potential to move the presumed consent donation rate as high as 82% if they decide to stay 
registered or if their indecision prevents them from opting out before they die. The overall 
conclusion drawn by the 2011 Netherlands Survey is that the default mechanism of presumed 
consent and the “positive obligation component” of mandated choice could generate registered 
donors more effectively than the current opt-in model.62 
 
In the Canadian context, findings from a 2010 survey on organ donation (“the 2010 Canadian 
survey”) concluded that only a slight majority of Canadians approved of a default donation system 
even though 95% of respondents said they approve of organ donation.63 More specifically, 54% of 
polled Canadians were in favour of presumed consent.64 Of the 1,500 randomly selected 
respondents aged 18 years and older, the default donation system is less appealing even in light of 
the strong attitudes that favour donation generally (69% strongly approve of it and 26% somewhat 
approve).65  
 
The 2010 Canadian survey also found that 51% of respondents decide to donate their organs 
(“decided donors”), while a significant number of respondents (42%) remain undecided, and 7% 
said they will not donate.66 Of the 7% of respondents that have decided not to donate, 6% cited that 









62 Ibid at 137. The opt-in model is also referred to as the explicit consent model. 
63 Ipsos Reid, “Views Toward Organ and Tissue Donation and Transplantation: Final report” (10 July 2010) at 4, 
online: <https://professionaleducation.blood.ca/sites/msi/files/Views-Toward-OTDT-Final-Report-2010-07-
221.pdf>. 
64 Ibid at 6. 
65 Ibid at 4. 
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid at 16. 
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Of the slight majority that said they were decided donors, the survey also asked if they “have taken 
certain official and unofficial steps to express or register their intention to donate.”68 In the result, 
84% of decided donors said they have discussed their wishes with next of kin; 78% of decided 
donors have signed a donor card and 76% have discussed their decision with their medical 
advocate.69 Of that latter group, 59% feel very confident that their advocate will exercise the 
decision,70 whereas over 40% lacked confidence that their wishes would be carried out. Just over 
half of decided donors (57%) have registered their consent through their health card and only 27% 
have recorded their name on a registry.71 Moreover, “respondents were asked to rate the importance 
of several principles in light of a national system for organ and tissue donation in Canada.72 The 
top principle was “ensuring that all Canadians have a fair chance of receiving an organ or tissue 
transplant.”73 
 
More recently, a 2019 Saskatchewan study conducted by the University of Saskatchewan’s Social 
Sciences Laboratories surveyed 400 Saskatchewan residents about organ donation.74 Of those 
surveyed, 84% of respondents said they somewhat agreed or strongly agreed that the province 
should implement a presumed consent system for organ donation.75 Like the 2011 Netherlands 
Survey, results from the Saskatchewan survey and the 2010 Canadian survey suggest that the 
default mechanism of presumed consent (and perhaps the positive obligation component of the 
mandated choice regime) could generate registered donors more effectively in Canada than the 
current opt-in model. The opt-out system is apt to satisfy the slight majority of people that are in 
favour of presumed consent and could also garner additional donors from that strong majority (95% 
of surveyed respondents) that approve of organ donation generally. With these survey results in 
mind, the following sections will consider if –and to what extent– presumed consent models are 
successful at increasing registered donor rates in countries that already have this default system 
implemented.  
 
d)  Rebuttable Presumption & Family Veto 
Research evidences that even in countries where presumed consent is in place, families can still 
easily rebut the presumption of consent by simply objecting to the donation.76 In the presumed 
consent nations of Spain, Croatia and Portugal, family override provisions are still in play and yet 
these countries continue to be the most successful in Europe.77 Under Spain’s presumed consent 
 




72 Ibid at 26. 
73 Ibid.   
74 University of Saskatchewan Social Sciences Research Laboratories, “Taking the Pulse Saskatchewan”, online 
<https://ssrl.usask.ca/taking-the-pulse.php>. See also Andrea Hill, “Taking the Pulse: 84 per cent of Sask. Residents 




76 van Dalen & Henkens, supra note 23 at 137; G.T. Laurie et al., Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical 
Ethics, 10th ed (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 601; M. Rosenblum et al., “The 
authority of next-of-kin in explicit and presumed consent systems for deceased organ donation: an analysis of 54 
nations” (2012) 27:6 Nephrol Dial Transplant 2533.  
77 Laurie et al., supra note 76 at 601. See also J. M. Martinez et al., “Organ donation and family decision within the 
Spanish donation system” (2001) 53:4 Soc Sci Med 405. 
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framework, individuals are able to “express a desire to be a donor in addition to a method [for] 
objecting to deceased donation”.78 The next-of-kin’s authorization is required if the deceased’s 
wishes are unknown and presumed donation can be vetoed by the next-of kin.79 Similarly, in 
Columbia and Costa Rica, next-of-kin hold significant authority under these presumed consent 
frameworks. In these two nations, ‘presumed consent’ is practiced only if the next-of-kin cannot 
be reached.80  
 
Several studies have explored various factors that affect substitute decisions, including socio-
economic factors, understanding brain death, religion, quality of procurement requests, and so on.81 
Of all factors considered, one study found that “the living will of the deceased is the most important 
single factor for decision.”82 The “living will” concept stems from Sweden’s legislation, the 
Transplant Act of 1995, and amounts to the deceased’s prior wish concerning post-mortem organ 
donation.83 Under Swedish legislation, an individual expresses their living will by registering in 
the national organ donation registry, signing a donor card or informing family of their wishes.84 As 
authors of a 2007 Swedish study advise, we should not view the living will as a factor in the 
families’ decision since Swedish law intends for the deceased’s prior wish to settle the decision.85 
In this way, the living will is intended to serve as binding first person consent but the study suggests 
that family is still asked about donation even where the deceased had already decided themselves.86 
Where the deceased’s consent was known, the study found that the family agreed to the donation 
request 100% of the time.87 Where the deceased did not express wishes during life, the family is 
approached to either veto or consent to the donation presumption. In those instances, it is estimated 
that family will override the presumption 40% to 50% of the time.88  
 
Medical literature has consistently found that “public education is needed to modify attitudes about 
organ donation… [in order to] maximize the opportunity to persuade families to donate their 
relatives’ organs.”89 Despite family involvement in presumed consent systems, nations with the 
opt-out model have shown statistically higher deceased donation rates than nations with opt-in 
 
78 Rosenblum et al., supra note 76 at 2542 (Table 2) footnote a. 
79 Ibid at 2542 (Table 2).  
80 Ibid. 
81 Margareta A. Sanner, “Two perspectives on organ donation: experiences of potential donor families and intensive 
care physicians of the same event” (2007) 22 Journal of Critical Care 296 at 297. See also W. DeJong et al., 
“Requesting organ donation: an interview study of donor and nondonor families” (1998) 7 Am J Crit Care 13; H.G. 
Franz et al., “Explaining brain death: a critical feature of the donation process” (1997) 7 J Transpl Coord 14; J. Rosel 
et al., “Discriminant variables between organ donors and nondonors: a post hoc investigation” (1999) 9 J Transpl 
Coord 50; Laura A. Siminoff et al., “Factors Influencing Families’ Consent for Donation of Solid Organs for 
Transplantation” (2001) 286:1 JAMA 71; Samantha J. Anthony et al., “Family veto in organ donation in Canada: 
framing within English-language newspaper articles” (2017) 5:4 CMAJ E770. 
82 Sanner, supra note 81 at 297. 
83 Ibid at 296. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid at 297 (footnote 1). 
86 Ibid at 301, Table 5. 
87 Ibid at 301. 
88 Ibid at 296. 
89 Siminoff et al. supra note 81 at 71. See also: Franz et al., supra note 81; W. DeJong et al., supra note 81; J. Rosel 
et al., supra note 81. 
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models.90 Despite the practice of asking relatives if they are in favour of donation,91 Spain has the 
world’s highest rate of organ donation, with 47 deceased donors per million population in 2017.92 
That same year, the United States saw 31.7 deceased donations per million population and Canada 
saw only 21.9 per million population.93 Presumed consent nations, generally speaking, average 
about 17.29 deceased donors per million population per year.94 Compared to the annual average in 
informed consent counties, which is said to be about 14.19 deceased donors per million population 
per year, there is a difference of 3.10 donors per million population in presumed consent 
countries,95 which is actually an impressive statistic if we consider that this translates into a 21.84 
per cent increase. With this in mind, it has been suggested that presumed consent could actually 
lead to a 25-30 per cent jump in post-mortem donations in nations that currently have opt-in 
models.96 However, the caveat to any estimates concerning potential increase is the fact that there 
are substantial differences in how presumed consent legislation has been enforced across European 
countries.97 Statistics will therefore vary across presumed consent countries if the default “yes” is 
accompanied by nation-specific exceptions and practices such as transplant coordination teams, 
donation campaigns, physicians’ approaches to requesting donations from families, and other 
factors that will be discussed in the next section.  
 
e) Beyond the Presumption: Underlying Variables Affecting Donation 
While the effects of Spain’s default donation system have been shorter transplant wait lists and less 
reliance on inter vivos organ and tissue donation, it would be wrong to assume that the default ‘yes’ 
is solely responsible for increased donation rates in countries like Spain.98 A 1992 survey showed 
that, in England, organizational failures were deemed to be the cause of more than half of potential 
donors failing to become actual donors.99 And despite an overall high donation rate, a 1996 Spanish 
survey showed similar rates of “causes for lost donations”.100 These studies suggest that 
organizational elements and procedures impact the efficacy of presumed consent legislation. For 
example, accompanying Spain’s presumed consent legislation is a “…dedicated transplant co-
ordination team, largely made up of part-time paid doctors and nurses”101 that contributes to 
Spain’s higher donation rates. When Tuscany introduced its transplant coordination system, which 
 
90 Rosenblum et al., supra note 76 at 2541; Abadie & Gay, supra note 1. 
91 Cameron & Forsythe, supra note 35 at 73. 
92 Beatriz Dominguez-Gil & Rafael Matesanz, eds., “Newsletter Transplant: International figures on donation and 
transplantation (2017)” 23:1 (September 2018) at 44. See also David Rodriguez-Arias et al. “Success factors and 
ethical challenges of the Spanish model of organ donation” (2010) 376:9746 The Lancet 1109 at 1109.  
93 Dominguez-Gil & Matesanz, supra note 92 at 45 and 46.  
94 The 17.29 percent average comes from a sample study of cadaveric (deceased) donation rates in 2002 across 23 
presumed consent countries. See Abadie and Gay, supra note 1 at 607. 
95 The 14.19 percent average comes from a sample study of cadaveric (deceased) donation rates in 2002 across 13 
informed consent countries. See Abadie & Gay, ibid at 607 and 613.  
96 This potential increase in donation is estimated in the American and U.K. contexts and assumes that “percentage 
increases in cadaveric donations translate roughly for percentage increases in cadaveric transplantation”. See Abadie 
& Gay, ibid at 612.  
97 Limits on access to data have challenged attempts at describing the various effects of presumed consent legislation 
across different countries. See Abadie & Gay, ibid at 612, footnote 31. 
98 Rosenblum et al., supra note 76 at 2534; Laurie et al., supra note 76 at 601; Martinez et al., supra note 77; Abadie 
& Gay, supra note 1; Cameron & Forsythe, supra note 35. 
99 Cameron & Forsythe, supra note 35 at 73. 
100 Ibid at 73. 
101 Ibid at 74. 
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was based on the Spanish system, it saw the national donation rate double to 13.5 donors per million 
population within a year and a half after implementation.102  
 
Other variables that have also been attributed to the higher donation rates in presumed consent 
countries are initiatives aimed at promoting positive attitudes concerning organ donation as well 
as the training of medical practitioners involved in the organ procurement process, both of which 
are said to be important factors to increasing organ donation rates.103 Statistics suggest that a 
physician’s approach to requesting donation from families significantly impacts whether potential 
donors become actual donors. The 2007 Swedish study that I referenced earlier in this chapter 
determined that pro-donation approaches resulted in higher instances of family consenting to 
donation. The study reviewed the physicians’ approach related to donation outcome in 14 cases 
where the deceased’s wishes were unknown. The investigator found that a pro-donation approach 
was applied in seven of those cases and in all seven instances the families decided in favour of 
donating.104 Where physicians took a neutral or ambivalent approach in the other 7 cases, the 
families decided against donation.105 The investigator concludes that physicians who cannot 
exercise a pro-donation approach “should perhaps be excused from this task.”106 
 
A 2001 Spanish study has since analyzed 68 different cases where families were tasked with giving 
or denying consent and investigators determined a number of different variables that impact family 
decision-making when approached for consent.107 Family decisions appeared to be most affected 
by apparent knowledge of the deceased’s thoughts or wishes about organ donation.108 Other 
variables at play, from strongest to weakest, were: “family relationship climate”; the family’s level 
of satisfaction with received medical attention; and the number of family members present when 
consent was requested.109 These studies, like the Swedish study noted earlier, suggest the expressed 
wishes of a potential donor are paramount,110 and that the default can serve as the deceased’s 
donative intent if the family is convinced that the deceased could have opted out but intentionally 
chose to stay enrolled as a donor. Put simply, “legislative defaults affect the decisions of potential 
donors and families.”111  
 
4.2 The Default Mechanism 
 
Default rules for organ donation have been proven to impact donor consent rates. The results from 
the 2010 Canadian Survey and 2011 Netherland Survey, as discussed earlier in this chapter, suggest 
that legislation to institute presumed consent or mandated choice would be more effective at 
generating post-mortem donors than the opt-in framework.112 But why do these legislated defaults 
make such a difference? Literature from the fields of medicine, behavioural economics and 
 
102 Ibid at 74. 
103 Martinez et al., supra note 77 at 405 and 416. 
104 Sanner, supra note 81 at 301. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid at 304. 
107 Martinez et al., supra note 77 at 405. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid at 405 and 416. 
111 Abadie & Gay, supra note 1at 600.  
112 Van Dalen & Henkens, supra note 23 at 137. 
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psychology have long explored the effect that defaults have on individual choices.113 In studying 
defaults within the organ donation context, studies show that there were more registered donors in 
opt-out countries (presumed consent) than there were in opt-in countries.114 One reason for this 
variation is because opting out of a presumed consent model is considered relatively onerous. The 
forms, phone calls and mailing of paperwork required to effectively opt out deters people from 
‘going to the bother’ of opting out; hence, more people remain on the donor registry of a presumed 
consent country.115 On the other hand, more people remain off the donor registry in an opt-in 
country,116 and this is the case even in countries where surveys show deceased donor intent to be 
strong.  
 
Regardless of donor preference, consent rates tend to remain low where the legislated default is the 
opt-in framework.117 By way of example, the Netherlands instituted a national donor registry in 
1998 and its creation involved widespread campaigning.118 Over 12 million letters were sent out to 
encourage citizens to donate their organs.119 In a country of 15.8 million at that time, the 
expectation was to increase the rate of donors, but the opt-in rate did not change.120  
 
Where deceased donor rates are higher in opt-out rather than opt-in countries, the fairly obvious 
deduction to be made is that defaults will have a considerable role to play on the large pool of 
“potential donors” who are indeed in favour of donation but do not get around to making the 
decision to become actual donors. Defaults have been viewed as useful, particularly when 
compared to the mandated choice model, because the default mechanism of presumed consent 
theoretically allows people to avoid making the unpleasant decision about organ donation.121 In 
this line of thought, it follows that since decisions are easier to make under the presumed consent 
model, and since most people appear to be in favour of donation, donation rates are said to increase 
since the default decision is donation. 
 
The default mechanism of the presumed consent model is said to impose “physical, cognitive, and, 
in the case of donation, emotional costs on those who must change their status.”122 As one study 
suggests “…defaults can lead to two kinds of misclassification: willing donors who are not 
identified or people who become donors against their wishes”; however, it also observes that “[t]he 
tradeoff between errors of classification and physical, cognitive, and emotional costs must be made 
with the knowledge that defaults make a difference in lives saved through transplantation.”123 In 
 
113 See van Dalen & Henkens, ibid at 138. See also Abadie & Gay, supra note 1; Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, 
“Do Defaults Save Lives” (2003) 302:5649 Science 1338 [Johnson & Goldstein, “Do Defaults Save Lives”]; C.R. 
McKenzie et al., “Recommendations implicit in policy defaults” (2006) 17:5 Psychological Science 414; Richard H. 
Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness (Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 2008).  







121 Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, “Defaults and donation decisions” (2004) 78:12 Transplantation 1713 at 
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other words, defaults save lives.124 The default mechanism of presumed consent has the potential 
to significantly increase post-mortem donation rates. But would an increase through such a 
framework be at the expense of individual autonomy?  
 
Thus far we have seen how family continues to play a monumental role in organ donation 
frameworks. Saskatchewan’s opt-in model and Europe’s presumed consent model carve out a 
special role for substitute decision-makers. Both models are keen on maintaining a “just in case” 
mechanism; always reserving the family’s ability to veto a deceased’s consent or non-consent, “just 
in case” the deceased changed his or her mind about organ donation, or “just in case” the deceased 
died without a prior given instruction.  
 
Although studies have shown that default legislation sways an individual’s consent to donate, it is 
not entirely clear as to whether default legislation also influences the family’s role in cadaveric 
procurement practices. Are families as inclined to refuse or veto consent under a presumed consent 
model as they are under an opt-in model, or does presumed consent have an impact on their ultimate 
choice as well? Generally speaking, where donative intent is unknown, it has been said that 40% 
to 50% of relatives refuse to consent on the deceased’s behalf.125 In the presumed consent context, 
while donation rates have been seen to increase by 25%-30%,126 there will still be situations where 
family can and will decide to opt out from donating the deceased’s organs. 
 
Under a presumed consent model, the societal need for increased donation rates seems to be taken 
into account more than it has been under the opt-in framework. As we have seen, more people 
remain on a donor registry under a presumed consent framework, and this fact can increase the 
amount of post-mortem procurements. However, some might argue that individual autonomy could 
be violated under a presumed consent framework where a deceased person wanted to opt out of 
donating but was unable to do so. In such instances, advocates of this angle might also suggest 
substitute-decision making is actually more consistent with autonomy. Indeed, an opt-out system 
does provide the setting for opt-out challenges, and easily and widely accessible opt-out 
opportunities must be in place to mitigate against this issue arising. Moreover, some sort of 
evidentiary threshold should be legislated to facilitate fair and timely resolution where next of kin 
claim the deceased person really does not want to donate but did not opt out. Otherwise, next of 
kin could override the presumption of donating with mere hearsay, which alone is a problematic 
form of evidence in every other area of law.127 
 
Conclusion 
As the above example suggests, individual autonomy stands to be violated under a presumed 
consent model where a deceased person wanted to opt out of donating but was unable to do so and 
where family maintains a veto power to ultimately decide if a deceased’s organs and tissue will be 
donated. Substitute consent provisions and the role of the family need to be carefully qualified in 
 
124 Ibid at 1338-1339; Abadie & Gay, supra note 1; Shepherd et al., supra note 20; Lena V. Groeger, “Set It and 
Forget It: How Default Settings Rule the World – The many ways we act by default (without even knowing it) (27 
July 2016), online: Pro Publica <https://www.propublica.org/article/set-it-and-forget-it-how-default-settings-rule-
the-world>.  
125 Sanner, supra note 81 at 296.  
126 Abadie & Gay, supra note 1 at 599 and 613. 
127 Determining what the evidentiary standard should be and how that standard should be enforced is an aspect of 
organ donation that should be addressed but such analysis and discussion is beyond the scope of my thesis. 
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a presumed consent system. Ultimately, the presumed consent model common in European 
countries is not a perfect safeguard of individual autonomy. It can and does infringe individual 
autonomy in the same fashion as that of the opt-in framework and in doing so it undermines the 
potential that a default system could have in significantly increasing donation rates. In the next 
chapter, I suggest considerations for an improved presumed consent system; a system that not only 
recognizes society’s need for increased donations, but also recognizes and balances that aspect 




Suggestions for Reform: Considerations for Presumed Consent 
 
As previously discussed, it is important to reform the donation system to one that safeguards a 
deceased’s consent to donate post mortem. The discussion that follows will show that a reformed 
presumed consent system can work to balance donor (and non-donor) autonomy more fairly against 
the public’s need for increased donations than the opt-in framework does. In exploring common 
criticisms of presumed consent, we will see that most hinge on the argument that default 
mechanisms violate individual autonomy just as much as – if not more than – opt-in systems. As 
we will see, this view is a shallow misrepresentation of the default mechanism.  
 
On the contrary, this chapter will outline specific components that are necessary for a successful 
presumed consent system. As we will see, a presumed consent system could actually violate 
individual autonomy less than the current opt-in frameworks if the former offered people a 
workable system for de-registering consent and deferring decisions to next of kin. I will outline 
specific components necessary for a successful presumed consent system and consider the 
feasibility of implementing such a framework. 
 
5.1 Why Presumed Consent? 
 
a) Autonomy Through De-registration 
Mandated choice and presumed consent are similar in that both will place a positive burden on a 
certain sub-set of people. The opt-in system also places a positive burden on a certain sub-set of 
people, namely those that want to donate – insofar as donors have to make their intent known in 
the hope of having their choice realized. In theory, under a mandated choice model, everyone is 
required to register a choice concerning organ donation, and in having the opportunity to do so, it 
can be said autonomous choice has been respected. However, it could also be said that being 
obligated to make a choice is in and of itself violating to autonomy, since “some individuals may 
want to exercise their autonomy by refusing to make a decision.”1  
 
Similarly, while there is no requirement to ‘act’ or ‘do something’ under a presumed consent 
system, there will likely be a considerable number of people who will be required to do something 
(i.e. opt out) in order to exercise their individual autonomous choice not to donate. Moreover, some 
would say the presumption of consent is a blatant violation of individual autonomy. But again, 
much like the mandated choice policy, the opportunity to opt out mitigates the violation of 
autonomy. 
 
One interesting observation concerning presumed consent is that this model quite literally contains 
a mandated choice for some people (i.e. those individuals wishing not to donate their organs would 
be required to take action and opt out). In this way, presumed consent is less violating to individual 
autonomy than mandated choice is, because under presumed consent only some people would be 
forced to make a choice, whereas all people must make a decision under mandated choice. Still, 
some critics of presumed consent view the model as excluding consent altogether.2 To them, the 
 
1 Haley Cotter, “Increasing Consent for Organ Donation: Mandated Choice, Individual Autonomy, and Informed 
Consent” (2012) 21:2 Health Matrix 599 at 607. 
2 Charles Erin & John Harris, “Presumed Consent or Contracting Out” (1999) 25:5 J Med Ethics 365. 
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model is a sneaky contradiction because consent cannot exist on presumption and instead should 
be thought of as a ‘contracting out’ model.3 These critics say that adopting ‘consent’ language is 
an attempt by policy makers to disguise the reality of the situation in order to appeal to the principle 
of individual autonomy.4 Further to this point, they note: 
 
…by presuming consent, we are acting against the principle; we are being 
disrespectful of individual autonomy. 
… 
…in formalising a contracting-out approach for the removal of organs from 
cadavers, we are, in essence, articulating a particular society’s view of what it is 
morally supportable to do with the body of a dead person, where that person has not 
consented prior to death to such treatment of her body after death. 5  
 
Opponents of presumed consent might also suggest that such a model overlooks the importance of 
fully informed consent. As one analysis observes, “[o]btaining consent is …one of the guiding 
principles that provide moral validation of organ transplant programs.”6 Another analysis states, 
“[p]resumed consent would violate the principle of informed consent and would infringe on 
individual autonomy.”7 However, others have said that whether we refer to this default model as 
‘presumed consent’ or as ‘contracting out’, the end result is the same.8 In other words, this 
argument is really one of semantics and under either terminology the default that presumes donative 
intent is still in effect. Even though “there is a faintly distasteful sense of dominance in a 
‘presumption’ which is avoided in a ‘contract’”, both are actually synonymous in the context of an 
opt-out model.9  
 
In the organ donation framework, our individual autonomy has been defined by what opportunity 
we have for consenting to or refusing organ donation. As one lawyer notes, “[d]ecisions about the 
body are ‘prima facie’ expressions of individual autonomy.”10 In making decisions about the body, 
we are either consenting to or opposing actions against it. Thus, when the process for making 
decisions about the body is flawed (e.g. when our consent is not binding), we consider our 
autonomy violated. Our intention to donate or to refrain from donating is susceptible to alteration 
under the current donation framework. However, in the context of post-mortem organ donation, I 
suggest the better approach would be to think of consent as ‘intent’. If we accept that intention 
should determine post-mortem donation, the legal framework should be designed to ensure this 
intention is carried out, and any reform should be aimed at guaranteeing a deceased’s previously 




5 Ibid [emphasis in original]. 
6 Joseph L. Verheijde et al., “Recovery of Transplantable Organs After Cardiac or Circulatory Death: Transforming 
the Paradigm for the Ethics of Organ Donation” (2007) 2:8 Phil Ethics & Human. Med 1, as cited by Cotter, supra 
note 1 at 605.  
7 Cotter, supra note 1 at 618. 
8 G.T. Laurie et al., Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, 10th ed (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford 
University Press, 2016) 600 at footnote 129. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Cotter, supra note 1 at 607 citing T. M. Wilkinson, “Individual and Family Decisions About Organ Donation” 
(2007) 24:1 J. Applied Phil 26 at 26, 33. 
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As we will recall from the intestacy and wills parallel that was discussed in Chapter 2, intention 
plays an important role in disbursing property after death. It is trite law that the deceased’s 
expressed intention must always tip the scales.11 Intention is also paramount in disbursing property 
before death; for example, when gifting or abandoning property, and perhaps most notably when 
consenting to an inter vivos organ donation. With the view that donation laws should, first and 
foremost, secure the individual’s intention (another way of saying individual autonomy), law 
makers should feel compelled to reform the donation system in a way that views intention as 
sacrosanct.  
 
In guaranteeing an individual’s donative intent, the donation framework should also carve out an 
option to defer or assign the donative decision to the next of kin; as well as an option for certain 
next of kin or legal guardians that have a so-called “legitimate interest” in making the decision on 
behalf of minors and adult-dependants that cannot de-register or defer from the default 
themselves.12 Once a minor reaches the age of majority, they should then be absorbed under the 
default in some automatic “coming of age” way. I do not believe this idea is ahead of our time, 
technologically speaking, as there are already many ways in which governments track age and 
identity (e.g. social insurance, driver’s licence, and health card registration, to name a few). Surely, 
we are well within an era that would allow a donation default to seamlessly apply as soon as a 
person reaches the age of majority.  
 
While we continue our search for a better framework, some opponents of the default system 
continue likening the presumed consent model to conscription or mandatory donation. In their 
view, it supposedly “presupposes society’s right of access to organs of any deceased person” and 
“[s]uch a right would rest either on the claim that society ‘owns’ the body of the deceased or on 
the premise of an enforceable moral duty all of us as humans have to allow post-mortem organ 
retrieval.”13 In this way, empowering family with a veto power is a way of assigning “a property 
interest in the body to the next of kin” and presumptions of consent would “depart from this legal 
principle.”14  
 
These observations, in my view, signal a shallow and misrepresented view of what presumed 
consent is and can be. First, unlike the historic understanding of conscription, the presumption is 
always rebuttable in that there will always be the option to opt out of a presumed consent model 
without punishment under law. Additionally, presumed consent models need not exclude family 
involvement altogether. In a presumed consent system, the opt-out process could include three 
options: “no – I don’t want to donate”, “yes, I want to donate” (with the option of specifying 
particular body parts or whether the body is to be used for transplantation, medical research or 
science) or “I assign my donation decision to my family” (with the option of designating a specific 
person).15 A good presumed consent system will guarantee donor and non-donor autonomy. The 
 
11 See for example Re Tilbury West Public School Board and Hastie, [1966] 2 OR 20, 55 DLR (2d) 407 (HC); Re 
McKellar, [1972] 3 OR 16, 27 DLR (3d) 289; Re Essex County Roman Catholic Separate School Board and Antaua, 
80 DLR (3d) 405, [1977] CarswellOnt 429 (WL). 
12 Neuberger v York, 2016 ONCA 191 at para 118, 129 OR (3d) 721. 
13 Verheijde et al., supra note 6 at 5-6. 
14 Ibid at 6. 
15 Lawyer Haley Cotter made a similar recommendation for recording wishes under the “ideal mandated choice 
system”. In that context, she proposed three options: “yes”, “no”, and “defer to family wishes”. See Cotter, supra 
note 1 at 616 citing Tom Farsides, “Winning Hearts and Minds: Using Psychology to Promote Voluntary Organ 
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option to register revised donation instructions (i.e. to donate only certain organs as opposed to all 
of them or to donate to medical research or science) as well as the options to de-register altogether 
or to defer the decision to a particular designated person, are all equally important to individual 
autonomy. That is why a good presumed consent system must be able to guarantee that all three 
types of decisions are binding.  
 
b) Autonomy Through Deferral Option 
In Chapter 1, we explored how the court in Re JS16 sought to identify the person in the best position 
to make post-mortem determinations on behalf of the deceased. In that case, the court gave a de 
facto property right to the next of kin, whom they believed was in the best position to facilitate 
proper disposal. As we discussed, the court did not define “proper disposal” but recognized that 
customs change over time,17 which leaves open the possibility for new ways to dispose of bodies 
and for new limited forms of property to facilitate those disposals. As we discussed in Chapter 2, 
there does not seem to be a principled reason for denying post-mortem donation powers to an 
individual prior to their decease. In testamentary law, it would be highly offensive to enforce a 
framework that gave next of kin ultimate decision-making power over what happens to the 
deceased’s property gifted in a will.  
 
In my view, next of kin have no interests in the post-mortem donation process except insofar as 
they act as substitute-decision makers when the deceased lacked capacity to make a decision before 
death or where the deceased assigned the decision to next of kin.18 Any interests beyond these are 
overridden by considerations for individual autonomy and public policy. Therefore, legislation 
needs to clearly identify when the next of kin’s decision-making power has been engaged to make 
decisions on the deceased’s behalf. Anything short of certainty as to where next of kin belong in 
the decision-making process risks infringing a donor’s autonomy and violating public policy. An 
organ donation system that takes autonomy and public policy seriously should also consider 
introducing a statutory or regulatory offence, chargeable whenever the next of kin’s involvement 
has wrongfully prevented procurement. 
 
Limiting the next of kin’s role in any organ donation framework would be consistent with general 
constraints on actions with property. As was discussed in Chapter 3, property rights are very often 
constrained by legal rules. Applying this notion to organ donation, we see that our current donation 
framework constrains the individual from leaving binding donative instructions prior to their 
decease. A fairer organ donation model would balance the interest of the deceased with the public’s 
interest in increasing donations by shifting the default away from the next of kin. Certainly, next 
of kin are well-placed to make decisions on a deceased’s behalf, but the next of kin’s interests 
 
Donation” (2000) 8:2 Health Care Analysis 101 at 108-109. 
16 Re JS, [2016] EWHC 2859 (Fam). 
17 Ibid at 47. 
18 In cases where the deceased either lacked capacity or assigned the decision to next of kin, the substitute decision is 
a determination made by the person best suited to make a decision for the deceased, but not necessarily in 
accordance with what the deceased would have wanted. In these situations, whether the substitute-decision was 
consistent with the deceased’s wishes may be irrelevant since the deceased either lacked the requisite capacity to 
express intention or opted to defer the determination to next of kin. It is beyond the scope of this thesis whether 
substitute decision-makers in the organ donation context should be acting purely on what they believe the deceased 
would have wanted or if they have any interest of their own that may be expressed in their choice. In my view, a 
substitute-decision involves either or both of these components and how much of the decision should be rooted to 
one or the other varies with circumstance. 
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should only be considered when the deceased lacked capacity to make a decision before death or 
if the deceased assigned their decision to the next of kin.  
 
There are several arguments for why the wishes of relatives should continue to carry weight in the 
post-mortem donation process. For example, it has been said that eliminating the next of kin’s 
involvement in the process could turn public opinion against the transplant system.19 Moreover, it 
has been argued that respecting the next of kin’s wishes is consistent with respecting the deceased’s 
wishes because of the presumption “that a deceased would not want distress caused to his or her 
relatives.”20 Yet, it can also be said that the next of kin are probably just as interested in avoiding 
the distress of being asked to verify or provide donative consent on the deceased’s behalf. As one 
author suggests, the ideal mandated choice system would allow for registrants to select one of three 
options: “yes” or “no” to donation, or “defer to family wishes”.21 If the deferral is selected, “the 
individual should be required to state which designated person should have the authority to make 
the decision on that individual’s behalf.”22  
 
The option of deferring to a designated person need not be exclusive to the mandated choice model. 
As part of the opt-out registry, those who are not satisfied with the presumption of consent could 
just as easily select an option to defer the choice to a someone else. This would be analogous to 
wills and advance health care directives where executors or next of kin can be empowered with 
discretion. A good presumed consent model would largely release the next of kin from the 
emotional stress of making a post-mortem donative decision on the deceased’s behalf, except when 
the deceased has explicitly elected to assign the decision to a loved one. In this way, autonomy is 
respected and there is little-to-no room for disagreements from family.  
 
Interestingly, the 2010 Canadian Survey that was discussed in Chapter 4 also asked respondents 
(randomly selected Canadians) if the wishes of the deceased or the deceased’s family take 
precedence when the family does not consent to organ donation.23 Of those surveyed, 27% think 
the family’s wishes are followed and 70% think the deceased’s wishes are followed.24 In situations 
where donation wishes conflict, 88% of respondents feel the wishes of the deceased should take 
precedence.25  
 
These statistics suggest that a majority of Canadians could be unaware that donor cards and 
registration systems do not actually bind individual consent, and could also suggest that public 
opinion is not in favour of outright excluding next of kin from the donation process. This attitude 
would be consistent with the position of some transplant organizations that state the family plays 
an essential role in the transplant process by providing the medical background of the deceased in 
 
19 Jonathan Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, 6th ed (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 
469. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Cotter, supra note 1 at 616. 
22 Ibid at 616-617. 
23 Ipsos Reid, Canadian, “Views Toward Organ and Tissue Donation and Transplantation: Final report” (10 July 






situations where donative intent is unknown, or is known but not registered or recorded.26 In my 
view, an improved donation model would have information about the deceased’s donative intent 
readily available so as to avoid having to approach the family for this data. However, the enhanced 
model would also allow potential donors to select the option of deferring their consent to the family, 
or to a particular designated person if preferred. 
 
c) Donation Default Satisfies Public Policy 
The process for consenting to organ donations will always be imperfect, insofar as it is impossible 
for one single consent system (explicit/opt-in, presumed, or mandated choice) to satisfy everyone. 
I have argued that the property law lens helps to shed light on why the single most important goal 
of any organ donation framework should be to strike a balance between individual autonomy (that 
is, respecting dispositive intentions concerning our own bodies) and the public need for increased 
donations (that is, promoting use and mitigating waste of such valuable property).  
 
Legislatures should be asking themselves how they can strike the best balance between 
guaranteeing individual autonomy while also appealing to the public’s need for increased 
donations. The presumed consent philosophy adopted across various parts of Europe has proven to 
increase organ donation rates and holds the potential for further increases. With the proper opt-out 
options, this type of default framework could be the most considerate to concerns for autonomy 
and increasing donation. The presumption of consent recognizes the need for increased donations 




Recall that the 2010 Canadian survey referenced in Chapter 4 showed nearly 50% of respondents 
opposed presumed consent.27 What is it about a presumed consent model that makes it seem so 
radical? Quite possibly one sticking point is the belief that the default would function without a 
role for the next-of-kin. Indeed, any donation model without a role for the next-of-kin is unlikely 
to find warm reception in Canada or anywhere for that matter. Educational initiatives would be 
helpful in clarifying and educating people about the functional capabilities of a presumed consent 
model, and these initiatives could come in the form of commercials, posters, websites, information 
pamphlets, webinars, and so forth.  
 
Recall also that 84% of respondents from the 2019 Saskatchewan survey (also referenced in 
Chapter 4) said they somewhat agreed or strongly agreed that the province should implement a 
presumed consent system for organ donation.28 But is it economically feasible to implement and 
sustain a truly impactful presumed consent system? It is challenging to address the economic 
feasibility for such a framework given research gaps in this area. Costs that would be directly 
associated with a presumed consent system would be a user-friendly registry that provides the 
opportunity to opt out or defer the decision to next of kin and have that decision respected. More 
 
26 Herring, supra note 19 at 469. 
27 Ipsos Reid, Final Report, supra note 23 at 6 
28 University of Saskatchewan Social Sciences Research Laboratories, “Taking the Pulse Saskatchewan”, online 
<https://ssrl.usask.ca/taking-the-pulse.php>. See also Andrea Hill, “Taking the Pulse: 84 per cent of Sask. Residents 





generally, we observed in Chapter 4 that the success of any donation model is significantly 
influenced by the capacity of the transplant system.29 The trained surgeons and transplant centers 
necessary to support any effective donation model will not be without a hefty price tag, and as one 
author notes, the costs could be viewed as serious disincentives, even though research has found 
that transplantation is the most cost-effective treatment for end-stage liver or cardiac failure.30 
Academics note that it is not clear to what extent obvious and hidden costs associated with an 
improved donation program could burden the healthcare system.31 For example, there will be 
expenses associated with anesthetic and surgical times, as well increased numbers of ICU beds.32  
 
In addition to these obvious expenses, less obvious ones are the healthcare costs associated with 
treating and continuing to treat transplant recipients, as well as salary expenses for the support staff 
necessary to facilitate this default program. Researchers continue to urge “transplant organizations 
to routinely collect data on important organ donation indices (for example, consent type, 
procurement type, number of intensive care beds and trained surgeons) and make this publicly 
available to develop future research and policy recommendations.”33 To determine the true impact 
and feasibility of restructuring our donation framework to an opt-out/default model, the 
government should conduct a research audit on the most successful organ donation programs, to 
assesses their key components and determine a path for reform.34  
 
The cost or cost-savings of a successful transplant system will undoubtedly weigh on law reform 
decisions. Notwithstanding the economic impact of a robust transplant infrastructure, providing 
people with the best way to record binding consent is arguably a separate issue from whether a 
successful transplant system is economically feasible. A system that provides the best way to give 
consent may not be overly taxing on the healthcare budget. However, in a presumed consent system 
that takes the public need for increased donations seriously, i.e. where organ procurement is going 
to be guaranteed in all cases where competent adults die with the presumption of donating, and the 
deaths make transplanting medically feasible, then there is a possibility that the healthcare system 
will not be equipped to handle that influx of available deceased donors. For this reason, if such a 
system were to be seriously considered by politicians, a research audit with respect to costs would 
be necessary.  
 
Conclusion 
In this thesis I have argued that the property law lens illuminates sound reasoning for why such 
important reform is both principled and necessary to the organ donation system. In the previous 
chapter I argued that the default mechanism within the presumed consent system is ripe with 
potential for meaningful reform. Chapter 5 aimed to develop this point further by arguing that the 
presumed consent default mechanism and de-registration and deferral options are all key 
components to safeguard individual autonomy and balance it with the public’s interest in increased 
 
29 Lee Shepherd et al. “An international comparison of deceased and living organ donation/transplant rates in opt-in 
and opt-out systems: a panel study” (2014) 12:131 BMC Medicine 1 at 12. 
30 S. Cameron & J. Forsythe, “How can we improve organ donation rates? Research into the identification of factors 
which may influence the variation” (2001) 21:5 Nefrologia 68 at 68 and 73. 
31 Ibid at 73. For a more recent study from 2014 that made the same observation see Shepherd et al., supra note 29 at 
12. 
32 Cameron & Forsythe, supra note 30 at 73. 
33 Shepherd et al., supra note 29 at 12. 
34 Cameron & Forsythe, supra note 30 at 74. 
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donations. Such a system would facilitate choice and safeguard decisions, and at the same time 
ensure predictability as to how organs and tissue will be disposed of upon death. Ultimately, if we 
accept that organs and tissue are property, then a presumed consent system should be to post-









As we saw in Chapter 1, although the common law recognizes property rights in the human body 
in only narrow circumstances, we know that it continues to expand. Advancements in modern 
technology and health care make findings of property prudent for invoking new laws, legal rights, 
legal duties, and so forth. The legislatures, although slow to reform organ donation statutes, are at 
least awake to the organ donation problem across Canada and are aware of the increasing need to 
reform. Governments are looking for a solution. Saskatchewan’s recent 2015 reform, Alberta’s 
second reform within 20 years, and Nova Scotia’s move to a presumed consent model are all telling 
that this issue is alive and well – and unresolved. 
 
As was discussed in Chapter 2 and threaded throughout this thesis, the next of kin’s power to veto 
inter vivos decisions concerning post-mortem donation is a violation of donor autonomy. To date, 
neither the common law nor statutes explain how this veto should be interpreted and applied. 
Without such explanation and mechanisms for guaranteeing binding consent, the result is a system 
of organ donation that depends significantly on the altruism of surviving family members and 
ignores the public interest of increasing donations and the individual interest in having donor and 
non-donor autonomy secured. This is a problem. As was also discussed in Chapter 2, we do not 
allow such powers over testamentary property when it comes to probating a deceased’s will. 
Disposal rules are no less relaxed when a person dies intestate. We accept that governments enforce 
laws to oversee and ensure how our “other property” is disposed of after we die. Will and intestacy 
laws govern that. A similarly aimed organ donation system that protects our donative intentions 
from family veto and mitigates against waste is needed in the organ donation context.   
 
Chapter 3 explored definitions of property as described by Jeremy Waldron and Anthony Honoré 
and examined how their popular understandings can enhance arguments in favour of personal 
property ownership in organs and tissue. As we saw, limitations on the scope of ownership, such 
as prohibitions on sale, do not preclude something from being property. Much like other property 
ownership that is regulated by the law (such as prescription medications, vehicles, guns, etc.), body 
parts should also be viewed as a type of property requiring limitations on how they can be alienated 
from one owner to another. As further discussed in Chapter 3, our choices concerning where our 
post-mortem body parts go are not safeguarded by the same protections afforded to our choices 
concerning property. This is because property is largely understood to be an enforceable right to a 
particular thing, and an object that may be property is only truly property if law enforces or gives 
effect to ownership rights surrounding it. By exploring natural law and legal positivist theories, I 
argued that the enforceability of ownership rights in organs and tissue is not only consistent with 
popular definitions of property, but is also substantiated further by two ostensibly contrasting 
theoretical views of jurisprudence.  
 
As I aimed to illustrate in this thesis, if the donation shortage is to be taken seriously, law reform 
must respond to the problems generated by the continued and substantial loss of potential donors 
each year. Worthwhile law reform must recognize that the success of any donation system cannot 
hinge on substitute decision-making, and imbuing organs and tissue with principles of property can 
guide lawmakers to a better donation framework. Through the property law lens, we should see 
organs and tissue as personal property capable of first-person ownership. Property is the common 
thread that runs through the frameworks of organ donation, wills and intestacy. Each framework 
deals in property and has autonomy and the public interest at stake. Ultimately, property is the 
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subject of all post-mortem dispositions and the law is the driving force behind effective transfers 
of property. In the context of organ donation, post-mortem donative instruction should be viewed 
as sacrosanct (as I noted in Chapter 2), much like the testator’s instruction is viewed in the law of 
wills. In introducing this thesis, I suggested that organs and tissue are among the most valuable 
‘things’ in this world. The property law lens should encourage the view that organ donation 
frameworks can (and should) mitigate the waste of such precious property by facilitating donation 
more effectively and as much as possible.  
 
In Chapter 4, we explored whether mandated choice and presumed consent jurisdictions tap into 
the “potential donor pool” better than opt-in frameworks, and how individual autonomy and public 
policy fare under each system. In examining other countries, we observed that mandated choice 
had little to no effect on increasing donation rates because those jurisdictions (namely, Texas and 
Illinois) do not actually mandate people to make a choice regarding organ donation. In presumed 
consent countries, we observed that family continue to have a veto power in all opt-out countries. 
We also observed that the default mechanism of presumed consent is not solely responsible for 
increasing donation rates in presumed consent countries like Spain. Other factors contributing to 
higher donation rates included procurement training for medical practitioners, transplant 
coordination teams, donation campaigns, but especially how physicians approach requesting 
donations from families.  
 
We also observed that a presumed consent system stands to violate individual autonomy where 
deceased people want to opt out but are unable to do so, or where family maintains a veto power 
to ultimately decide if the deceased’s organs and tissue will be donated. Chapter 5 therefore posed 
suggestions for an improved presumed consent system that carefully qualifies the role of family, 
safeguards individual autonomy and balances those components with the public need for increased 
donations. Ultimately, donation levels are directly impacted by the way in which lawmakers frame 
legislative options for organ donation. Lawmakers should provide options that result in the highest 
level of donation. To do so, they must recognize that increasing donation rates does not need to be 
at the expense of individual autonomy.  
 
As stated earlier in this thesis, consent should be viewed as the protector of autonomy. As this 
thesis has aimed to show, presuming consent or mandating choice no further violate individual 
autonomy than our current opt-in framework. Quite the reverse, a system requiring someone who 
does not want to be a donor to opt out, and that removes the ability of family to decline donations, 
seems to more fully respect autonomy than a system which requires an intended donor to opt in 
and that requests the family to validate prior given consent. Lawmakers need to recognize that 
presuming consent, mandating that a choice be made, and offering de-registration and options to 
defer the decision to family or a designated individual to decide after death are achievable under 
one donation framework, and together these components can increase donation rates and safeguard 
individual autonomy.   
 
I noted it once before in this thesis and I will conclude on this point: it remains a surprise to me 
that the organ donation laws have yet to be litigated. If governments fail to meaningfully reform 
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